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ABSTRACT 
The general objective of this study was to examine the relationship between political 
influences and earnings quality. Specifically, this study examined the relationship 
between the ruling party politically connected firms and poor earnings quality. In 
addition, the study also compared the opposition party politically connected finns, when 
politically influenced firms substitute real earnings management for accrual earnings 
management in Pakistan. This study used the data of 129 firms listed on the Pakistan 
Stock Exchange over the period 2009-2013. The Panel Corrected Standard Error 
(PCSE) technique was employed to solve the heteroskedasticity issue. The results 
showed that politically influenced firms are reporting poor earnings quality. Contrary to 
previous studies, politically connected firms through opposition party(s) report poor 
earnings quality compared to ruling party(s) politically connected firms, when earnings 
quality is measured by the real earnings management attribute of earnings quality. 
However, there is no difference between the ruling party and the opposition party 
political connections on earnings quality, when earnings quality is measured by the 
accrual earnings management attributes of earnings quality. The study also found that 
politically influenced firms substitute real earnings management for accrual earnings 
management. Further, this study revealed that firms with stronger political connections 
are more involved in accrual earnings management activities and firms with weaker 
political connections are more inclined to use the real earnings management strategy. 
Accordingly, regulators must keep in mind political factors during regulatory reforms. 
This study provides detailed investigations and deep insight on the relationship between 
political influences and earnings quality. This study contributes to the field of earnings 
management where it integrates the agency theory with the political economy theory. 
Apart from that, this study contributes to practice where it provides deep insight to 
policy- makers who are interested in improving corporate governance in Pakistan. 
Keywords: political influences, earnings quality, earnings management, Pakistan. 
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ABSTRA.K 
Objektif am kajian ini adalah meneliti hubungan antara pengaruh politik dan kualiti 
pendapatan. Secara khususnya, kajian i.Jri meneliti hubungan antara finna yang 
mempunyai kaitan dengan parti politik pemerintah dan kualiti pendapatan yang lemah. 
Di samping itu, kaj ian ini juga membuat perbandingan antara firma yang mempunyai 
kaitan dengan politik dengan parti lawan di Pakistan. Jni apabila finna menggantikan 
pengurusan pendapatan pilihan dan apabila firma mengunakan pengurusan pendapatan 
akruan. Kajian ini menggunakan data daripada 129 buah firma yang disenaraikan dalam 
Bursa Saham Pakistan dari tahun 2009 hingga2013. Teknik Panel Corrected Standard 
Error (PCSE) digunakan untuk menyelesaikan masalah heteroscedasticity. Kajian 
mendapati firma yang mempunyai pengaruh politik melaporkan kualiti pendapatan yang 
lemah. Hal ini berbeza dengan kajian terdahulu iaitu firma yang mempunyai pengaruh 
politik daripada pihak la wan melaporkan kualiti pendapatan yang lemah apabila kualiti 
pendapatan diukur menggunakan pengurusan pendapatan sebenar sebagai atribut kualiti 
pendapatan. Waiau bagaimanapun, kajian juga mendapati tiada kesan perhubungan 
antara parti pemerintah dan parti lawan apabila kualiti pendapatan diukur menggunakan 
pengurusan pendapatan akruan sebagai atribut kualiti pendapatan. Kajian juga 
mendapati firma yang mempunyai pengaruh politik, melaporkan pengurusan 
pendapatan sebenar berbanding dengan pengurusan pendapatan akruan. Justeru6, kajian 
juga mendedah.kan bahawa firma yang mempunyai pengaruh politik yang kuat, 
melibatkan diri dengan aktiviti pengurusan pendapatan akruan dan firma yang 
mempunyai pengaruh politik yang lemah lebih cenderung kepada pengunaan strategi 
pengurusan pendapatan sebenar. Oleh itu, pihak berkuasa perlu mengambil perhatian 
akan hubungan politik apabila membuat reformasi terhadap penguatkuasaan. Secara 
keseluruhannya, kajian ini memberi penelitian yang terperinci dan mendalam akan 
perhubungan antara foma politik dan pengurusan pendapatan. Kajian ini menyumbang 
kepada pengurusan pendapatan apabila menghubungkaitkan teori agensi dengan teori 
ekonomi politik. Selain itu, kajian ini juga menyumbang kepada praktis apabila 
memberi maklumat yang mendalam kepada pembuat polisi yang berminat dalam 
menambah baik tataurus tadbir di Pakistan. 
Kata kunci: pengaruh politik, kualiti pendapatan, pengurusan pendapatan, Pakistan 
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The top management of an organization communicates firms' performance to its 
stakeholders through financial reports or annual reports, which allows the stakeholders 
to differentiate between good perfonning and poor performing firms . However, this can 
only be reliable guide when the firms are reporting their earnings in a credible or 
reliable way (Dechow and Schrand, 2004). The managers communicate about firm 
performance in financial reporting, and accounting standards allowed managers to use 
their judgments in reporting. This gives discretions to the managers to choose reporting 
technique that tmly reflects the economic transactions of business. However, the 
discretions may also give opportunities to managers to misuse it, and get involved in 
earnings management activities (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). 
Schipper ( 1989) defines earnings management ( earnings manipulation) activities as the 
purposeful intervention in financial reporting, with the intent of getting some private 
gain. There are also empirical evidences that highlight some factors that motivate finns 
to get involved in earnings management. For example, Dechow and Schrand (2004) 
highlight factors which encourage finns to get engaged in managing earnings; such as 
issuing shares at high prices, meeting analysts and investors' expectations and reducing 
cost of acquiring new capital etc. In addition, Healy and Wahlen (1999) have also 
discussed several methods adopted by the finns to managed earnings i.e. overstating 
1 
assets, revenues and profits, understating earnings per share, premature revenue 
recognition, aggressive capitalization, changing depreciation and amortization policies, 
undetreporting expenses and liabilities, fictitious revenue recognition and overstating 
cash flows. Previous studies show that earnings management activities decrease the 
earnings quality. 
Earnings quality is contextual and it means different things to different people. Prior 
studies exemplify that high earnings quality contain small amount of accruals (Sadiq 
and Othman, 2017; Bhattacharya, Daouk, and Welker, 2003), give a useful measure for 
assessing firms values (Dechow and Schrand, 2004 ), earning is predictable and 
persistent (Penman and Zhang, 2002). On the contrary, earnings quality problem arises 
when firms get involved in earnings management activities (Al-dhamari and Ismail, 
2015), and report less transparent earnings (Bhattacharya, Daouk, and Welker, 2003). 
The significance of high earnings quality bas long been recognized since still there are 
many firms that are involved in earnings management activities, and reporting poor 
earnings quality. For example, Toshiba and Valeant Phannaceutical was reported to be 
involved in activities like overstating earnings, postponing reporting losses, moving 
current year costs to later years, and inflating sales (Fortune, 2015). Other infamous 
earnings management scandals include Penn West Petroleum Ltd., Tesco, Satyam, Tyco 
international and HealthSouth. Penn West Petroleum Ltd moved millions of dollars 
from revenue expenditure to capital expenditure, which artificially reduced 20 percent 
of their operating expenses (Reuters, 2017). Tesco was found involved in earnings 
2 
management practices by reporting inflated profits (Telegragh, 2017). Satyam was 
involved in overstating its reported earnings, assets and also paying salaries to non-
existing staff for several years. WorldCom on the other hand used a simple method to 
capitalize more than $11 Billion of expenditures as assets rather than expenses. It was 
also involved in underreporting expenses and inflating revenues through fake 
accounting entries. A Switzerland based company named as Tyco international was 
found involved in inflating income by its CEO and CFO. In Australia, HealthSouth was 
caught by Security exchange commission which was found inflating $1.4Billion 
earnings to meet its shareholders expectations. 
Pakistan is not excluded in respect of earnings quality; scandals have engrossed finns 
such as Tandlianwala Sugar Mills, Chenab Limited, Callmate Ltd, NICL and OGRA are 
all linked to earnings quality issues (Dawn, 2015; Tribune, 2014; SECP, 2010; Dawn, 
2008). The earnings quality gets worse when finns are politically influenced (Sadiq and 
Othman, 2017; Al-d.hamari and Ismail, 2015). A firm is considered as politically 
influenced in presence of politician(s) or close relative(s) of a politician(s) in a board or 
senior management; a firm is significantly owned by the government; and in presence of 
civil/military bureaucrat(s) in a board. 
Security Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) reported that a politically 
influenced firm named Chenab Limited was involved in manipulating share prices or 
artificially increasing share prices (SECP, 2010). On the other hand, Dawn newspaper 
reports that National Accountability Bureau (NAB) of Pakistan has started investigating 
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against a politically connected firm named Tandlianwala Sugar Mills (Dawn, 2015). 
NAB accused Tandlianwala Sugar Mills for involving in suspicious transactions. 
Similarly, CallMate was found involved in fraudulent practices such as reporting 
fictitious revenue or manipulated revenue (Dawn, 2008). 
1n addition, a politically influenced firm named National Insurance Company Limited 
(NICL) was involved in buying properties more than the market value by giving 
benefits to politically connected people (Dawn, 2015). Further, the former Chairman 
and Directors of Oil and Gas Regulatory (OGRA) were engaged in manipulating 
earnings and share prices of Sui Northern Gas Pipeline (SNGPL) and Sui Southern Gas 
Company (SSGC) (Tribune, 2014). The Express tribune also reported that former Prime 
Minister Yousuf Raza Gillani and minister Raja Pervaiz Ashraf were also summoned 
for illegally appointing the chairman of OGRA. All these facts show that there is a 
strong nexus between politics and businesses in Pakistan. 
Realizing the seriousness of earnings quality issues, regulatory bodies from many 
developed and developing countries realized and revamped the laws related to 
accounting practices. For example, the implementation of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 
2002 was one immediate response to earnings quality soon after Enron scam. Some 
authors opine that accrual based earnings management (AEM) was reduced 
substantially after the implementation of SOX (Braam, Nandy, Weitzel, and Lodh, 
2015; Cohen, Dey, and Lys, 2008), indicating the success of the revamping of the rules 
and regulations related to earnings management. 
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Prior studies have determined factors that influence the quality of earnings such as 
ownership and capital structure (Ben-Nasr, Boubakri and Cosset, 2015; Soderstrom and 
Sun, 2007), accounting methods (Altamuro, Beatty, and Weber, 2005), corporate 
governance (Zhao, Chen, Zhang and Davis, 2012; Lin and Hwang, 2010; Cohen, 
Krishnamoorthy, and Wright, 2004), corporate social responsibility (Kim, Park, and 
Wier, 2012), audit quality (Lin and Hwang, 2010; Prawitt, Smith, and Wood, 2009). 
Significantly, some authors opine that corporate political influences are a global 
phenomenon and it creates complex economic consequences (Bleibtreu and 
Konigsgruber, 2015). 
Previous studies even documented that earnings quality gets worse when firms are 
politically influenced (Chi, Liao, and Chen, 2016; Liu, Li, Zeng, and An, 20 l 6; Al-
dhamari and Ismail, 2015; Liu, Saidi and Bazaz, 2014; Narayanaswamy, 2013; Chaney, 
Faccio, and Parsley, 2011 ). Ironically, in recent years political influences have become 
a common phenomenon (Saeed, Belghitar, and Clark, 2015), which is evident in the 
study of Zang (20 I I), who disclosed that 54.5 percent of the firms in their sample had 
politically influenced senior management in 2007 compared to 31.5 percent in 1990. 
Such trend is also noted in developing countries where political connections are 
valuable for firms operating in economies where institutions are weak and politicians 
have no fear of accountability. 
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Fisman (2001) shows how finns that have close connections with politically connected 
people get favors. He cites the example that before the news of Indonesian President 
Suharto's bad health was publicly released, firms linked with President Suharto's family 
had already known about it while other viewed it as spread of rumors. Roberts (1990) 
finds out that in 1983 finns that contributed in elections campaign of Senator Henry 
Scoop Jackson, unexpectedly find their stock returns dropping after his sudden death. 
At the same time, firms connected to Senator Sam witnessed unexpected increase in 
stock returns who was the successor of Senator Henry. 
Moreover, it is also noticed that in developing economies politically influenced finns 
get favored bank loans at a lower interest rate and higher debt ratio. This view is 
supported by a number of empirical evidences. For instance, Charumilind (2006) find 
that political influences are an important determinant in Thailand to get a long-term 
financial leverage. Similarly, K.hwaja and Mi.an (2005) reveal that politically influenced 
firms are determined by a lower interest rate and higher debt equity ratio. Some 
researchers argue that political connection negatively affects earnings quality (for 
example, Al-dhamari and Ismail, 2015; Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley, 2011 ), while other 
researchers opine that politically influenced firms have additional power beyond 
country specific, regulatory and firm-specific ownership characteristics (e.g. Faccio, 
Masulis, and McConnell , 2006). 
There is also empirical evidence proving that political influences are more common in 
countries with high corruption and less common in countries where strict regulations are 
6 
practiced and there exists political conflicts of interest (Faccio, 2006). Pakistan for 
instance, labeled as one of the most corrupted countries in Asia, is associated with 
corruption, power abuse and bribery (Saeed, Belghitar, and Clark, 2015). As a matter of 
fact, the Index of Economic Freedom has named Pakistan as amongst the top corrupt 
countries of the world (Saeed, Belghitar, and Clark, 20 15). As evidence, during the last 
25 years three elected prime ministers have been removed and four elected parliaments 
have been dissolved on charges of corruption and political abuse of power. Since the 
independence of Pakistan, business and politics in Pakistan have a very close 
association (Rehman, 2006). The firs t Chief Minister of Sindh province named Yousuf 
Haroon was one of the leading industrialists, and people like Naseer Shiekh and Rafiq 
Saigol were the founding owners of Saigol Group, and Ahmad Dawood (owner of 
Dawood group) held main positions in the governments (Rehman, 2006). In the general 
elections held in 2002, 2008 and 20 I 3, the political parties that participated were mainly 
led by politicians representing some of the country's top industrialists (Cheema, Munir, 
and Su, 2016; Saeed, Belghitar, and Clark, 2015). 
In these elections, a large number of Parliament members belonged to families that 
owned large business firms and groups, such as the Ittefaq Group of Nawaz Sharif 
family, current prime minister of Pakistan while chief minister of Puajab too belongs to 
this family. Besides, there are business groups such as Saif Group of current Senator 
Usman Saifullah, Salim Saifullah Kllan, and Anwar Saifullah Khan, former Provincial 
and Federal Ministers; JWD group of Jahangir Khan Tareen, former Federal Minister 
and current member of National Assembly; Service Industries of Ahmad Mukhtar, 
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fo1mer Defense Minister, Mirza Sugar Mills of Zulfiqar Mirza, former Interior Minister 
of Sindh Province; Masood Textile Ltd of Shahid Nazir, member of the National 
Assembly during 2002-2007 and Tandlianwala Sugar Mills Ltd of Haroon Akhtar Khan 
and Humayun AkJ1tar Khan, former Ministers, and Media times and Worldcall of 
Salman Taseer, former Governor of Punjab (Saeed, Belghitar, and Clark, 2015). In a 
country where businessmen are significantly involved in politics and politicians have 
their own business interests, it is difficult to separate business interests from the 
interests of the state. Traditionally, it is understood that politically influenced firms 
misuse resources on a large scale through the abuse of their political influences and 
state power. 
Reviewing the previous literature notably, there is a clear evidence which indicates the 
relationship between political influences and earnings quality (e.g., Sadiq and Othman, 
2017; Chi, Liao, and Chen, 20 l 6; Al-dhamari, and Ismail, 20 15; Liu, Saidi, and Bazaz, 
2014; Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley, 20 11 ). Some authors argue that politically 
influenced firms are more involved in manipulating earnings, and reporting poor 
earnings quality. For example, Sadiq and Othman (2017); Al-dhamari and Ismail (2015) 
find that politically influenced firms have lower accruals quality; they are more engaged 
in earnings smoothing (Liu, Saidi, and Bazaz, 2014), and reporting less transparent 
earnings (Riahi-Balkaoui, 2004). Other researchers opine that politically influenced 
firms are involved in income-decreasing earnings management activities in order to 
report less taxable income (Li, Selover, and Stein, 2011; Ramanna and Roychowdhury, 
2010), and hiding political gains which they obtain through dubious legality (Sadiq and 
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Othman, 2017; Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley, 2011 ). However, to the best of knowledge, 
none of the study has investigated political influences and earnings quality using three 
aspects of political influences and three attributes of earnings quality, which includes 
both accruals and real earnings management attributes of earnings quality. This is 
because; including only one attribute i.e. accruals or real earnings management 
underestimates earnings management activities of a firm. Therefore, this study adopted 
both accruals earnings management and real earnings management attributes in order to 
estimate and capture all earnings management activities of a firm, and thus gives more 
insight on the relationship between political influences and earnings quality. 
Pakistan has numerous unique characteristics of politically influenced finns , which 
provided the opportunity to examine the impact of political influences on earnings 
quality in Pakistan. First, prior studies have used political influenced firm in a limited 
sense, where firm is assumed to be a politically influenced if it is affiliated with a single 
powerful politician (i.e. Dr. Mahathir and Dr. Anwar Ibrahim in Malaysia and Suharto 
in Indonesia). Unlike in Pakistan, there is a high presence of politicians and their close 
relatives in fmns. In fact, political system of Pakistan is controlled by influential 
families and business conglomerate (Saeed, Belghitar, and Clark, 2015), which is 
unlikely witnessed in previous studies . Secondly, congruent with the study of Cheema, 
Munir, and Su (2016), this study contributes to the agency theory and political 
economic theory by including another aspect of political influences (i.e. the presence of 
civil/mi litary bureaucrats in a firm). This is because; Pakistan has directly been ruled by 
civil/military bureaucrats for couple of decades, which make these bureaucrats equally 
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influential as politicians. Thirdly, politically influenced firms of Pakistan provide a 
distinctive characteristic of data by offering almost equal nwnber of ruling and 
opposition party of politically connected firms. This is because, ruling party(s) has 
generally faced a strong opposition party(s) in Pakistan which provides the opportunity 
to investigate whether political connected ruling party firm report earnings quality 
poorer than a political connected opposition party firm. Fourthly, there is a strong nexus 
between politics and business in Pakistan, and numerous scandalous politically 
influenced firn1s are named of manipulating eamings as mentioned earlier. However, 
limited empirical evidence is available on the issue. Therefore, this study is motivated to 
give more insight on the relationship between political influences and earnings quality, 
and thus quantitatively investigated the impact of political influences on earnings 
quality in Pakistan. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
It has been observed that earnings quality is high when earnings numbers truly reflect 
firm's current performance (Dechow and Schrand, 2004); they are free from earnings 
management (Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley, 2011; Barth, Landsman and Lang, 2008), 
and contain high transparency (Sadiq and Othman, 2017; Bhattacharya, Daouk, and 
Welker, 2003). Consequently, financial statement users can make a well informed 
decision when firms are reporting high earnings quality, which reflects true and fair 
value of the firm (Dechow and Schrand, 2004). The above scenario is not met when 
firms' managers are engaged in earnings management to achieve desirable results but 
end up with lower earnings quality. 
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Managers often involve in earnings management to hide and cover the real performance 
of a firm (Braam, Nandy, Weitzel, and Lodh, 2015; Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley, 2011; 
Teoh, Welch, and Wong, 1998). Consequently, the occurrence of earnings management 
deteriorates the reliability of earnings numbers, which results in unpredictable, non-
sustainable, and less transparent earnings. 
The above scenario gets worse when firm is politically influenced, creating agency 
problem and revealing that politically influenced finns are more involved in earnings 
management activities and reporting poor earnings quality (Sadiq and Othman, 2017; 
Chi, Liao, and Chen, 2016; Braam, Nandy, Weitzel, and Lodh, 2015; Chaney, Faccio, 
and Parsley, 2011 ). This is because politically influenced finns are involved in tax-
induced earnings management activities (Li, Selover, and Stein, 2011 ), obtaining 
political benefits through dubious legality (Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley, 2011 ), and 
then cover those political benefits by getting involved in income-decreasing earnings 
management activities (Ramanna and Roychowdhury, 20 I 0), and thus report poor 
earnings quality. 
Pakistan is not an exception in respect of political influences and earnings quality; there 
is a nexus reported between politics and business; there are scandalous firms and 
companies as mentioned above that direct and monitor most of the political and 
business fortunes of the country. 
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Due to seriousness of the issue and consequent to its impact on shareholders, 
researchers have suggested studies to be conducted to examine the impact of political 
influences on earnings quality. For instance, Sadiq and Othman, 2017; Chi, Liao, and 
Chen, 2016; Al-dhamari and Ismail (2015) suggest that political influences and earnings 
quality need to be investigated in more detail using different aspects of both variables. 
Although there are studies that have investigated the correlation between politically 
influenced firms and earnings quality, very little focus was given to investigate the 
relationship between politically influenced firms and earnings quality in comparison to 
non-politically influenced finns using multiple aspects of political influences and 
multiple attributes of earnings quality. 
Given the importance of the issue, seriousness of the consequences and impact of the 
issue to many stakeholders, this study will use three aspects or types of political 
influences simultaneously to investigate political influences and earnings quality: first, 
presence of politician(s) or close relative(s) of a politiciao(s) in board of directors or 
senior management; second, significant government shareholding in a firm; third, 
presence of fo1mer/current civil/military bureaucrat(s) in board of directors or senior 
management) and three attributes of earnings quality (i.e. Real earnings management, 
accruals earnings management, and earnings aggressiveness). The regulatory bodies and 
conflict of interest laws are weak in Pakistan, which allow powerful politicians and their 
close relatives, and civil/military bureaucrats to manipulate things and obtain private 
gains (Cheema, Munir, and Su, 20 16). 
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As mentioned, the impact and consequences of the issue is tremendous. Political 
influences are considered to be an important detenninant of the Asian economies 
(Harymawan and Nowland, 2016; Chi, Liao, and Chen, 2016; Gul, 2006; Fisman, 
2001), and particularly in Pakistan (Sadiq and Othman, 2017; Cheema, Munir, and Su, 
20 16; Saeed, Belghitar, and Clark, 2015; Khwaja and Mian, 2005). Considering the 
issue, current study provides a detailed investigation regarding the relationship between 
political influences and earnings quality in Pakistan, because Pakistani finns provide 
diversity in the data of politically influenced firms. In Pakistan, there is a high presence 
of civil/military bureaucrats, politicians from ruling/opposition parties and their closed 
relatives in finns, which offers useful variation in terms of the type of political 
influences that is used to examine the phenomenon. The study used politically 
influenced and similar non-politically influenced listed firms in Pakistan Stock 
Exchange (PSE) in order to get a clear picture of earnings quality in each of the finns, 
and to quantitatively investigate in detail the effects of political influences on earnings 
quality. 
1 .3 Research Questions 
Based on the above research problem, which is to provide a detailed investigation 
regarding the relationship between political influences and earnings quality in Pakistan. 
This study addressed a few fundamental questions: 
1) Is there a negative relationship between political influences and earnings 
quality? 
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2) Does a politically connected ruling party firm report earnings quality poorer than 
a politically connected opposition party firm? 
3) Do politically influenced finns substitute between earnings management 
strategies? 
1.4 Research Objectives 
This study used politically influenced listed companies of Pakistan in order to get a 
clear picture of earnings quality in each of the firm, and to quantitatively investigate the 
effects of political influences on earnings quality. To achieve this, the study has general 
and specific objectives. Following are the objectives of the research: 
1) To examine whether there is a negative relationship between political influences 
and earnings quality; to judge whether politically influenced firms report poorer 
earnings quality as compared to non-politically influenced firms. 
2) To examine whether politically connected ruling party firms are reporting poor 
earnings quality compared to politically connected opposition party firms. 
3) To investigate whether politically influenced finns substitute real earnings 
management for accruals earnings management. 
14 
1.5 Significance 
The impact of political influence on earnings quality remains an area of interest to 
policy makers, accounting practitioners, auditors, and academic researchers. Though, 
there are a number of studies that have investigated the impact of political influence on 
earnings quality, recent studies such as Chi, Liao, and Chen (2016); Al-dhamari and 
Ismail (2015); Zeng, Li, and Hong (2012) have recommended that political influences 
and earnings quality need to be investigated in more detail and critically. Hence, this 
study provides a useful contribution to the existing literature as it has examined the 
relationship between political influence and earnings quality using multiple aspects and 
attributes of both variables. 
First, this study contributes to agency theory by using political aspects of agency theory. 
Agency theory explains the basis of conflict that can occur between the agent 
(managers) and principal (shareholders). The conflict between the agents and principals 
occur when the act of agents do not meet the interests of the principals and thus create 
agency conflict. Previous studies show that the presence of politically influenced people 
in a finn creates agency conflict. However, prior studies argue on agency theory by 
using only one aspect of political influences i.e. the presence of politicians or close 
relatives of politicians in a firm. While current study contributes to agency theory by 
adding two more aspects of political influences (i.e. the presence of civil/military 
bureaucrats in a finn and a finn significantly owned by government). In addition, our 
findings contribute to the political economy theory, which argue that a powerful 
individual (through any aspect of political influences) maintain their self interest 
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(through targeted information disclosures) to the detriment of those individuals without 
power (Deegan, 2006). 
Secondly, most of the previous studies have used data from multiple countries, while 
current study used only Pakistani firms' data, which overcomes some criticisms of 
multiple-countries data. Pakistan is famous for its doubtful relationship between politics 
and businesses (Saeed, Belghitar, and Clark, 2015; Khwaja and Mian, 2005). Over the 
last 25 years, three elected governments were dissolved on allegations of corruption and 
political abuse of power (Cheema, Munir, and Su, 2016). Due to the fact of the weak 
government institutions and regulatory bodies, the Pakistani business environment looks 
particularly weak to political influences (Khwaja and Mian, 2005). Pakistan has many 
politically influenced listed firms; however, there are no restrictions to such political 
influences (Saeed, Belghitar, and Clark, 2015). Such features of the Pakistani economy 
provided an interesting platform to examine the effect of political influences on finns ' 
earnings quality. Therefore, this study suggests policy makers and regulators of 
Pakistan m particular and of other developing economies m general with similar 
socioeconomic conditions and comparable regulatory mechanism, in order to improve 
the quality of earnings in politically influenced firms. 
Further, this study contributes and extends previous literature in several ways, by 
selecting Pakistani firms' data. Pakistan lies in the developing economies, which 
provides diversity in the politically influenced firm's data. Prior studies have used 
political influenced finn in a limited sense, where firm is assumed to be a politically 
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influenced if it is affiliated with a single powerful politician (i.e. Dr. Mahathir and Dr. 
Anwar Ibrahim in Malaysia and Suharto in Indonesia). Unlike in Pakistan, there is a 
high presence of politicians and their closed relatives in firms. In fact, political system 
of Pakistan is controlled by influential families and business conglomerate (Cheema, 
Munir, and Su, 2016; Saeed, Belghitar, and Clark, 2015). Moreover, a political 
influence varies with the political strength, which provides useful variation in terms of 
the type of political influences that is used to examine the phenomenon. In addition, this 
study contributes to the existing literah.lre of political influences by including 
civil/military bureaucrats as another aspect of political influences. This is because; 
Pakistan has directly been ruled by military and bureaucrats for several years, which 
make these bureaucrats equally influential as politicians (Cheema, Munir, and Su, 
2016). In addition to civil/military bureaucrats, current study enrich the existing 
literature of political influences by including significant government owned firm as 
another aspect of politically influenced firm, because government will place their 
representatives on board and management to protect government's political interest and 
concurrently government also act as a shareholder. 
Thirdly, this study examined the relationship between political influences and earnings 
quality using three aspects of political influences and three attributes of earnings 
quality. In addition, this study also investigated the difference in effect between 
ruling/opposition party political connections and direct/indirect political connections on 
earnings quality. Further, it empirically examines whether politically influenced firms 
substitute between earnings management strategies, which shall also be a 
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methodological contribution to this domain. Therefore, this study provides more insight 
and detail investigation on the relationship between political influences and earnings 
quality, by testing almost all possible aspects of political influences (in Pakistani 
context) and earnings quality (using both accruals and real earnings management 
attributes of earnings quality). 
Fourth, the current study expands the literature by showing that politically connected 
firms related to opposition party are reporting poor quality of earnings compared to 
political connections related to ruling party, because connected finns related to 
opposition party are more involved in real earnings management. Notably, these 
findings are one of the main contributions of the current study to the body of literature 
of political influences and earnings quality. While previous studies have suggested that 
the politically connected firms related to ruling party are more involved in accruals 
earnings management (Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley, 20 l 1 ). The current study findings 
are contrary to the findings of Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley (2011). This is because; 
Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley (2011) only employed accruals attributes of earnings 
quality in their study. However, this study has employed both accruals and real earnings 
management attributes of earnings quality. 
After the implementation of Sarbanes•Oxley Act (SOX), firms shift their manipulation 
activities from accruals earnings management strategy to real earnings management 
strategy (Kothari, Mizik, and Roychowdhury, 201 2; Cohen and Zarowin, 20 IO; Cohen, 
Dey, and Lys, 2008), particularly in politically influenced firms (Chi, Liao, and Chen, 
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2016; Braam, Nandy, Weitzel, and Lodh, 2015), because real earnings management 
activities are not easily detectable (Zang, 2011; Roychowdhury, 2006; Gunny, 2005). 
These shifts of earnings management strategies were noticed in developed economies, 
where institutions and regulatory bodies are strong. However, the current study expands 
literature by showing that politically influenced firms manipulate earnings through both 
accruals and real earnings management measures in a less developed country (i.e. 
Pakistan), where regulatory bodies are weak. 
Fifth, this study extends literature by showing that the presence of politically influenced 
people in a firm creates agency problem, which resulted in reporting lower earnings 
quality. Hence, to reduce the impact of agency problem, strong regulatory bodies and 
enlightened shareholders are needed. The results of the cun-ent study will enable 
shareholders to evaluate the negative effects of political influences on reporting 
earnings quality. Further, other stakeholders can also use the findings of the current 
study to identify which factors should be taken into consideration when evaluating a 
finns ' earnings quality, and thus corporate political influences should be taken into 
consideration in the valuation process. The findings of the current study contributed to 
in setting up the foundation of agency theory that explains the relationship between 
political influences and earnings quality in Pakistan and worldwide. Thus, the agency 
cost in political influences and earnings quality literature could extend to other 
developing and under-developing economies in the future. 
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1.6 Scope of the Study 
The scope of this study is politically influenced listed firms in Pakistan. There are many 
reasons for select ing Pakistan data in this research. First, Pakistan 's business and 
economy is very much influenced by politicians (Cheema, Munir, and Su, 2016; 
Khwaja and Mian, 2005). Politically influenced firms offer a suitable condition to 
examine the quality of earnings in this environment. Second, the political and business 
culture in Paki~tan is unique in nature. Finally, focusing on one country will overcome 
some of the constraints of cross-country studies, such as possible difficulties in data 
collection, analysis and interpretation that arise as a result of differences in-cultural and 
legal system and like. 
The study covers the seven-year period from 2008-2014. This period includes one 
lagged year and one lead year data, because the accruals quality models and real 
earnings management models adopted in the current study required one lagged year and 
one lead year data. Data were collected from the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) and 
annual reports of 129 listed firms. Annual reports used for the study were retrieved from 
the website of firms. The analyses of this study focus on political influences and 
earnings quality, whicb cover one tenure of the elected government between 2009 and 
2013. 
I. 7 Organization of the Study 
The content of this research is divided into six chapters. First chapter highlights the 
various important contents that are relevant to this study. Specifically, this chapter sheds 
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a light on the background of the study, which includes discussing earnings quality and 
its related scandals in the world and particularly in Pakistan. It also includes political 
influences and its impact on earnings quality. This chapter also explains the problem 
statement; it reports research questions and research objectives of the study; justifies 
significance of the study and discusses scope of the study. 
The next chapter investigates the results of previous studies that are related to earnings 
quality and political influences. It consists of two main sections namely; earnings 
quality definitions and its measurements and political influences, and its impact on 
earnings quality. Chapter three explains methodology of the study. In addition, it also 
discusses underpinning theory i.e. agency theory and a theoretical framework; it 
discusses the hypotheses developed for this study followed by justification of variables, 
models specification, sampling and methods of data collection and finally methods of 
analysis. 
Chapter Four discusses descriptive statistics, diagnostic tests, reporting of main results 
followed by sensitivity analysis. Chapter Five covers discussion of the results. The last 
chapter; Chapter Six, concludes the study by presenting contributions of the study, 




2.1 Earnings Quality Definitions 
Earnings quality is contextual and it means different things to different earnings 
information users (Dechow and Schrand, 2004 ). For example, standard setters or 
regulators view earnings to be of high quality when it is in accordance with Accounting 
Standards. In contrast, when earnings are easily convertible into cash then it is viewed 
as high quality from creditors' perspective. Researchers have considered earnings 
quality in different ways (Kamarudin and Ismail, 2014 ). For example, Abdelghany 
(2005); Schipper and Vincent (2003) define earnings quality from the decision 
usefulness concept. The decision usefulness is the only vital attribute of high earnings 
quality, because it is empirically good and captures the intent of standard setters 
(Schipper and Vincent, 2003). 
Dechow and Schrand (2004) describe earnings quality wider than decision useful 
concept, having three categories: first high earnings quality reflect finns ' current 
performance; second, high earnings quality should be a good indicator of future 
operating perfonnance; and last, it is a useful measure for assessing firm value. In short, 
high earnings quality accurately annuitizes the real value of the firm. Similarly, 
Dechow, Ge, and Schrand (2010) in their study define earnings to be of higher quality 
when it gives more information about future operating perfonnance of a firm. Similarly, 
some researchers found persistence earnings as important measure of earnings quality. 
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For instance, Comiskey and Mulford (2000) define high earnings quality as the ability 
to generate sustainable earnings while Penman and Zhang (2002) classify sustainable 
future earnings as high quality. It is argued that earnings which are closer to cash flow 
and contain comparatively small amount of accruals, are considered to be of higher 
quality (Visvanathan, 2006). 
It is argued that earnings which timely recognize losses are considered to be of higher 
quality of earnings (Basu, 1997). Some researchers such as Ashbaugh, Collins, and 
Lafond (2006) explain high earnings quality when earnings include timeliness and 
value relevance. Earnings quality problem arises when film 's earnings lack 
transparency and include unusual items (Bhattacharya, Daouk, and Welker, 2003). 
In addition, Barth, Landsman and Lang (2008) in their study state that earnings which 
involve less earnings management, timely recognizes losses and thus earnings is 
considered to be of high value relevance. Similarly, Guay, Kothari, and Watts (1996) 
argue that managerial opportunism decreases earnings quality and information 
accuracy. In contrast, Dechow and Schrand (2004) state that some finns will have low 
earnings quality because of the nature of their business, even without earnings 
manipulation. This will include firms working in unstable environments as well as high-
growth firms. Consequently, both types of firms due to their nature of business and 
opportunistic management can find their earnings quality affected. In this regard, some 
authors opine that earnings information consists of errors made by the accounting 
system and fundamental earnings process (e.g., Dechow, Ge, and Schrand, 2010). 
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Similarly, Francis and Ke (2006) reveal that earnings quality issue arises from both 
business environment, and financial reporting processes, such as governance activities, 
reporting standards and managerial judgment. 
In addition, the conceptual Framework of Financial Accounting Standard Board 
(FASB) gives a general guideline for high earnings quality (Schipper and Vincent, 
2003). The main purpose of published accounts or financial reporting is decision 
usefulness, and thus financial statements which are useful for decision making are 
considered as high quality (Dechow and Schrand, 2004). Two characteristics behind the 
financial reporting purpose are representational faithfulness and relevance. Schipper and 
Vincent (2003) stated that the information is faithfully represented if it is free from 
error, complete and relevant, and it is said to be relevance if it has predictive or 
confirmatory value. 
2.2 Measurements of Earnings Quality 
As discuss above, earnings quality is a multifaceted concept and its measurement is also 
multifaceted. The current study measures earnings quality through multiple 
measurements such as accruals earnings management, real earnings management, 
earnings smoothing, and earnings aggressiveness. Generally, high earnings quality has a 
high level of persistency, less volatility and total accruals, have lower level of accruals 
and real earnings management. The following subsections discuss each of the 
measurement in detail. 
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2.2.1 Earnings Management 
Earnings management is the process of getting desirable earnings through 
manipulations, within the limitations of generally accepted accounting practice 
(Davidson, Stickney and Weil, 1985). Similarly, Healy and Wahlen (1999) define 
earnings management as "intervention in the financial reporting process, with the 
intention to get some personal or private gain". Managers have the discretions to 
transfer current income to future periods without the violation of general accepted 
accounting principles (Dechow and Schrand, 2004), and accounting standards give 
discretions to managers in preparing financial reports (Kamarudin and Ismail, 2014). 
Prior research provides evidence that earnings management exists due to the main 
functions and roles played by financial reporting. For instance, Bauwhede (2001) claims 
that some managers' get involved in earnings management activities due to their need 
for external financing, board quality, audit quality and taxes. Healy and Wahlen (1999) 
state that firms manage earnings to affect stock prices. Prior to seasoned equity 
offerings (SEO) firms manage earnings to increase share prices (Dechow and Schrand, 
2004). The study also reveals that earnings management mainly occurs after an 
increasing performance and period of high economic growth in booming economies. 
Whereas, Burgstahler and Dichev ( 1997) state that management manage earnings to 
meet benchmark. Similarly, Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1999) reveal that at some 
places a few finns involve in earnings management to improve their financial image by 
trying to meet the expectation of investors and achieve profit forecast of the analyst. 
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High earnings quality exists in the absence of earnings management since unmanaged 
earnings are of higher quality compared to managed earnings (Dechow and Schrand, 
2004). Levitt (1998) argues that earnings quality decreases when firm's management is 
involved more in earnings management. 
Melumad and Nissim (2008) also state that earnings management does not necessarily 
mean fraud. Fraud though is a severe case of earnings management, whereas Levitt 
(1998) states that earnings management is found to be in the middle of legitimate 
accounting and absolute fraud. Badertscher (2011) on the other hand, divides earnings 
management in three categories: first, earnings management that violates accounting 
principles; second earnings management in the middle of legitimate accounting and 
violating GAAP, and third, earnings management within the requirement ofGAAP. 
Badertscher (2011) too states in his study that firms have two ways to manage earnings. 
First, firms manage earnings through accruals to get the desired level of earnings. This 
method is known as accruals earnings management (AEM). Second, firms manage 
earnings through changes in real business transactions, such as decreasing prices to 
increase sales, reducing discretionary expenses to increase current earnings, and 
overproducing goods (inventory) to reduce costs of goods sold. Managing earnings 
through real business transaction is known as real earnings management 
(Roychowdhury, 2006). 
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Zang (2011) opines that firms choose earnings management strategy based on its 
relative cost. It means that real earnings management (REM) is more useful compared 
to accruals earnings management (AEM) if the cost of using AEM relative to REM is 
higher and vice versa. The cost of manipulating earnings depends on the limitations that 
are applicable on using AEM and REM. 
Cohen, Dey, and Lys (2008) also show that after the implementation of Sarbanes Oxley 
Act (SOX), the level of real earnings manipulation has increased, while accruals based 
earnings manipulation has decreased. In contrast, throughout seasoned equity offering 
(SEO) firms use both earnings management strategies (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). The 
study further reveals that the SEO firms' inclination to use real earnings management 
activities is positively related to the costs of accruals earnings management in these 
firms. 
Furthermore, Fields (2001) states that examining only one earnings management proxy 
at a time underestimates earnings management activities in a firm. Particularly, if 
managers employ both earnings management strategies as substitutes for each o ther, 
then examining onJy one strategy in isolation underestimates earnings management 
activities. Similarly, Braam, Nandy, Weitzel, and Lodh (2015) state that taking only 
accrual-based measure underestimates the earnings management activities. Therefore, 
this research is motivated to use both accruals and real earnings management as a 
measure of earnings quality. 
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2.2.1.1 Real Earnings Management 
Firms manage their earnings to obtain the desired level of earnings, and managing 
earnings through real business activities is known as real earnings management 
(Roychowdhury, 2006). The Roychowdhury defines real earnings management as 
"deviation from normal business practices, which is motivated by managers' desire to 
mislead some stakeholders into believing that certain financial objectives have been met 
in the normal course of operations". These deviations enable managers to meet financial 
reporting goals, even though they do not contribute to fim1 's economic value. Certain 
real earnings management practices, such as price discounts, overproduction of goods 
and reduction of discretionary expenditures are probably favorable measures in certain 
economic situations. However, managers are involved in real earnings management, if 
they are engaged more extensively in these activities with the objective of 
beating/meeting an earnings target, (Roychowdhury, 2006). 
Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) find in their sw-vey that managers are willing to 
manage real earnings to meet earnings targets such as analyst forecasts, zero earnings 
and previous periods ' earnings, although real earnings management potentially reduces 
firm value. Real earnings management adversely affects finns' value because real 
operating measures taken in the current period to increase earnings can have an adverse 
effect on future periods' cash flows. For instance, to meet short-term earnings target 
finns offer price discounts to increase sales volumes which can lead customers to expect 
such discounts in future periods as well. In other words, it means lower profit margins 
on future sales. 
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Despite the costs linked to real earnings management (REM) and also because it 
imposes greater long-term costs on the finn value, managers are unlikely to rely only on 
accrual-based earnings management to manage earnings. In respect of loss linked to 
REM, Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) state that fifty percent of the CFOs in their 
survey say that they would accept small losses to meet current earnings targets by 
postponing new projects, while eighty percent of the CFOs say that, they would 
decrease expenditure on advertising, maintenance and R&D to meet target earnings. 
Roychowdhury (2006) on the other hand, give evidence that managers avoid reporting 
annual losses by decreasing selling, general and administration expenses, overproducing 
inventory goods to decrease cost of goods sold (COGS), and decreasing research and 
development costs. 
Moreover, firms have poorer performance in the following three years when they beat 
analyst forecasts by using both earnings management strategies compared to firms that 
miss analyst forecasts without earnings management (Bhojraj, 2009). In contrast, firms 
have better performance in the following three years when they meet target earnings 
through real earnings management compared to firms that do not involve in real 
earnings management (Gunny, 20 I 0). 
Furthermore, managers are willing to manipulate earnings through real eammgs 
management (REM) compared to accruals earnings management (AEM), since relying 
only on AEM involves a risk and REM is not likely to draw regulators or auditors 
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scrutiny (Braam, Nandy, Weitzel, and Lodh, 2015; Zang, 2011; Bruns and Merchant, 
1990). Prior studies such as Roychowdhury (2006); Gunny (2005) have identified 
various methods of REM. These methods are further divided into two: manipulations in 
operating and investing activities, and manipulations through financing activities 
(Cohen and Zarowin; Xu, Taylor, and Dugan, 2007). 
Finns manipulate operating activities by altering the discretionary expenditures, such as 
selling, general and administrative expenditures (SG&A) and research and development 
expenditures (R&D). Under international financial reporting standards (IFRS), research 
and advertising costs are expended in the period in which they are incurred. Therefore, 
by reducing any of these costs will overstate reported income. Developments costs are 
revenue expenditure rather than capital expenditure which may have to be postponed 
due to uncertainty issues related to the developing product or service (IASB 1998, IAS 
No. 38, para. 57). Hence, postponing development projects can increase earnings as 
well. 
In respect of cost of research and development (R&D), Baber, Fairfield, and Haggard 
(1991) give evidence that managers reduce R&D, because spending on R&D might risk 
the ability to report positive earnings in the current period. Similarly, Dechow and Sloan 
( 1991) reveal that CEOs spend less on R&D in their final years in office. Moreover, 
Bens, Nagar, and Wong (2002) find that managers cut capital expenditure and research 
and development cost when faced with earnings per share dilution due to stock option 
exercises. In contrast, however, Holthausen, Larcker, and Sloan (1995) find that 
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managers do not cut research and development expenditure to increase managerial 
bonuses. 
Moreover, in manufacturing firms, REM through over-production of goods become a 
better choice because operating activities are then manipulated through overproduction 
of goods with the objective to decrease cost of goods sold (Zang, 2011 ; Roycbowdhury, 
2006). Costs of goods sold per product decreases because of overproduction of goods, 
since the fixed overhead costs will then be spread over a larger number of products. In 
addition, the Roychowdhury states that firms that involve in (REM) exhibit at least one 
or more of the following characteristics: abnormally low discretionary expenses and 
abnormally high production costs. To capture REM through discretionary expenses, 
Braam, Nandy, Weitzel, and Lodh (2015); Cohen and Zarowin (2010); Roychowdhury 
(2006) estimate the following equation: 
DISX, _ a fJ (-1-) /J ( S,_1 ) 
---'- - /Jo + 1 + 2 + c, 
A,_1 A,_, A,_1 
Where: DISX, is the discretionary expense at year t, which is computed as the sum of 
selling, general, and administrative expenses (SG&A) and research and development 
(R&D) expenses; A,_1 is the total assets in year t-1; S1_ 1 is the net sales in year t-1 . 
Roychowdhury (2006) estimate the normal level of production costs using the following 
equation: 
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Where PROD, is the sum of the cost of goods sold (COGS) in year t and the change in 
inventory from t-1 to t; A,_1 is the total assets in year t-1; S, is the net sales in year t; 
and M, is the change in net sales from year t-1 to t. The abnormal level of production 
costs RMl'ROD is measured as the estimated residual from the above equation. The 
higher the residual, the larger is the amount of inventory overproduction, and the greater 
is the increase in reported earnings through reducing the COGS. 
Finns manage earnings through deviation from real business activities m order to 
achieve target earnings. However, due to the different operating environment, the 
consequences of deviating from real business activities differ across industries. For 
instance, in competitive industry, it is comparatively more costly to deviate from normal 
business activities as it would reduce the competitive advantage of a firm in industry in 
comparison with less competitive industry. This is because; firm operating in a less 
competitive industry can deviate from normal business activities as it faces less 
competition. Therefore, the use of real earnings management constrains with the level 
of competition within an industry. 
Furthermore, achieving earnings target through real earnings management may result in 
higher levels of taxable income. Consequently, higher taxable income would constrain 
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finns to use real earnings management, because it may lead to higher marginal tax rates. 
Moreover, real earnings management through over-production may increase other costs 
of firm such as storage and impairment costs. Therefore, real earnings management 
through over-productions constrains with the avai I ability of storage. 
2.2. 1.2 Accrual-Based Earnings Management 
Earnings consist of accruals and cash flows; accruals are discretionary and based on 
estimates while cash flows are considered more consistent than accruals (Dechow, 
1994 ). Earnings are mostly manipulated through accruals (Dec how, 20 I 1) and 
numerous measures view that high accruals reduce earnings quality (Francis and Ke, 
2006). As accruals give discretion to use judgments, it provides opportunity for earnings 
management (Dechow and Schrand, 2004). 
In addition, managers use their discretions in reporting process to manipulate earnings, 
which is known as accruals earnings management (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). However, 
discretions could be controUed by auditors' scrutiny (Becker, 1998). Moreover, the use 
of discretions in reporting process is reduced substantially after regulator's scrutiny and 
adoption of Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) (Cohen, Dey, and Lys, 2008). Since the purpose 
of SOX is to protect shareholders, it implies that investor protection restrict firms from 
accruals earnings management. Similarly, Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) confinn 
that investor or shareholders protection is negatively related to accruals earnings 
management. 
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However, this does not mean that accruals do not prove a useful decision. For example, 
Sloan (1996) in his study finds that earnings are more reliable compared to cash flows, 
whereas, Penman and Sougiannis (1998) state that earnings produce smaller forecast 
errors. Dechow and Schrand (2004) on the other hand reveal that accruals enhance 
decision usefulness by reducing irrelevant variations in cash flows. Moreover, a firm 
with high tota l accruals is not necessarily a sign of poor earnings quality (Decbow and 
Schrand, 2004). The authors state that some firms could have low predictability and 
accruals qua lity, because of its business nature; such as firms with a large amount of 
intangible assets and high growth. 
Levitt (1998) states that earnings quality is on the decline whi le accruals earnings 
management 1s on rise. The current study is using accruals quality model to detect 
accruals earnings management. The next section discusses this aspect in detail. 
2.2.1.3 Accruals Quality 
Dechow and Oichev (2002) first proposed the model or concept of accruals quality 
(AQ) as a measure of earnings quality. Regardless of the intention, Oechow and Oichev 
do not differentiate between intentional and un-intentional errors because all errors 
indicate poor accruals quality. The authors measure accruals quality by matching 
operating cash flows and working capital accruals; thus, a poor match indicates poor 
accruals quality. In particular, this model regress a change in working capital on the 
cash flow of previous last year, present year, and next year. 
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In addition, Dechow-Dichev (DD) Model was also further modified and enhanced by 
McNichols (2002) after including additional explanatory variables i.e. revenue, and 
Property, Plant, and Equipment (PPandE). Kent, Routledge, and Stewart (2010) find 
that the DD model and modified DD model perform equally well whereas Francis, 
Lafond, Olsson, and Schipper (2005) find that the modified concept or model has better 
explanatory power. 
Modified Dichew-Dichev Model 
Where, TCA 
1
_, is total current accrual of firm j in year t; CFO is cash flows from 
operations of firm j in year t; .o. Rev is revenue of firm j in year t; and PPE is gross 
property, plant, and equipment of finn j in year t. All the variables are scaled by lagged 
total assets. The variance of £ is an inverse measure of accruals quality (AQ). 
Instead of total accruals, DD and modified DD models concentrate only on current 
accruals. Researchers criticize both models for concentrating only on short-term 
working capital (Dechow, Ge, and Schrand, 2010; Barth, Landsman, and Lang, 2008). 
Barth, Landsman, and Lang (2008), for instance, also criticized the model for not 
considering the perception of analysts and investors, and it was observed that instead of 
total accruals it concentrates only on current accrnals. 
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2.3 The difference between Accruals Earnings Management and Real Earnings 
Management 
Accrual earnings management and real earnings management have many differences. 
For example, when the finns manipulate the earnings, the accrual-based earnings 
manipulation comes under the scrutiny of auditors and regulators, while real earnings 
management does not come under the jurisdiction of auditors and regulators (Braam, 
Nandy, Weitzel, and Lodh, 2015). Secondly, variations in current and future cash flows 
also vary for accruals and real earnings management (Braam, Nandy, Weitzel, and 
Lodh, 2015; Cohen, Dey, and Lys, 2008; Roychowdhury, 2006). In addition, firms' 
managers can manipulate real earnings throughout the year as real earnings 
management provides more flexibility to managers (Gunny, 2010). In contrast, accruals-
based earnings management represents accounting choices that occur before the 
issuance of the financial statements, which is at the end of the fiscal year (Dechow and 
Skinner, 2000). 
Further, real earnings management provides flexibility to managers, which gives 
opportunities to deviate from normal business activities, such as reduction of cost of 
goods sold through over-production of goods, sales prices to increase sales volume, 
selling, general, and administrative (SGand A) expenses, research and development 
(RandD) expenditure (Roychowdhury, 2006; Gunny, 2005). Contrary to real earnings 
management, accrual-based earnings management reverses over time and has no direct 
impact on operating cash flows (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). 
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Moreover, when regulatory bodies and institutions show strength, managers prefer to 
employ real earnings management strategy, instead of accrual earnings management 
strategy in order to avoid detection by the regulators (Braam, Nandy, Weitzel, and 
Lodh, 2015). Some authors argue that after the implementation of Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
2002 (SOX), firms have switched from accruals earnings management to real earnings 
management (Braam, Nandy, Weitzel, and Lodh, 2015; Cohen, Dey, and Lys, 2008), 
because SOX impose restrictions on accruals earnings management (Cohen, Dey, and 
Lys, 2008), and real earnings manipulation are not easily detectable (Braam, Nandy, 
Weitzel, and Lodh, 2015; Zang, 2011). 
In addition, Braam, Nandy, Weitzel, and Lodh (20 I 5) provide evidence that politically 
connected firms employ real earnings management to avoid detection by the regulators 
and media. The authors further argue that politically connected firms substitute accruals 
earnings management for real earnings management when there is a high level of public 
monitoring. Consistent with Braam, Nandy, Weitzel, and Lodh (2015), Chi, Liao, and 
Chen (2016) document that firms with politically connected CEOs are engaged 
intensively in high level of real earnings management and low level of accrual earnings 
management to avoid the scrutiny. Similar evidence is presented by Cohen and Zarowin 
(2010), who argue that to avoid the detection and scrutiny by the regulators; firms' tend 
to substitute between both earnings management strategies. Although real earnings 
manipulation activities are less detectable and less risky (Zang, 2011; Cohen and 
Zarowin, 20 I 0), some authors opine that the consequences of real earnings management 
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activities have severe long term effects for future perfonnance, and are even greater 
than the accrual earnings management (Kothari, Mizik, and Roychowdhury, 2012). 
2.4 Earnings Management Motivations 
2.4.l Earnings Benchmarks 
Earnings benchmark is considered to be one of the most important indicators to evaluate 
finns' performance by many users of the accounting information. Firms' could achieve 
earnings benchmarks through normal business activities; however, managers manipulate 
earnings when forecast earnings fall short of the desired earnings. This shortfall 
between actual and desired earnings motivates managers to indulge in income 
increasing earnings management to avoid reporting earnings below the benchmarks (Al-
dhamari and Ismail, 2015; Zang, 2011 ; Burgstahler and Dichev, l 997). Consistent with 
the findings of Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), who argue that firms get involved in real 
earnings manipulation activities to meet earnings benchmarks i.e. meeting analysts' 
forecasts and avoiding report of losses (Roychowdhury, 2006). Other studies investigate 
the negative relationship between the earnings benchmarks and research and 
development (RandD) expenditure. The authors opine that firms reduce RandD 
expenses to meet earnings benchmarks (Osma and Young, 2009). 
2.4.2 Timing Equity Offerings 
Firms issue seasoned equity offering (SEOs) and initial public offering (IPO) to raise 
capital, increase the number of its shareholders, and expand its operational capabilities 
in the financial markets. Prior studies document that firms manage earnings to enhance 
reported earnings around the SEOs and IPOs (e.g., Kothari, Mizik, and Roychowdhury, 
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2012; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Rangan, 1998; Teoh, Welch, and Wong, 1998). Other 
studies document that firms which get involved in earnings manipulation during equity 
offering, experience reduction in post equity offering earnings. For example, Teoh, 
Welch, and Wong (1998) argue that IPO finns engage in income increasing accruals 
earnings management during the equity offering experience a decline in performance 
after the IPO for three years. 
Consistent with the findings of Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998), Kim and Park (2005) 
exemplify that SEO firms that involve in high level income increasing accrual earnings 
management during the equity offering, later experience a decline in perfonnance. 
Similarly, some authors opine that IPO finns with high levels of accrual-based 
manipulation during the first year after the IPO experience a worse stock performance 
for three years after the IPO (DuChanne, Malatesta, and Sefcik, 2004; Roosenboom, 
Goot, and Mertens, 2003). 
Prior studies have focused on accruals earnings management strategy only; however, 
other studies such as Kothari, Mizik, and Roychowdhury (2012); Cohen and Zarowin 
(20 l 0) have examined both accruals and real earnings management strategies. The 
authors argue that the equity offering firms employ both earnings management 
strategies and therefore comparatively real earnings manipulation activities have more 
negative consequences than accruals earnings manipulation for subsequent 
performance. 
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2.4.3 Executive Compensation 
Prior studies document about the compensation of Chief Executives Officers (CEOs), 
stating that perfonnance-based compensation motivates managers to get involved in 
income increasing earnings management (Sun, 2012; Cheng and Warfield, 2005), which 
negatively affect shareholders' wealth (Kothari, Mizik, and Roychowdhury, 2012; Fan, 
Wong, and Zhang, 2007). CEOs engage in income increasing earnings management to 
meet performance-based compensation through real earnings management (e.g. Cao and 
Laksmana, 2010; Cheng, 2004; Dechow and Sloan, 1991), and accrual-based earnings 
management (e.g. Laux and Laux, 2009; Cheng and Warfield, 2005). 
Moreover, some authors opine that the Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) are 
comparatively more involved in reporting earnings processes than the CEOs and, thus, 
CFO equity incentives are positively related to beating analysts' forecasts and accrual 
earnings management, with even greater impact than CEO equity incentives (Jiang, 
Petroni, and Wang, 2010). On the contrary, Feng, Ge, Luo, and Shevlin (2011) argue 
that the CFOs are likely to get involved in earnings management as a response to a 
pressure from their powerful CEOs. 
2.4.4 Debt Contracts 
Prior studies exemplify that firms get involved in earnings management activities to 
avoid violations of debt contracts; and that firms are more likely to do so when their 
ability to renegotiate the technical contract violations is restricted ( e.g., Franz, 
HassabElnaby, and Lobo, 2014; Kirn, Lei, and Pevzner, 2011 ). However, Franz, 
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HassabElnaby, and Lobo, (2014) argue that firms with a stronger incentive to avoid 
debt contract violation switched from using more accruals earnings management before 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to using more real earnings management and more total 
earnings management afterwards. The authors further argue that firms with poor credit 
rating are more engaged in earnings management. In a similar study, Kim, Lei, and 
Pevzner (2011) find that firms get involved in earnings management activities to avoid 
violations of debt contracts; and that firms are more likely to do so when they do not 
meet analyst forecasts and exhibit poor credit ratings. The authors further argue that the 
firms with more rigid managers to re-negotiate a debt contract engage more in real 
earnings management activities in order to avoid contract violations. 
Other studies provide evidence that finns involve in income increasing/decreasing 
earnings management to avoid debt contracts violations (e.g., Jaggi and Picheng, 2002). 
Sweeny ( 1994) conducted a study on debt contracts violation who find out that fnms 
employ income-increasing earnings management to decrease the cost imposed by 
lenders. These findings are consistent with those of DeFond and Jiambalvo (I 994) who 
investigate the relationship between accruals earnings management and debt contracts 
violations. The authors examine a high total accrual in the year prior to the debt contract 
violation. 
On the contrary, Jaggi and Picheng (2002) find that the debt contract violating firms use 
income-decreasing accruals earnings management when their waiver requests for 
violations are denied. However, when their waiver requests for debt covenant violations 
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are accepted, financial distressed firms use income-increasing accruals earnings 
management. Similarly, Bartov ( 1993) provide evidence that firms increase reported 
earnings through timing the sales of their long-term assets to avoid contract violations 
and smooth reported earnings. 
2.4.5 Political Cost 
Prior studies have also observed that firms manipulate earnings to avoid political cost. 
For instance, Key (1997) provide evidence that a few firms indulge in income 
decreasing earnings management only to avoid detection by the regulators, and reduce 
the chances of imposing new regulations if their firms report high profits. Similarly, 
Han and Wang ( I 998) indicate that firms that engage in income-decreasing accruals 
eaniings management to avoid poli6cal cost, are likely to report high profits. This is the 
reason, some authors argue that firms manipulate earnings to cover and hide their 
political gains, which they receive through their political connections (Chaney, Faccio, 
and Parsley, 2011). Other authors opine that politically connected firms substitute 
between earnings management strategies to avoid detection and scrutiny by regulators 
and media (Braam, Nandy, Weitzel, and Lodh, 2015). 
This section discusses several motivating factors which encourage managers to get 
engage in earnings management activities. It is observed from previous literature that 
finns get involved in income increasing/decreasing earnings management activities in 
order to achieve their objectives. Firms inflate earnings through both accruals and real 
earnings management in order to achieve earnings benchmarks, avoid violations of debt 
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contracts, before equity offering, executive compensations. On the contrary, firms ' 
managers get involved in income decreasing earnings management activities in order to 
report poor organizational performance, and thus report less taxable income. Further, 
managers are engaged in income decreasing earnings management activities to cover 
the political gains which they obtain through dubious legality. Going through the 
literature notably, it is argued that earnings management activities are contextual and it 
varies with the objectives of finns. Therefore, it is suggested that finns get engaged in 
both income increasing/decreasing earnings management activities and it varies with 
firms' objectives. 
2.5 Earnings aggressiveness 
Earnings aggressiveness is the propensity to speed the realization of gains and delay the 
realization of losses, which would eventually result in more positive or high accruals 
(Bhattacharya, Daouk, and Welker, 2003). The author adopts the magnitude of accruals 
as a measure of earnings quality. He states that the opportunistic overstatement of 
earnings increases the level of total accruals. Earnings aggressiveness also reduces 
earnings quality because it increases total accruals, and high accruals represent less 
persistent earnings (Dechow, Ge, and Schrand, 2010). These researches further argue 
that firms usually present high total accruals when they get involved in eammgs 
manipulations activities. Similarly, Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) use the 
magnitude of accruals as a measure for earnings management. Whereas, Bhattacharya, 




Where; ACC kl are the total accruals of firm k in year t; l:!.CAkl is change in current 
assets of firm k in year t; l:!.CLkl is the change in current liabilities of firm kin year t ; 
!iCASH 1a is the change in cash of firm k in year t; l:!STD13 is the change in long-term 
debt included in total current liabilities for firm k in year t; DEPkt is the amortization 
and depreciation expenses of finn k in year t; !iTP11 is the change in tax payables of 
fum k in year t; TAkl-i is the total assets of finn k in year t-1. 
The earnings aggressiveness (EA) model is simplistic and cannot be seen 
independently; moreover it is less often used as the only proxy of earnings quality 
(Dechow and Schrand, 2004). Due to their business nature some fmns have higher level 
of accruals (Dechow and Schrand, 2004). Moreover, Dechow, Ge, and Schrand (2010) 
states that underlying performance of firms is probably different in firms with lower 
accruals from those with higher accruals; moreover, they opine that this variation in 
accruals probably stems from sources other than AEM. 
2.6 Comparison of Measurements 
As discussed above in the review of different measurements and attributes of earnings 
quality, there is no particular attribute which captures the overall concept of earnings 
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quality. Instead, attributes should not be seen as substitutes of each other because each 
attribute exemplify a different concept of earnings quality. For instance, Dechow, Ge, 
and Schrand (20 I 0) states that some of the measurements are negatively related to each 
other and therefore they can have reverse implications and requires to carefully choose 
the particular measurement which is suitable for their research questions. Similarly, 
Dechow, Richardson, and Tuna (2003) states that discretionary accruals are highly 
correlated with overall level of accruals. Dechow and Dichev (2002), on the other hand, 
states that the accruals quality is closely related to earnings persistence because accruals 
are not correlated to cash flows when accruals are of lower quality; thus accruals quality 
captures the volatility in earnings persistence. 
A major contradiction also exists between earnings persistence, earnings predictability 
and earnings smoothing because persistent and predictable earnings may be the result of 
opportunistic earnings smoothing (Dechow, Ge, and Schrand, 2010). However, 
artificially smooth income increases the predictability and persistence but deteriorates 
the correlation between earnings and cash flow (Melumad and Nissim, 2009). The fact 
that earnings quality attributes are not substitutes, it often provides an opposite 
interpretation to each other, and thus gives an opportunity to researchers to evaluate 
different perspectives of the multifaceted or wide-range earnings quality concept. 
Therefore, it involves careful selection criteria to select a suitable earnings quality 
attribute; to make sure they are appropriate to achieve research objectives. 
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Table 2.1 
Overview of Earnings Quality (EQ) Measurements 













2.7 Determinants of Earnings Quality 
High production cost compared to 
last year, decrease in discretionary 
expenses indicate real earmngs 
management, which decreases 
earnings quality. 
Working capital to be closely 
linked to past, current, and future 
cash flows. High variations in 
accrual not clarified by cash flows 
indicate lower earnings quality 
(EQ). 
High level of accruals indicates 
lower EQ. 
Prior studies have examined many determinants that affect the quality of earnings (See 
Figure 2.1 ). Francis and Ke (2006) divide then into two groups, the fundamental group 
and the reporting basis group. The first group consists of the operating environment and 
business model of the firm, while the second group consists of governance activities, 
auditors, the quality of the standards and management's financial reporting decisions. 
The fundamental determinants of a firm such as age, size, governance structure, 
diversification, leverage, growth, and profitability can decrease earnings quality, even 
without earnings manipulations (Dechow and Schrand, 2004). 
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It is widely accepted that the diligence of regulators and the quality of accounting 
standards are vital determinants of earnings quality. For example, Houge, Zijl, and 
Dunstan (2012); Kwon, Lim, and Tan (2007); Soderstrom and Sun (2007) mention in 
their study, that the legal and the tax system, the accounting standards and political 
systems are drivers of earnings quality. Whereas, Levitt (1998) states that external 
auditing and improvement of accounting standards increase earnings quality. In a 
similar study, Ismail, Kamarudin, Zijl, and Dunstan (20 I 3); Barth, Landsman, and Lang 
(2008) provide evidence that the earnings quality has improved, after the adoption of 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and implementation of International 
Accounting Standards (IAS). Similarly, Beuselinck, Joos, Khurana, and Meulen (2009) 
note that after the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (JFRS), 
earnings quality has positively changed. Such findings support the view that earnings 
quality is positively related to high quality accounting standards. 
In contrast, Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) illustrate that real earnings management 
cannot be restricted to better accounting standards; however it increases the quality of 
earnings. Whereas, Ball, Robin and Wu (2003) find that high earnings quality is not 
guaranteed by high accounting standards. It is other incentives which influence earnings 
quality. 
Moreover, Caramanis and Lennox (2008); Doyle, Ge and McVay (2007) find out that 
audit efforts and internal governance positively affects earnings quality. Caramanis and 
Lennox (2008) in their study use data of a few Greek companies and reveal that audit 
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efforts reduce earnings manipulations and increases earnings quality. Some authors 
argue that weak internal control negatively affects earnings quality (Doyle, Ge and 
McVay, 2007). 
Prior studies have also found that corporate governance has positive effects on earnings 
quality (Badolato, Donelson, and Ege, 2014; Salehi, 2013; Chtourou, Bedard, and 
Courteau, 2001). Badolato, Donelson, and Ege (2014) find that audit committees with 
high relative status and financial expertise are linked to lower levels of earnings 
management. Salehi (2013) use the Iranian data to examine that audit committees 
ensure higher earnings quality. The study further reveals that high earnings quality 
requires that the board of directors to be taken into account. Similarly, Chtourou, 
Bedard, and Courteau (200 I) opine that large Board of Directors and shareholding by 
non-executive directors seem to reduce earnings manipulation which increases the 
earnings quality. 
Studies also reveal that financial or capital market forces impact the quality of earnings. 
Ball and Shivakumar (2005) state that due to high market demand public firms have 
earnings quality higher than private firms. Whereas, Soderstrom and Sun (2007) argue 
that earnings quality is influenced by capital market development. In a similar study, 
Burgstahler, Hail, and Leuz (2006) examine how institutional factors and capital 
markets pressures affect firms' incentives to report accurate earnings. In addition, Gao 
and Zhang (2015); Kim, Park andWier (2012) find that socially responsible firms have 
high earnings quality. Gao and Zhang (2015) reported that socially responsible firms' 
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earnings are more value relevant and deviate less from their permanent earnings. On the 
other hand, Kim, Park, and Wier (2012) using American firms' data reveal that socially 
responsible firms are less involved in accruals and real earnings management, and 
provide reliable and transparent financial information to investors. 
Fu1ihermore, firms' earnings quality is also affected by other factors such as ownership 
and capital structure (Ben-Nasr, Boubakri, and Cosset, 2015; Soderstrom and Sun, 
2007); the accounting methods selected by the finns (Altamuro, Beatty, and Weber, 
2005), and firms' performance (Defond and Park, 1997). Ben-Nasr, Boubakri, and 
Cosset (20 I 5) also find out that foreign ownership is related to higher earnings quality 
in countries with lower risk of government expropriation and higher government 
stability. Whereas, Fan and Wong (2002) find that concentrated ownership is Jinked to 
lower earnings infonnativeness. Similarly, Altamuro and Beatty (20 I 0) reveal that 
corporate governance mechanisms and internal control regulation of the firm also affect 
the earnings quality. However, Dechow and Schrand (2004) state that high growth 
companies, firms in volatile business environments and companies with complex 
transactions or intangible assets, can give earnings numbers that do not indicate future 
cash flows or truly reflected firm performance. 
In addition, previous studies have shown the significant relationship between political 
influences and earnings quality. For example, Al-dhamari and Ismail (2015); Ben-Nasr, 
Boubakri, and Cosset (2015); Braam, Nandy, Weitzel, and Lodh (2015); Zeng, Li, and 
Hong, 20 12; Liu, Saidi, and Bazaz (2014); Narayanaswamy (2013); Chaney, Faccio, 
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and Parsley (2011) quantitatively investigate the relationship between politically 
influenced firms and earnings quality. In their studies they find that politically 
influenced firms are more frequently involved in earnings management and earnings 
smoothing to achieve desirable results, rarely recognize losses on time and there 
earnings are less predictable. They also reveal that politically influenced firms have 
significantly higher discretionary accruals and lower accruals quality compared to non-
politically influenced firms. Therefore, it is trended that political influences are 
negatively related to earnings quality. 
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Firms' Fundamental 
Characteristics ( such as age, size 
Firms' Financial Characteristics 
(such as profitability, growth, etc) 
Corporate Governance 
Regulators and Accounting 
Standards 




Corporate Social Responsibility 
Ownership Structure 
Earnings Quality 
Figure 2.1: Determinants of Earnings Quality determined by previous studies 
Source: Author ' complied based on previous studies 
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2.8 Political influences 
Political influence of firms is considered as intangible asset or relational asset, which 
shows firms' connections with politicians and its influence on firms ' decision making 
(Saeed, Belghitar, and Clark, 2015). In addition to connections with politicians, 
Cheema, Munir, and Su (2016) also considered firms to be politically influenced if there 
is a presence of civil/military bureaucrats in a firm. Prior studies have shown that 
political influences have a broad impact on firms' earnings quality. Political influences 
are defined as the relationship between a particular firm and a politician(s); it could be 
either through cronyism (political appointments in firms) or shareholding or political 
board of directors (Cheema, Munir, and Su, 2016; Saeed, Belghitar, and Clark, 2015; 
Faccio, 2006; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Johnson and Mitton, 2003). Moreover, Desai 
and Olofgard (20 I I) define political influences as such measures through which the 
firms with political influences receive favors, which can even contain economic value. 
Moreover, prior studies have shown that political influences can be acquired through 
connections with individuals who have position(s) in the government (Faccio, 2006; 
Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Fisman, 2001), or through state ownership of fums (Opper 
and Wong, 2007; Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith 2004), or through the presence of 
politician(s) or their close relatives on the board of directors (BOD) or in senior 
management (Cheema, Munir, and Su, 2016; Faccio, 2006), or through the presence of 
current/fonner civil/military Bureaucrat(s) on the BOD or in senior management 
(Cheema, Munir, and Su, 2016; Fan, Wong, and Zhang, 2007). Political influences 
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through politician(s) and close relatives are difficult to find, because connections with 
politicians are informal and formal relations are never shared or disclosed. 
Prior studies identify political influences as rent-seeking activities where firms use 
resources in bribing or lobbying to get preferential treatment and privileges from 
government officials. Khan and Jomo (2000) explain the rent-seeking activities in 
which finns try to influence the state through bribing, lobbying or through political 
connections. The benefits from such rent-seeking activities directly depend upon the 
spending power of a firm. 
The impact of political influences on firms' activities has already been recognized 
around the globe. For instance, Boubakri et al. (2008) state that firms create political 
influences to increase their chances of success. In fact, political influences give benefits 
to both parties: the politician(s) reward the firms in form of privileges and policies; 
which provide support to the politicians, financially and politically; whereas firms use 
these political influences to enrich themselves (Boubakri, Cosset, and Saffar, 2008). 
Prior studies have found many bases for the involvement of firms in political 
relationships; these bases are categorized at finn and industry level. 
At the firm level, researchers recognize political influence as an option which aims to 
enhance the finn 's overall value. The firms seek to utilize opportunities in their business 
while designing their corporate strategies. Though many of these opportunities offer 
themselves in markets; however, by investing in political connections firms create new 
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opportunities (Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2003). However, the choice to become a 
politically influenced firm depends on firms' particular factors i.e. financial resources, 
size and international diversification (Schuler, 1996). 
The large size of groups or firms signifies its possibility to get involved in political 
activities. Similarly, Hillman (2003) stated that only big firms afford to get political 
favors because political influences involve huge cost. Diversifications of the fim1s' have 
also been linked to political influences, because diversified firms have a wide range of 
trade activities, and are probably to get involved in political activities (Lenway and 
Rehbein, 1991 ). Lastly, prior research has found that huge capital is prerequisite for 
involvement in costly political activities (Keim and Baysinger, 1988). So, firms with 
huge capital or financial resources are likely to get involved in political activities 
compared to firms' lacking such financial resources. 
In industry level, the degree of competition within industry has huge effects on the 
strategy of the firms (Schuler, Rehbein, and Cramer, 2002). Because of intense 
competition pressure, firms in industries find political influences highly important to get 
privileged treatment and protection from the government (Jia, Shi, and Wang, 2012). 
Similarly, Nee, Opper, and Wong (2007) found that political influences give 
competitive advantage in highly competitive industries and firms have more advantages 
to create political influences since they get more political benefits. Schuler, Rehbein, 
and Cramer (2002) on the other hand found that firms in a competitive industry are 
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more involved in campaign and lobbying compared to those in less competitive 
industries. 
The nature of political influences is different amongst countries. In developed countries, 
for example, the firms give political donations for campaign, and get involved in 
lobbying to establish political influences. On the other hand, in under-developed or 
developing countries, political influences are usually achieved through direct financial 
dealings between the politician(s), senior managers and owners (Desai and Olofgard, 
2011 ). 
In many under-developed or developing countries, governmental restrictions on 
economic activities are a known reality. Such restrictions provide an opportunity to 
those firms with strong political influences to get special treatment in terms of policy 
implementation and resource allocation (Jia, Shi, and Wang, 2012). Therefore, with 
regard to conduct business efficiently in such an environment, political influences 
through government officials and politicians facilitate the firms to overcome all the 
difficulties. 
In developing countries finns also establish a political connection through establishing a 
link with the most influential families or individuals, in order to get easy access for 
loans (Khwaja and Mian, 2005). Due to the time-consuming activities of financial 
institutions, fmns in under-developing and developing economies face difficulties in 
getting bank loans because of government regulations. Therefore, political influences 
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help firms to overcome problems relating to an ill-functioning market in such 
economies. Firms may have the ability to access leverage because they might have 
created strong connections with families or individuals that have the ability to control 
bank-lending policy. On the other hand, banks also expect to get some benefits by 
giving such loans and leverages (Infante and Piaza, 20 I 0). 
Grounded by the previous studies, it is argued that politically influenced obtain more 
benefits such as easy access to loans on lower interest rates, tax rebates, government 
contracts, leverage, and get special treatment in tenns of government policy 
implementation. After obtaining all these political benefits through dubious legality, 
politically influenced finns want to cover and mask these political benefits, and thus get 
involved in manipulating earnings. 
2.8.l The Politics in Pakistan's Context 
Pakistan is a commonwealth country, which is located in the South Asia (Cheema, 
Munir, and Su, 2016). It is a federal republic comprising a capital territory, named 
Islamabad, and four provinces, named, Sindh, Punajb, Baluchistan, and Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa. With reference to the Constitution of Pakistan (1973 ), the provincial 
governments have unicameral provincial assemblies, which are headed by the elected 
Chief Ministers, while Federal Government has a bicameral parliament which is led by 
the elected Prime Minister. Pakistan scores low on World Bank governance indicators -
regulatory quality (24 percentile), rule of law (21 percentile), voice and accountability 
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(24 percentile), government effectiveness (23 percentile), political stability (0.95 
percentile), and control of corruption (I 7 percentile). 
Since the independence of Pakistan, except for military dictators and elected 
government backed by dictators, no political government has been able to complete its 
tenure, because of political instability (Constable, 2001 ). Elected governments were 
either toppled by the military dictators or dismissed by the President on charges of 
corruption, political abuse of power, and mismanagement (Saeed, Belghitar, and Clark, 
2015). In 2013, first time in the history of Pakistan, elected government formed as a 
result of 2008 general elections, completed its five-year tenure without any dictator's 
backing (Cheema, Munir, and Su, 2016). 
The listed firms in Pakistan are governed by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
of Pakistan (SECP), and firms are required to abide by the Code of Corporate 
Governance (CCG) of Pakistan, which is an essential part of listing requirements of the 
Pakistan stock exchange (PSE). Therefore, the PSE, SECP, and CCG Pakistan comprise 
major regulatory mechanism for listed firms of Pakistan. 
The regulatory mechanism is theoretically strong in Pakistan, but has not been 
implemented practically (Cheema, Munir, and Su, 2016). In addition, conflict of interest 
laws are weak in Pakistan, which allows civil servants and politicians to get political 
benefits (Cheema, Munir, and Su, 2016). Further, presence of government owned banks 
provide opportunity to politically connected firms to default on bank loans (Khwaja and 
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Mian, 2005). Therefore, weak regulatory bodies, institutes, and legal system, result in 
poor corporate governance practices in Pakistan. 
Moreover, the tax collection authority named, the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR), is 
always blamed for issuing Statutory Regulatory Orders to facilitate politically 
influenced people (Cheema, Munir, and Su, 2016). The authors ' further claim that the 
discretionary powers in tax assessment allow corrupt practices in the FBR. In addition 
to the weakness of FBR, National Accountability Bureau (NAB), which is the authority 
to curb financial corruption, is always accused of being a politicized authority (Cheema, 
Munir, and Su, 2016). 
2.8.2 Consequences of Political Influences 
As discussed earlier, noticeably the main purpose of political influences is to get 
benefits that are favorable for fim1s' financial success. Some researchers argue that 
finns make political connections to receive economic benefits (Braggion and Moore, 
2013; Fisman, 2001). In contrast, other authors reveal that politicians may take more 
resources from firms through operational inefficiencies or bribes, then confer the same 
back to the firm for personal gains (Frye and Shleifer, 1997; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). 
Rationally, firms usually establish and maintain their political influences when the 
marginal costs of such political influences are less than their own marginal benefits. 
Using data from multiple countries, prior studies document that politically influenced 
finns receive number of benefits, which include government bailouts, the allocation of 
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governmental contracts, tax evasion, relaxed regulatory, easy access to credit and 
preferential treatment by state-owned finns (Boubakri, Guedhami, Mishra, and Saffar, 
2012; Faccio, 2006). Faccio (2006) claims that political connected firm plays a vital role 
in world's most countries. For instance, In Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Italy and 
Russia, more than 10% of listed fums are politically influenced and they account for 
over I 0% of the market wealth. The study also finds that politically influenced firms 
represent 8% of the worlds' stock market wealth existing in 35 of the 47 countries of the 
sample. Further, Faccio (2006) also finds out that during a crisis, politically influenced 
finns have a greater probability to be bailed out by the government compared to similar 
non-politically influenced firms. 
Using multiple-countries data, prior studies examine the impact of political influences 
on cost of capital, firms' value, organizational performance, and leverage (Boubakri, 
Guedhami, Mishra, and Saffar, 2012; Faccio and Parsley, 2009; Boubakri, Cossett, and 
Saffar, 2008; Faccio, 2006). For example, Faccio (2006) using 35 countries data found 
that the market value of firms with political influence is affected by unexpected 
electoral outcomes. The study of Faccio (2006) revealed that the announcement of 
senior management or large shareholders entering into politics significantly increases 
the value of politically influenced firms. In contrast, Faccio and Parsley (2009) reported 
an average decline in the value of politically influenced firms by 1.7% in response to 
122 sudden deaths of politicians from around the world between 1973 and 2004. These 
findings show that political influence have significant impact on firms' value (Faccio 
and Parsley, 2009; Faccio, 2006). 
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Moreover, some researchers argue that politically connected firms are high leverage and 
exhibit poor organizational performance (Boubakri, Cosset, and Saffar, 2008). Other 
researchers documented that politically connected firms enjoy lower cost of capital 
compared to non-politically connected firms, and cost of capital is comparatively lower 
for firms with strong connections than firms with weak connections (Boubakri, 
Guedhami, Mishra, and Saffar, 2012). Further, the authors suggest that politically 
connected firms are less risky, because investors of politically connected firms require a 
lower cost capital than non-connected firms. 
In ASEAN countries, prior studies have shown how politically influenced firms get 
benefits. For instance, Crispin (2002) claimed that a Thai telecom company with a name 
Shin Satellite, whose 53% of the shares bought by the family of former Prime Minister 
Thaksin, made a 12 billion USD deal with Burmese military-government-controlled 
firm after an official visit to Thailand by Burma's intelligence chief. Similarly, in 
Indonesia, with the approval of President Suharto's the TexMaco group received large 
loans from one of Indonesia's largest state-owned bank, which was more than the 
bank's legal lending limit. The founder of the TexMaco Marimutu Sinivasan is known 
to be a close friend of Suharto (Solomon, 1999). In Malaysia, it is argued that 
government employed capital controls in 1998 as a trick to help politically influenced 
finns recovering from the 1997 Asian financial crisis (Johnson and Mitton, 2003). In 
addition, using Indonesian firms' data, prior study document that political connections 
60 
heavily affect the values of firms, and fim1s' value depends on political connections 
(Fisman, 200 I). 
In Malaysia, previous study investigates the relationship between political connections 
and effective tax rates (Adhikari, Derashid and Zhang, 2006). The authors state that the 
politically influenced finns pay significantly lower taxes compared to non-politically 
influenced finns. The authors suggest that the developing economies tend to be 
"relationship-based" rather than "market-based" capitalisms and therefore, political 
connections are an important determinant of effective tax rate in developing economies. 
Moreover, using Malaysian firms' data, Gui (2006) examine the correlation between 
political connections and audit fees. The author argue that the politically connected 
firms in Malaysia are related to high audit fees, because connected firms exhibit 
financial misstatements and report poor quality of earnings. 
Using Indonesian firms ' data, Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006) declared that political 
influences do not only change firms' financing strategies; they also impact long-run 
performance. The study also revealed that politically influenced firms face difficulty to 
re-establish connections with a new government when their patron falls from power, 
this lead politically influenced fums to underperfonn in new government and 
subsequently depend more on foreign financing and other sources of finance. 
In China, prior studies investigate the relationship between political connections and 
rent-seeking activities. For example, Minggui, Yafu, and Hongbo (2010) find that firms 
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with political connections get more subsidies compared to non-politically connected 
firms. Other researchers argue that entrepreneurs' connections with the ruling 
communist party have a positive effect on their firm performance (Li, Meng, Wang, and 
Zhou, 2008), because their connections help to obtain loans from financial institutes and 
banks, and provide legal support. In addition, Wu, Wu, Zhou, and Wu (2012) document 
that politically connected firms outperform those firms without such connections, 
because connected firms enjoy tax benefits. 
Moreover, Wu, Wu, and Rui (20 I 0) document that firms with politically connected 
managers obtain more government subsidies and exhibit higher value compared to firms 
with non-politically connected managers. Further, the authors suggest that state-own 
finns with politically connected managers employ surplus workers and exhibit lower 
value than those without politically connected managers. 
In America, using Brazilian firms' data, some researchers investigate the relationship 
between political donations and stock returns (Claessens, Feijen, and Laeven, 2008). 
The researchers report that political donations are related to higher stock returns during 
elections, and that contributing firms substantially increased their bank leverage relative 
to a control group after each election, indicating that investors receive political favors 
from politically influenced fums. Moreover, Using United States firms data, Goldman, 
Rocholl, and So (2009) examine the relationship between the politically influenced 
board members and stock returns. The study finds that the nomination of politically 
influenced person on board of directors is positively related to abnormal stock returns. 
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The study also finds that the stock-price of the finns connected to the winning political 
party increase in value, and firms connected to the losing Party decrease in value. 
Interestingly, Jayachandran (2006) used events and news related to American 
politicians. Jayachandran (2006) used political donations to proxy how much finns are 
aligned with political parties. The author reported that when Senator Jim Jeffor switch 
his political party in May 2001, which gave the Democrats power to take over the 
leadership positions, confinnation of Presidential appointees, chairmanships of the 
Senate committees and gained influence over the legislative agenda, and more. With 
this move, firms which gave political donations to the Republicans in the previous 
elections lose on average 0.8% of market value for every $250,000 they contributed to 
the Republicans (Jayachandran, 2006). 
Using European countries data, prior studies investigated the impact of political 
influences on organizational performance, stock returns, and employability (Amore and 
Bennedsen, 2013; Asquer and Calderoni, 2011 ; Menozzi, Urtiaga, and Vannoni, 2011; 
Dombrovsky, 2008). Using Italian firms' data, Asquer and Calderoni (2011) empirically 
show that political influences have adverse effect on performance. The study also 
revealed that the political influence through opposition party have no significance effect 
on firm performance, whereas maintaining links with future ruling party have positive 
effect. Similarly, using Latvian firms' data, Dombrovsky, (2008) show that firms 
experience a decline in sales in the year when politician joins, followed by a sharp 
recovery in the following years. The authors suggest that politicians join firms in 
financial distress and helps with political favors. 
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Using Italian firms ' data, it is opined that political connections make measurable firms ' 
specific benefits that could reduce economic welfare of the people (Amore and 
Bennedsen, 2013). Some researchers opine that politically connected firms have a 
negative impact on finn performance, because connected firms employ surplus workers 
(Menozzi, Urtiaga, and Vannoni, 201 I). 
On the other hand, Faccio (2006) deeply investigated the effects of political influences 
on firms. Particularly, political influences are common in countries that are perceived as 
being highly conupt. Political influences are less common in the presence of law or 
regulation of political conflicts of interest. The study further revealed that the value of 
political influences increase more when a businessperson is prime minister, rather than 
assembly or parliament member. 
In South Asia, various studies in the political influence literature concentrate on 
different forms of benefits that finns can receive through political influences. These 
benefits include tax rebates or discounts, relaxed rules and regulations for the politically 
influenced firm, preferential treatment by state-owned firms such as banks providing 
loans on low interest rates, preferential treatment in getting government licensing and 
contracts, paying lower prices to farmers (Saeed, Belghitar, and Clark, 20 15; 
Sukhtankar, 2011; Khwaja and Mian, 2005). 
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Using Indian firms' data, Sukhtankar (2011) investigates an alternative mechanism 
through which politicians may generate political campaign funds. The author documents 
that during the election year; politically connected sugar mills pay lower prices to 
farmer for sugar cane, because later politicians may recompense farmers upon getting 
elected. Using Bangladeshi firms ' data, Bardhan, Mitra, Mookherjee, and Sarkar (2009) 
found that political connections constraints the implementation of good governance 
practices. Other authors argue that politically connected family firms outperfonn family 
firms without such connections (Muttakin, Monem, khan, and Subramaniam, 2015). 
Pakistan is not excluded in respect of political connections. For example, Khwaja and 
Mian (2005) find that politically influenced fmns obtain preferential treatment from 
state-owned banks. Khwaja and Mian (2005) further document that politically 
influenced firms get 45% more loans compared to non-politically influenced firms and 
have 50% more default rates compared to non-politically influenced firms. Moreover, 
ruling party gets easy access to financial market than opposition party, which shows the 
practice of political power (Khwaja and Mian, 2005). The study further reveals that the 
economic lost to the economy of these preferential lending is between 0.30-1.9 percent 
of GDP annually. The authors explain that politically influenced firms are related to 
high debt ratio, because connected firms have easy access to loans or debts, and they are 
able to get loans on lower interest rate. 
In addition, Saeed, Belghitar and Clark (2015) using data of Pakistani firms, investigate 
the impact of political influences on firms' financing decisions. The study finds that 
65 
there is a significant and positive relationship between political influences and long-
term loans/debt, which shows that there is an easy access to loans. The study further 
reveals that preferential treatment and easy access to loans vary with political strength 
and the size of firms. 
Recently, Cheema, Munir, and Su (2016) examine the relationship between political 
connections and firms' performance in Pakistan. The study finds a negative relationship 
between political connections and organizational performance, because politically 
connected firms manipulate earnings to cover and hide their political gains (Chaney, 
Faccio, and Parsley, 2011 ). Particularly, if the political gains are large and obtained 
through dubious legality, then their political gains and benefits need to be hidden 
(Fisman, 2001 ), through earnings management activities (Chi, Liao, and Chen, 2016; 
Braam, Nandy, Weitzel, and Lodh, 2015; Al-dhamari and Ismail, 2015; Chaney, Faccio, 
and Parsley, 2011). 
Therefore, this research expands previous literature on the determinants of earnings 
quality. The determinant variable in this research is firms' political influences. This 
study investigates the impact of political influences on manager's reporting, which 
consequently affects the quality of reported earnings between politically influenced 
firms and non-politically influenced firms in Pakistan. 
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2.8.3 Impact of Political influences on earnings quality 
Previous studies have shown two important ways through which political influences can 
impact earnings quality of politically influenced firms. First, governments might 
pressurize politically influenced firms to hide information regarding expropriation 
activities exercised by their cronies (Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith 2004). Second, 
since politically influenced firms get benefits from their political connections, managers 
of these firms may have incentives to obscure information in relation to benefits 
received with the intention to increasing their wealth at the expense of outside investors 
(Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley, 201 l ). In this regard, enough evidence from previous 
studies has shown the negative relationship between political influences and earnings 
quality (Chi, Liao, and Chen, 2016; Liu, Li, Zeng, and An, 2016; Al-dhamari and 
Ismail, 2015; Braam, Nandy, Weitzel, and Lodh, 2015; Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley, 
2011; Ramanna and Roychowdhury, 20 I 0). These studies also reveal that earnings 
quality is ultimately shaped by political influences or factors, which influences the 
financial reporting incentives of management. This argument is based on a basic 
principle that political influences create incentives that influence the behavior of 
managers who prepare the financial statements. Such incentives affect the earnings 
quality through political connections. 
Using multiple-countries' data, some authors opine that politically connected firms 
exhibit poor earnings quality (Ben-Nasr, Boubakri and Cosset, 2015; Chaney, Faccio, 
and Parsley, 2011; Makar and Alam, 1998), because politically connected finns 
manipulate earnings to avoid political costs during economic boom (Makar and Alam, 
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1998), and hide the political benefits, which they receive through dubious legality 
(Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley, 2011 ). Similarly, Ben-Nasr, Boubakri, and Cosset (2015) 
show that politically influenced firms through state-ownership provide lower earnings 
infonnativeness, and report less persistent earnings. 
In addition, Riahi-Belkaoui (2004); Ball, Robin, and Wu (2003) using multiple 
countries data find that political influences are an important factor to impact financial 
reporting, and adopting better accounting standards only does not guarantee high 
earnings quality. Some scholars argue that political economy is related to financial 
transparency (Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith, 2004). The authors further argue that 
finns in countries with lower government ownership are related to better financial 
reporting practices. Correia (2009) reveals that firms with greater political expenditures 
have lower earnings quality, because finns with political influences increase their 
expenditures during the period of misreporting. 
Moreover, some researchers state that political influences are related to lower quality of 
accruals compared to non-politically influenced finns (Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley, 
2011 ). The study also states that the stronger type of political influences are 
maneuvered through ministers or head of state rather than members of national or 
provincial assembly, who are rather related to only lower quality of accruals. Further, 
the authors claim that politically influenced firms face less negative outcomes for 
reporting lower earnings quality. In a recent study, the authors suggest that political 
connections play a significant role in the choice between earnings management 
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strategies (Braam, Nandy, Weitzel, and Lodh, 2015). He opines that politically 
connected firms substitute real earnings management (REM) for accruals eanungs 
management (AEM), because REM is less detectable by the regulatory bodies. 
In East Asia, using Chinese firms ' data, prev10us studies have shown the negative 
relationship between political influences and earnings quality (Chi, Liao, and Chen, 
2016; Liu, Li, Zeng, and An, 2016; Guo and Ma, 2015; Liu, Saidi, and Bazaz, 2014; Li, 
Griffin, Yue, and Zhao, 2013; Srinidhi, Zhang, and Zhang, 2012; Wang and Yung, 
2011; Li, Selover, and Stein, 2011). Consistent with Braam, Nandy, Weitzel, and Lodh 
(2015), some authors argue that finns with politica11y connected CEOs are engaged in 
lower level of accrnals-based earnings management and higher level of real earnings 
management (for example, Chi, Liao, and Chen, 2016). Further, the authors claim that 
non-state owned firms with politically connected CEOs are involved in higher level of 
accruals earnings management. Similarly, in a very recent study, researchers opine that 
politically connected firms report poor earnings quality (Liu, Li, Zeng, and An, 2016). 
This is because the quality of audit decreases in firms with strong political connections, 
since finns with strong political connections have comparatively more manipulated 
accounting records. Consistent with Liu, Li, Zeng, and An (2016), Srinidhi, Zhang, and 
Zhang (2012) provide evidence that politically influenced firms are unwilling to engage 
big auditors compared to non-politically influenced fums, because politically influenced 
fi.nns exhibit higher discretionary accruals and less timely recognize losses. 
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Recently, Guo and Ma (2015) document that the existence of several state 
representatives in state-owned firms increases accruals earnings management. The study 
also shows that earnings management lack incentives when a state representative is the 
major shareholder, because then the firm have easy access to market and resources. In a 
similar study, using multiple measures of earnings quality, some authors claim that 
firms with significant government shareholding recognize losses less frequently and 
involve more in earnings smoothing, managing earnings towards target, and reporting 
less value relevant earnings (Liu, Saidi, and Bazaz, 2014). Further, the authors claim 
that state-owned firms provide regulatory backing and create incentives for self-serving 
purpose, which negatively influences eamings quality. 
Moreover, Li, Griffin, Yue, and Zhao (2013) relate earnings management activities of 
politically influenced fums with tax rates. The authors state that politically connected 
firms are only involved in tax induced earnings management (TEM) when the tax rates 
are increased; because this could help the politically connected firms to reduce tax 
burden and avoid being punished. In contrast, otJ1er researchers argue that earnings 
quality become less relevant between politically and non-politically influenced firms 
when economy is more market driven (Wang and Yung, 2011). 
In Southeast Asia, usmg Malaysian firms ' data, Al-dhamari and Ismail (2015) 
document that politically connected firms report poor earnings quality, because such 
politically connected firms are involved in accruals earnings management. The authors 
also claim that politically connected firms with high cash reserves report higher 
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earnings quality. On the other hand, using Indonesian fim1s' data, some authors argue 
that government effectiveness reduces the political gains of connected firms, which 
result in higher earnings quality (Harymawan and Nowland, 2016). However, the 
authors state that political stability enhances the certainty of political gains from 
political connections, which reduce the need for politicaJ!y connected firms to respond 
to market pressures and result in lower earnings quality. 
Using data of European countries, prior studies report that politically influenced firms' 
exhibit poor earnings quality (Bona-Sanchez, Perez-Aleman, and Santana-Martin, 2014; 
Capalbo, Frino, Mollica, and Palumbo, 2014). While using Spain firms' data, 
Bona-Sanchez, Perez-Aleman, and Santana-Martin (2014) reveal that when the boards 
of director(s) are politically influenced; it affects firms' financial reporting choices. The 
study also finds that political boards of director(s) are involved in disclosing as little 
information as possible in order to protect political connections from scrutiny. 
Therefore, political influences are related to less transparency. In addition, Capalbo, 
Frino, Mollica, and Palumbo (2014) claim that state-owned firms are more involved in 
earnings management with high profits and decreases with firm size. 
Using USA firms' data, Ramanna and Roychowdhury (2010) find that politically 
connected firms are more engaged in income decreasing earnings management during 
election period, in order to hide the political gains that they receive through connections 
(Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley, 2011). Similarly, using Indian firms' data, 
Narayanaswami (2013) reveal that politically connected firms are more likely to involve 
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Big Four auditors than non-connected firms in order to avoid scrutiny by regulatory 
authorities, because connected finns are engaged in manipulating earnings and report 
significantly lower quality of earnings. 
Table 2.2 
The review of politically influenced firms: Major results of empirical studies 
Authors Results 
Chi, Liao, and Chen (2016) 
Liu, Li, Zeng, and An (2016) 
Al-dhamari and Ismail (2015) 
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• Firn1s with politically connected 
CEOs engage in higher level of real 
earnings management and lower 
level of AEM. 
• Non-state owned firms with 
politically connected CEOs engage 
in higher level of AEM. 
• The quality of audit increases with 
weak political connections and vice 
versa for strong political 
connections. 
• The study shows the negative 
relationship between political 
connections and earnings quality. 
• Politically connected finns are 
related to lower earnings quality in 
Malaysia. 
• The study also finds that earnings 
with high cash reserves are of high 
quality 
Table 2.2 (Continued) 
Authors 
Guo and Ma (2015) 
Zeng, Li, and Hong (2012) 
Batta et al.(2014) 
Bona-Sanchez, Perez-Aleman, and 
Santana-Martin (20 I 4) 




• The study finds that existence of 
several state representatives in 
state-own firms increase accruals 
earnings management. The study 
also reveals that earnings 
management lack incentives when a 
state representative is the major 
shareholder, because then the firm 
has an easy access to market and 
resources. 
• Political connections negatively 
affect earnings quality of listed 
firms in China. 
• Politically connected firms have 
higher EQ than non-connected 
firms in Venezuela. Venezuelan 
politically connected firms are not 
involved in earnings smoothing and 
accruals earnings management. 
• Political connections negatively 
influenced firms' eamings 
informativeness and affects 
financial reporting choices of finns. 
• Shareholders and politicians are 
interested in providing little 
information to the market in order 
to protect political links from public 
scrutiny. 
• State-owned firms involve more in 
earnings management with high 
profits and decreases with firm size. 
Table 2.2 (Continued) 
Authors 
Ben-Nasr et al. (2014) 
Liu, Saidi, and Bazaz (2014) 
Srinidhi, Zhang, and Zhang (2012) 
Li et al. (2013) 
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Results 
• State ownership adversely affects 
stock price informativeness and it is 
more pronounced in countries with 
lower political rights. 
• The study also finds that state 
ownership is related to less 
transparency. 
• Firms with significant state 
ownership exhibit lower earnings 
quality. 
• State-owned firms' earnings are 
less value relevance, involve more 
in earnings smoothing, manage 
earnings towards target and less 
frequently recognizes losses. 
• Politically influenced firms exhibit 
lower transparency than non-
influenced firms in China. 
• These firms exhibit higher 
discretionary accruals compared to 
non-politically influenced firms, 
less timely recognize losses, and are 
unwilling to engage big4 auditors. 
• Politically connected firms are only 
involved i11 tax induced earnings 
management (TEM) when the tax 
rates are increased. Because this 
could help connected firms to 
reduce tax burden and avoid being 
punished. 
Table 2.2 (Continued) 
Authors 
Guedhami et al. (2013) 
Narayanaswamy (2013) 
Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley (2011) 
Li et al. (20 I 1) 
Ramam1a and Roychowdhury (2010) 
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Results 
• Politically influenced firms with 
Big4 auditors enjoy greater 
transparency and exhibit less 
earnings management. 
• Connected finns have significantly 
lower quality of earnings compared 
to non-connected firms in India. 
• Politically influenced firms are 
more likely to involve Big Four 
auditors than non-connected firms 
in order to avoid scrutiny by 
regulatory authorities. 
• Politically connected firms have 
poorer earnings quality than non-
connected finns because connected 
firms can afford to disclose lower 
earnings quality. 
• State-owned firms are linked to 
high earnings management. Chinese 
managers choose accruals policies 
that result in slightly positive 
profits. 
• Politically influenced firms with 
extensive outsourcing activities 
have more income-decreasing 
discretionary accruals implying 
lower earnings quality. The 
earnings are managed through 
income-decreasing discretionary 
accruals during election year. 
2.9 Earnings Management Motivations in Politically Influenced Firms 
One could have argued that political influences are related to better organizational 
performance. This is because; politically influenced firms have easy access to long term 
loans (Khwaja and Mian, 2005), government contracts (Saeed, Belghitar, and Clark, 
2015), and get preferential treatments (Pastor and Veronesi, 2013; Faccio, 2010). Some 
empirical evidences have shown the fact that political influenced firms obtain political 
gains from their connections (Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley, 2011 ; Faccio, 2010). 
However, this is not often the case. Prior studies exemplify that political influences are 
associated with poor organizational performance (Cheema, Munir, and Su, 2016); 
because politically influenced firms are involved in income-decreasing earnings 
management activities in order to report less taxable income (Li, Selover, and Stein, 
20 I 1; Ra manna and Roychowdhury, 2010), and hiding political gains which they obtain 
through dubious legality (Sadiq and Othman, 2017; Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley, 2011 ). 
Some studies found that political influenced firms are under media or public monitoring 
compared to non-politically influenced firms (Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley, 2011). 
Consequently, if the political gains and benefits are of dubious legality and large then 
their political connections need to be hidden (Fisman, 200 I). Therefore, to hide their 
political benefits; politically influenced firms could get involved in income-decreasing 
accruals earnings management to report poor organizational performance. 
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In addition to income-decreasing accruals earnings management activities, politically 
influenced firms are engaged in real earnings management activities in order to avoid 
detection by the regulators (Braam, Nanday, Weitzel, and Lodh, 2015). Further, the 
authors opine that politically influenced firms substitute real earnings management 
strategy for accruals earnings management to confuse the regulators and it is then less 
likely for the regulators to detect the manipulation activities. 
2.10 Control Variables 
Control variables play a vital role in examining whether the relationship between the 
independent variable (political influence) and dependent variable ( earnings quality) is 
affected by other correlated factors, and control finns' characteristics. In the existing 
state of political influence and earnings quality, researchers have used some sets of 
variable as control variables. For instance, firm size (SIZE), profitability (ROA), 
fmancial leverage (LEV), growth opportunities (GROWTH), audit quality (BIG4), and 
LOSS may be important determinant of the quality of earnings that have been widely 
used in prior research (e.g. Al-dhamari and Ismail, 2015; Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley, 
2011; Mashayekhi and Bazaz, 201 O; Dirnitropoulos and Asteriou, 2010; Cho and Rui, 
2009; Sivaramakrishnan and Yu, 2008; Cheng and Warfield, 2005). Therefore, this 
study uses these variables in order to explain their significant impact on earnings 
quality. The following subsections discuss the relationship between the control 
variables and the quality of earnings. 
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2.10.l Firm Size 
Large firms can utilize effective internal control system compared to small firms, and 
markets believe that large firms have high earnings quality. Petra (2007) for example, 
states that the markets react more favorably to reported earnings produced by large 
firms compared to small firms. Vafeas (2000) provides evidence that returns-earnings 
relationship is stronger for large firms. 
Makar and Alam (1998) claim that firms adopted income-decreasing eammgs 
management strategy m order to decrease political costs. Consequently, this would 
ultimately deteriorate the earnings quality of large firms. Sivaramakrishnan and Yu 
(2008) argue that earnings quality decreases as firm size increases. On the contrary, 
Machuga andTeitle (2009) find that small firms have high earnings quality in terms of 
abnormal accruals, timely loss recognition, and income smoothness. Dimitropoulos and 
Asteriou (2010) fmd that large firms experience less earnings quality, analyzed through 
abnormal accruals. In similar study, Epps and Ismail (2009) give evidence that 
managers in large firms involve in opportunistic behavior of earnings management. 
2.10.2 Audit Quality 
Firms are perceived to disclose high earnings quality when their financial statements are 
audited by BIG4 auditors (Gui, 2002). Some authors argue that audit quality constrains 
managerial reporting discretion, and thus reduces information risks (Chen, Ding, and 
Kim, 20 l 0). In contrast, prior studies document that BIG4 auditors only limit accruals 
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earnings manipulation, and are unable to constrain real earnings management. For 
example, Chi, Lisic, and Pevzner (2011) suggest an unintended consequence of higher 
quality auditors constraining accrual earnings management, namely, firms resorting to 
potentially even more costly real earnings management. Further, the study claims that 
high audit fees are related to higher levels ofreal earnings management. Following prior 
studies such as Al-dhamari and Ismail (2015); Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley (2011 ); 
Mashayekhi and Bazaz (20 IO); Cheng and Warfield (2005); Reynolds and Francis 
(2000) BIG4 is represented by an indicator variable taking the value of one (I) if a finn 
is audited by one of the big four auditing firms and zero (0) if otherwise. 
2.10.3 Leverage 
Leverage is measured as total liabilities divided by total assets. Cho and Rui (2009) and 
DeAngelo ( 1994) state that leverage represents the riskiness of debt or default, and thus 
earnings quality is low as the probability of default in debts or liabilities increases. 
Moreover, Gui and Lai (2002) reveal that leveraged firms produce less earnings 
informativeness. Similarly, Petra (2007) gives evidence that leverage is negatively 
related to earnings informativeness. Following Al-dhamari and Ismail (2015); Chaney, 
Faccio, and Parsley (2011 ); Mashayekhi and Bazaz (20 l O); Cheng and Warfield (2005); 
Reynolds and Francis (2000), this study measures firms leverage by dividing long term 
liabilities or debts to total assets. 
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2.10.4 Return on Assets (ROA) 
Managers in firms producing lower return on assets are probably to involve in 
opportunistic behavior of earnings management to avoid negative return on assets, and 
thus the earnings quality of these firms deteriorates. Velury and Jenkins (2006) argue 
that firms with negative ROA take longer time to announce earnings. Similarly, Vafeas 
(2000) find that negative ROA has a negative impact on the usefulness of earnings to 
financial information users. Zhao and Chen (2008) gives evidence that negative ROA is 
inversely related to earnings quality. 
In addition, Jaggi (2009) finds that firms with good operating performance report high 
earnings quality; and therefore earnings quality increases as profitability or ROA 
increases. Following Al-dhamari and Ismail (2015); Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley 
(2011 ); Mashayekhi and Bazaz (201 O); Cheng and Warfield (2005); Reynolds and 
Francis (2000) ROA is measured as net income before extraordinary items divided by 
average total assets. 
2.10.S Loss 
Prior studies have shown the positive relationship between loss and earnings 
management. For instance, Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) document that firms manage 
reported earnings to avoid reporting losses. Similarly, Maydew (1997) opines that firms 
with net operating losses are involved in tax-induced earnings management activities. 
Firms often manipulate earnings to avoid reporting small losses (Burgstahler, Hail, and 
Leuz, 2006). To avoid reporting annual losses, Roychowdhury (2006) provides 
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evidence that managers manipulate earnings through real earmngs management. 
Similarly, Cohen and Zarowin (20 I 0) provide evidence that firms use multiple real 
earnings management methods, in order to meet certain financial reporting benchmarks 
to avoid reporting annual losses. 
2.10.6 Growth 
Fim1s with high growth over-report earnings by a larger amount because stock price 
responsiveness increases with finns' growth (Lee, Li, and Yue, 2006). Furthermore, 
some authors claim the positive relationship between earnings management and growth. 
For example, Richardson, Tuna, and Wu (2002) argue that firms manipulate earnings to 
maintain consecutive growth. In addition, Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) associate 
high growth with inflated earnings. On the contrary, some authors claim that firms 
manipulate earnings through real activities management in order to increase sales. For 
instance, Cohen and Zarowin (2010); Roychowdhury (2006) suggest that managers are 
providing price discounts to increase sales. 
2.11 Underpinning Theory 
2.11.1 Agency Theory 
This study investigates the relationship between political influences and earnings 
quality. Although there is a literature which relates political influences to earnings 
quality (for instance, Sadiq and Othman, 2017; Al-dhamari and Ismail, 2015; Braam, 
Nandy, Weitzel, and Lodh, 2015), there is no particular theory that directly relates 
political influences and earnings quality. This study employs agency theory to link both 
variables. 
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Agency theory elucidates the basis of conflicts and ways to curtail the conflicts that can 
arise between parties in an agreement (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In a listed firm, the 
parties that are involved in an agreement are shareholders (the principals) and managers 
(the agents). Jensen and Meckling ( 1976) mention that a company is a place of formal 
and informal agreements under which shareholders elect another person as their agent 
(director or manager) to make decisions on their behalf, which requires delegations for 
the decision making to the agents. Therefore, agency theory recognizes the relationship 
between shareholders and managers. Shareholders may include government 
shareholding and other institutions (Hill and Jones, 1992). 
Agency theory also explains that the conflict between managers and shareholders occur 
when they have contrary interest. For instance, the actions of the managers do not meet 
the interest of the shareholders. Managers or agents are perceived to take decisions that 
capitalize on their self-interest and do not satisfy the interests of shareholders or 
principal (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This conflict causes cost to the shareholders 
which is known as conflict or agency cost (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). 
In firms where the government owned significant shareholdings, conflicts may occur 
more between principal and agent (Shliefer and Vishny, 1994). In such firms, the 
principal-agent relationship is broken down into two other agency relationships as the 
government act simultaneously as principal and agent. In relation to the managers of 
govenunent-owned firms, the government is a principal and thus it must assign goals 
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(Rodriguez, Espejo, and Cabrera, 2007). The government is also the agent in its 
relationship with the public, the ultimate owner of the resources invested in by the 
government-owned firms (Ernst, 2004). The government not only considers the public 
interest as voters in decision making process, but also the agendas of the opposition 
parties that compete for votes. Therefore, the government wants to control managerial 
decisions so that the decisions are congruent with its political interests. The government 
may use its political influences to interfere with firms' operational decisions (Chen, 
2004). For instance, the government may put pressure on managers to provide benefits 
to its supporters or stabilize employment and induce them to drift beyond profit-
maximizing goals (Roe, 2003). In this study, the government is supposed to have 
influence on managerial decisions through significant shareholdings, appointing 
politicians and bureaucrats(s) as its representative on the board of directors and 
management. 
Political influence can occur in any finns other than government-owned firms. Hillman 
(2005) reveals that firms build relationship with the government to get benefits, and the 
best way to build the relationship is to appoint a politician on the board of directors. 
This relationship is assumed to be able to decrease the effects of government policies, 
enforcements and regulations. Such relationships could improve firms' performance 
through protecting them from external threats and fluctuations (Hillman, 2005). Further, 
political influences also occur in a firm when a firm is significantly owned by 
politician(s) or their close relative(s) (Cheema, Munir, and Su, 2016; Faccio, 2006). 
Politically influenced firms through any aspects enjoy benefits in form of lower taxes, 
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high debts and lower interest rates (Saeed, Belghitar, and Clark, 2015; Faccio, Masulis, 
and McConnel, 2006; Fisman, 2001). 
However, the association of politicians with a finn can create double agency problem 
involving self-centered behavior by both politicians and managers (Wong, 2004). Some 
researchers opine that people engaged in the political process are self-centered actors 
who want to maximize their own interests which may curtail the interests of the 
majority shareholders (e.g., Tullock, 2003). For instance, politicians may create a 
connection between government agencies and managers, which may give firms a 
preferential access to loans and in return firms may give political donations (Hillman 
and Pitt, 1999). 
Further, negotiation between managers and politicians could take place in order to 
maximize their own interest (Sheleifer and Vishny, I 994). The authors argue that when 
a firm is controlled by managers, politicians engaged in the firms use subsidies as bribes 
to influence managerial decisions in order to pursue their political objectives. Thus, the 
involvement of politicians in a fmn can affect managerial decisions, and consequently 
may affect the outcomes of the firms' economic objectives. The current study looks at 
the earnings quality as the outcomes. 
Generally, the interference from the politically influenced people and government in 
firms may also give the impression that autonomy of management decisions has not 
been met, because it discourages managers to monitor firm's success, which may lead 
84 
management to pursue its own interest at the cost of shareholders' interests (Chen and 
Jia, 2005). Other than creating agency problem by politically influenced firms through 
political interference, the accounting systems of the firms may also be affected. This is 
because agency problems and accounting systems of the finns are closely related 
(Tagesson, 2007). Politically influenced firms may adopt an accounting system which 
allow them to publish and report information that is best for their interests (Zimmerman, 
1977). 
In short, agency theory makes a framework that relates political influences and earnings 
quality. This study concentrates on the effect of political influences on earnings quality 
in Pakistani finns. In current study, politically influenced finns are assumed to occur 
through significant shareholding by government; presence of politician(s) or closed 
relative(s) of politician(s) in a firm; presence of currenUforrner civil/military 
bureaucrat(s) in a firm. 
2.12 Supporting Theory 
2.12.1 Classical Political Economy Theory 
Classical political economy theory highlights the structural conflict within the society. It 
clarifies corporate disclosure as being a tool by which a powerful individual maintain 
their self interest (through targeted information disclosures) to the detriment of those 
individuals without power (Deegan, 2006). 
Gray, Owen, and Adams (1996) define political economy theory as: 
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"Political economy theory is the social, political, and economic framework within 
which human life takes place. Political economy theory explicitly recognizes the power 
conflicts that exist within society and various struggles that occur between various 
groups within society. The perspective embraced in political economy theory is that 
society, politics, and economics are inseparable and economic issues cannot be 
meaningfully be investigated in the absence of considerations about the political, social, 
and institutional framework in which the economic activity takes place. It is argued that 
by considering the political economy a researcher is better able to consider broader 
issues which impact how an organization operates and what information it elects to 
disclose." 
Further, some researchers argue on the relevance of accounting and disclosures in 
political economy (Guthrie and Parker, 1989). The Guthrie and Parker (1989, pg. 166) 
argue that: 
"The political economy perspective perceives financial reports as political, social, and 
economic documents. They serve as a tool for constructing, sustaining, and legitimizing 
economic and political arrangements, institutions, and ideological themes which 
contribute to the corporation's private interests. Disclosures have the capacity to 
transmit social, political, and economic meanings for a pluralistic set of report 
recipients." 
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2.13 Literature Gap 
In recent years many studies have investigated the relationship between political 
influences and earnings quality. There is enough literature available on the issue. 
However, there is still a need to investigate the relationship between political influences 
and earnings quality in more detail. The review of past literature shows that many 
studies pay attention on the relationship between political influences and earnings 
quality. However, most of the studies have used multiple-countries data and single 
aspect of political influences and attribute of earnings quality. 
To the best of knowledge, none of the prior studies has investigated political influences 
(presence of politician(s) or close relative(s) of politician(s) in a firm; significant 
shareholding by government; and presence of current/fonner civil/military bureaucrat(s) 
in a firm) and earnings quality (real earnings management, accruals earnings 
management, and earnings aggressiveness) using these proxies simultaneously. 
According to Al-dhamari and Ismail (2015); Zeng, Li, and Hong (2012) political 
influences and earnings quality need to be investigated in more details with multiple 
attributes. This is because; earning quality is a multifaceted concepts and using only 
single attribute may not provide a good indicator of earnings quality. In a recent study, 
Braam, Nandy, Weitzel, and Lodh (2015) argue that using only accruals or real earnings 
management attribute underestimates the overall earnings management activities of a 
finn. Further, the authors suggested that future studies should employ both accruals and 
real earnings management attributes of earnings quality in order to capture the overall 
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earnings management activities of a finn. Therefore, employing both accruals and real 
earnings management offers a good indication of earnings quality. 
This research is different from previous studies in several ways. First, previous studies 
mostly use only one or two earnings quality attributes as the measure of earnings 
quality, while this study uses three attributes as proxies of earnings quality. Second, this 
study uses three main aspects of political influences. Third, to give more insight, current 
study investigates whether there is a difference in effect between ruling/opposition party 
political connections on earnings quality. Fourth, current study uses both proxies of 
earnings management i.e. accruals earnings management and real earnings management 
simultaneously, which is being used by very limited studies. Fifth, following Braam 
Nandy, Weitzel, and Lodh (2015) current study also investigates whether politically 
influenced finns substitute real earnings management strategy for accruals earnings 
management. However, unlike Braam Nandy, Weitzel, and Lodh (2015), this study 
employs three aspects of political influences instead of single aspect of political 
influences and uses single-country data (i.e. Pakistan) instead of multiple-country data. 
Using one country data will overcome some of the criticisms of the multiple-country 
studies, including difficulties in interpretation and data analysis, noisy variables as a 
result of differences in cultural, judicial and legal factors. Finally, the Pakistan 
envirornnent allows an investigation of the relationship between political influences and 
earnings quality. 
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This study extends previous literature on the effects of institutional factors on earnings 
quality. The institutional variable in current study is firms' political influences, i.e. 
firms ' political links with politician(s) or political party, significant government 
shareholding, close relatives of politician(s), and senior manager(s) is a current/former 
civil/military bureaucrat(s). Particularly, this research proposes that the existence of 
political influences impact manager reporting incentives which as a result causes 
systematic differences in the quality of reported earnings between politically influenced 
firms and non-politically influenced firms in Pakistan. 
2.14 Summary 
Chapter two discusses literature review of earnings quality and political influences. 
Initially it presents different contextual definitions of earnings quality followed by 
earnings quality measurements adopted by current study. This chapter also discusses 
and compares different measurements of earnings quality to be used in this study. In 
addition, it examines such previous studies that discuss determinants that affect earnings 
quality. It has also provided a discussion on independent variable i.e. political 
influences and its multiple aspects, followed by impact of political influences on 
different variables in the whole world and particularly in Pakistan. Moreover, this 
chapter discusses previous studies on political influences and earnings quality and 
provides results of these studies. It also provides the summaries of previous studies on 
political influences and earnings quality. The control variables used by previous studies 
to regress earnings quality and political influences have also been highlighted. Further, 
next section discusses the underpinning theory i.e. agency theory followed by the 
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supporting theory i.e. political economy theory. Finally, this chapter presents literature 
gap of current study. 
The next chapter gives explanation of theoretical framework, development of 
hypotheses, and the research methodology to be used in the current study. In addition, 
the next chapter also discusses data collection, study period, sample selection and model 





The review of related empirical studies in the previous chapter sets the direction and 
identifies research gaps of the current study. This chapter provides the research 
methodology; develops the theoretical framework to test the hypotheses of this study in 
relation to earnings quality; presents the methodological aspects of current study; and 
discusses a selected sample. The current study has used secondary data which was 
collected from politically influenced firms' annual reports and financia l databases. In 
addition, a quantitative approach is also employed to achieve the objectives of the study. 
The chapter is organized in the following manner: first this chapter discusses the 
theoretical framework; followed by the measurements of variables and development of 
the hypotheses; next section introduces the data collection and sample specification of 
the study; and method of analysis. 
3.1 Theoretical Framework 
The current study argues that political influences occur through significant government 
shareholding, the presence of politicians and their close relative's presence in a firm, 
and the presence of civil/military bureaucrats in a firm. In this regard, current study 
examines political influences in Pakistani finns. These firms include firms with 
significant government shareholdings and non-government owned firms with 
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politician(s) or former bureaucrat and army officer appointed in senior management and 
board of directors. 
The current study argues that government has a control and influence over a firm 
through significant shareholding by government and by appointing politicians or 
current/former bureaucrats as representatives in the senior management. Political 
influences can also occur in private firms with the presence of politicians in the senior 
management. 
Within the framework of agency theory, the current study argues that in the 
government-owned firms, agency conflict can happen between (1) the government 
(principal) and the managers (the agents); (2) the politician(s) as the government's 
representatives on the board (the agent) and the government (the principal); (3) the 
managers (the agents) and the politician(s) or their relatives (the principal); and (4) the 
current/former civil/military bureaucrat (the agent) and other shareholders (the 
principals). The government can directly control and influence over its owned firms by 
imposing rules and regulations and its policies in order to achieve political agenda. The 
decisions of the managers influenced by the government may conflict with the 
manager's financial interests. 
Moreover, the government controls or monitors managers' decisions and actions by 
appointing politician(s) as its representative(s) in the senior management or board of 
directors. Whereas, a politician(s) as the governments' representative(s) can use their 
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political influences to influence the managers for their personal interests. These 
personal interests may contradict with the firms' economic objectives and the 
government policies. The current study argues that the influence of politicians on the 
senior managers can also occur in a firm which is privately owned and not owned by the 
government, but appoints a politician(s) to its board to create connections with the 
government. Therefore, it is expected that political connections can influence managers' 
decisions and actions. In current study, political connections and earnings quality are 
examined. 
Prior studies discussed in previous chapter, indicate that political influences 
significantly affect earnings quality. However, most previous studies reviewed confine 
political influence to a particular measure such as government ownership or political 
donations etc. The current study is using three aspects of political influences 
simultaneously i.e. political connections through the presence of politician(s) and their 
close relatives in a firm; significant government ownership; and the presence of 
current/fonner civil/military bureaucrat(s) in a firm. In relation to earnings quality, the 
current study uses three attributes of earnings quality i.e. accruals earnings 
management, real earnings management, and earnings aggressiveness. 
Following figure summarizes the framework of the study. As shown in the figure that 
political influences have three main aspects and earnings quality are measured by three 
different attributes. The expected connections between the two variables (i.e. political 
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influences and earnings quality) as modeled in figure become the framework used to 
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3.2 Hypothesis Development 
3.2.1 Political Influences and Accruals Earnings Management (Accruals 
Quality) 
One could have argued that political influence is related to better organizational 
performance, because politically influenced firms have easy access to long-term loans 
on lower interest rates (Khwaja and Mian, 2005), they easily get government contracts 
and write-off their loans (Saeed, Belghitar, and Clark, 2015). Some empirical evidence 
exemplify that politically influenced firms get preferential treatment and gain a lot from 
their connections (Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley, 2011; Faccio, 2010). However, this is 
often not the case. Recently, some authors argue that political influences are associated 
with poor organizational performance in Pakistan (Cheema, Munir, and Su, 2016); 
because politically influenced firms are involved in accruals earnings management in 
order to hide political gains (Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley, 2011), and report less taxable 
income (Ramanna and Roychowdhury, 2010). 
In addition, prior studies exemplify that earnings, as a result of the accruals process, 
gives a better measure of firm performance in comparison to cash flow (e.g., Dechow et 
al., 2010). However, accruals are often based on estimates, and thus accruals quality 
decreases as accruals estimation errors increases (Dechow and Dichev, 2002). Fisman 
(2001) argue that firms with political connections receive political favors such as 
government contract, subsidies, tax discount, and licenses. Subsequently, political 
favors increase the transitory component of earnings, because it comes in a windfall 
fashion which may disrupt the time series pattern of earnings (Chen, Ding, and Kim, 
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2010), consequently increases chances of estimation errors (Dechow and Dichev, 2002), 
and thus result in lower accruals quality. 
In addition to trnnsitory earnings, some authors opine that political factors influence the 
incentives of managers who are involved in preparing financial statements ( e.g., 
Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith 2004; Ball, Robin, and Wu, 2003; Ball, Kothari, and 
Robin, 2000). Other researchers suggest that the magnitude of accruals estimation errors 
is also influenced by managerial intentions, and managerial intentions are often 
influenced by political factors ( e.g., Bushman and Piotrosk.i, 2006; Ball, Robin, and Wu, 
2003). 
Moreover, previous studies exemplify that politically influenced firms are more 
engaged in accruals earnings management activities in comparison to non-politically 
influenced firms (Sadiq and Othman, 2017; Al-dhamari and Ismail, 20 I 5; Chaney, 
Faccio, and Parsley, 2011), and report less transparent earnings (Riahi-Belkaoui, 2004). 
Other studies provide evidence that political connections create incentives for managers 
to manage earnings (Bushman and Piotroski, 2006; Gul, 2006). Therefore, the quality of 
accruals decreases in firms with political influences. 
Hl: Politically influenced finns are more involved in accruals earnings management 
compared to non-politically influenced :finn. 
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3.2.2 Political Influences and Real Earnings Management 
Managers of non-politically influenced as well as politically influenced finns may use 
both real earnings management and accrual-based earnings management to enhance 
corporate value. However, after the implementation of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), new 
phenomenon could be seen in firms. For example, Zang (2011); Cohen and Zarowin 
(20 IO); Cohen, Dey, and Lys (2008) show that after the implementation of SOX, fmns 
are more inclined to use real earnings management instead of accruals earnings 
management, because real earnings management is not easily detectable (Kothari, 
Mizik, and Roychowdhury, 20 I 2), and does not come under auditors and regulators 
jurisdictions (Braam, Nandy, Weitzel, and Lodh, 2015). This phenomenon could also be 
seen in politically influenced firms. For example, some authors argue that firms with 
politically connected CEOs are more involved in higher level of real earnings 
management (Chi, Liao, and Chen, 2016), because detection of accruals earnings 
management may damage the reputation of the firm and its managers, as well as the 
social image of a connected politician or political party (Braam, Nandy, Weitzel, and 
Lodh, 2015). Thus, if accruals earnings management strategy is risky, then politically 
connected firms are likely to employ less detectable real earnings management strategy 
to avoid detections. 
In addition, some researchers opine that real earnings management reduces political 
costs of connected firms, maintains the reputation of politically connected firms, 
weakens the monitoring ability of society, and the likelihood of outside intervention 
(Braam, Nandy, Weitzel, and Lodh, 2015). Real earnings management reduces the risks 
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that managers are taking when they get involved in earnings management (Cohen and 
Zarowin, 2010; Cohen, Dey, and Lys, 2008; Roychowdhury, 2006). Therefore, current 
study also expected that politically influenced firms are likely to use real activities' 
manipulation. 
H2: Politically influenced firms are more involved m real earnings management 
compared to non-politically influenced firms. 
3.2.3 Political Influences and Earnings Aggressiveness 
Finns with high total accruals are considered to be reporting lower earnings quality, 
because it represents less persistent earnings (Decbow, Ge, and Schrand, 2010), and 
increases chances of estimation errors (Dechow and Dichev, 2002). Some researchers 
argue that earnings are considered to be of higher quality, if earnings are closer to cash 
flow, and contain comparatively small amount of accruals (Visvanathan, 2006; 
Bhattacharya, Daouk, and Welker, 2003). Bhattacharya, Daouk, and Welker (2003) 
exemplify that opportunistic overstatement of earnings (earnings management) lead to 
more positive and fewer negative accruals, that leads to an overall higher level of 
accruals. Similarly, Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) also use the magnitude of 
accruals as a measure for accruals earnings management. In a recent study, Sadiq and 
Othman (2017) document that politically influenced firms are more involved in accruals 
earnings management and report less transparent earnings numbers (aggressive 
earnings) compared to non-politically influenced firms. Therefore, firms that involved 
more in accruals earnings management have higher level of accruals. 
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H3: Politically influenced firms are positively related to earnings opacity ( earnings 
aggressiveness) compared to non-politically influenced firms. 
3.2.4 Ruling/Opposition Party(s) Political Connections and Accruals Earnings 
Management 
Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley (2011) exemplify that the earnings quality reported by 
politically connected firms is significantly poorer than that of similar non-politically 
connected firms, and amongst the politically connected firms, those that have stronger 
(ruling party) political connections have the poorest earnings quality. This is because; 
politically connected firms through ruling party obtain more benefits compared to 
politically connected firms through opposition party. Therefore, it is argued that in order 
to hide political benefits, politically connected firms through mling party are more 
involved in accruals earnings management in comparison with politically connected 
fmns through opposition party. However, our finding shows the inconsistent result. 
H4: Political connections through ruling political party firm are more engaged in 
accruals earnings management compared to political connections through opposition 
political party firm. 
3.2.5 Ruling/Opposition Party(s) Political Connections and Real Earnings 
Management 
Prior studies exemplify that employing real earnings management strategy reduces the 
risks that managers are taking when they get involved in earnings management 
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activities (Braam, Nandy, Weitzel, and Lodh, 2015; Zang, 2011; Cohen and Zarowin, 
20 I 0). This is because; real earnings management strategy weakens the monitoring 
ability of regulators, and the likelihood of outside intervention (Braam, Nandy, Weitzel, 
and Lodh, 2015). Some researchers opine that real earnings management reduces 
political costs of connected firms, and thus maintains the reputation of politically 
connected firms. Amongst the connected firms, those that have connections with the 
ruling party(s) accumulate more political gains (Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley, 2011). 
Therefore, it is argued that in order to mask the political gains, ruling party politically 
connected firms may have more incentives to manipulate earnings through real earnings 
management strategy in comparison with the opposition party politically connected 
finn. However, our findings are contradictory to our expectations. 
HS: Political connections through ruling political party firm are more engaged in real 
earnings management compared to political connections through opposition political 
party finn. 
3.2.6 Ruling/Opposition Party(s) Political Connections and Earnings 
Aggressiveness 
Previous studies exhibit that ruling party politically connected finns are more involved 
in accruals earnings management and report less transparent earnings information 
compared to opposition party politically connected firms (Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley, 
2011 ). Some researchers argued that firms that involved more in accruals earnings 
management activities contain higher level of accruals (Bhattacharya, Daouk, and 
Welker, 2003). Therefore, it is expected that political connection through ruling party(s) 
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firm exhibit high earnings aggressiveness in comparison with the political connections 
through opposition party(s) firm. 
H6: Political connections through ruling political party firm are positively related to 
earnings opacity (earnings aggressiveness) compared to political connections from 
opposition political party firm. 
3.2.7 Substitution of Real Earnings Management Strategy for Accruals Earnings 
Management 
Recently, some authors argue that politically connected firms substitute real earnings 
management for accruals earnings management with the objective to avoid detection by 
the authorities (Braam, Nandy, Weitzel, and Lodh, 2015). Detection of earnings 
management may damage the reputation of the finn and its managers, as well as the 
social image of a connected politician or political party. For these reasons, accrual-
based earnings management may be more costly than real earnings management for 
firms with political connections, if earnings management is risky (Zang, 20 I 1; Cohen 
and Zarowin, 201 0; Cohen, Dey, and Lys, 2008). Substitution of real activities 
manipulation for accruals earnings management reduces political costs of connected 
firms, maintains the reputation of politically connected firms, weakens the monitoring 
ability of society, and the likelihood of outside intervention (Braam, Nandy, Weitzel, 
and Lodh, 2015; Li, Griffin, Yue, and Zhao, 2013; Kothari, Mizik, and Roychowdhury, 
2012). In addition, the substitution of real earnings management for accruals earnings 
management reduces the risks that managers are taking when they involve in earnings 
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management (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Cohen, Dey, and Lys, 2008; Roychowdhury, 
2006). 
Braam, Nandy, Weitzel, and Lodh (2015) using multiple-countries data found that 
politically connected finns substitute real earnings management strategy for accruals 
earnings management. Following Braam, Nandy, Weitzel, and Lodh (2015) current 
study also expects that politically influenced firms are likely to substitute real earnings 
management for accruals earnings management. 
H7: Politically influenced firms substitute real earnings management for accruals 
earnings management compared to non-politically influenced firms. 
3.3 Measurement of Variables 
3.3.1 Accruals Quality 
This study uses a cross-sectional accruals quality model, where the estimate of the 
model for every industry is classified each year. The empirical measure of accruals 
quality used in this study is derived from McNichols (2002), which was first introduced 
by Dechow and Dichev (2002). The Dechow and Dichev (2002) model relates current 
accruals to lagged, current and one-year ahead cash flows from operations. McNichols 
(2002) argues that changes in sales and property, plant, and equipment (PPandE) are 
also the important factors in the estimation of current accruals. So, the author modified 
the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model by including the change in sales and PPandE in 
the regression. The McNichols (2002) model significantly reduced the measurement 
errors and enhanced the explanatory power of the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model. 
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Based on the McNichols (2002) model, the following equation is used to estimate 
abnonnal accruals: 
TCA1., = 80 +81CFOj,,-l +82CFOi1 +83CFOJ;+t +84MEViJ +85PPE11 +E1,, 
(1) 
Where: 
TCA 1., = firm j ' s total current accruals in year t; 
TCA = fl.CA - fl.CL - 6.C.ash + /jSTDEBT + ti7P; 
CFO1., = firm j's cash flow from operations at year t; cash flow from operations is 
calculated as net income before extraordinary items less total accruals (TA); 
TA = tiCA - 6.CL - 6.C.ash + /jSTDEBT + 6.TP - Dep 
CFO,_, = cash flow from operations at year t- 1; 
CFO,+, = cash flow from operations at year t+ 1; 
!).REV1., = firm j's change in sales revenue between year t-1 and year t; 
PPE.1., = firm j's property, plant and equipment in year t; 
~CA1., = firm j's change in current assets between year t-1 and year t; 
~CL
1
., = firm j ' s change in current liabilities between year t-1 and year t; 
tiCash1., = firm j ' s change in cash between year t-1 and year t; 
/jSTDEBT
1
,, = firm j ' s change in debt in current liabilities between year t-1 and year t; 
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= firm j's change in tax payable between year t-1 and year t; 
Dep-'·' = firm j 's depreciation and amortization expense in year t; 
All variables are scaled by lagged total assets. 
Equation 1 was then used to estimate the residuals for every industry in each year. 
Consistent with Sadiq and Othman (20 I 7); Al-dhamari and Ismail (20 I 5), the absolute 
values of the residuals, capturing accruals quality (accrual-based earnings management) 
in year t, serve as the proxy for earnings quality. 
This study repeated analysis by using three alternative measure of accruals earnings 
management models, 1) measure based on the signed values (instead absolute values) of 
the residuals obtained from the main model; 2) measure based on the residuals obtained 
from the original (unmodified) model of Dechow and Dichev (2002); 3) measure based 
on the absolute values of the residuals obtained from modified Jones model of Dechow 
(1995). The current study findings use these alternate measures of accruals which are 
largely similar to those reported in the main results. 
3.3.2 Real earnings management 
This study relies upon previous studies to develop proxies for real earnings 
management. For example, Chi, Liao, and Chen (2016); Braam, Nandy, Weitzel, and 
Lodh (2015); Zang (2011) examine the following real earnings management activities: 
reducing the cost of goods sold (COGS) by overproducing inventory to increase 
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earnings, and cutting discretionary expenditures, including advertising, selling, general, 
and administrative (SG&A) expenditures, and research and development. The former is 
measured by the abnonnal level of production costs, the latter by the abnormal level of 
discretionary expenditures. Following studies using the same proxies (Braam, Nandy, 
Weitzel, and Lodh, 2015; Zang, 2011; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010) give evidence that 
these measures capture real earnings management. 
Managers increase production unnecessarily in order to increase earnings by reporting 
lower cost of goods sold through increased production. Since the increased production 
units force managers to spread the fixed overhead costs over a larger number of units, a 
lower fixed cost per unit reduces cost of goods sold (COGS). However, producing more 
units will also result in high holding costs that will lead to lower cash flows from 
operations given sales levels and higher annual production costs relative to sales. 
A reduced discretionary expenditure also boosts current period earnings at the risk of 
lower future sales and earnings (Chi, Liao, and Chen, 2016; Braam, Nandy, Weitzel, 
and Lodh, 2015; Cohen, Dey, and Lys, 2008), and leads to higher current period cash 
flows (at the risk of lower future cash flows) if the firm generally pays for such 
expenses in cash (Zang, 2011). 





PROD, = sum of the cost of goods sold (COGS) in year t and the change in inventory 
from t-1 to t; 
/4_1 = total assets in year t-1; 
S1 = net sales in year t; 
/JS, = change in net sales from year t-1 to t. 
The abnonnal level of production costs REM PROD is measured as the estimated residual 
from the above equation. The higher the residual, the larger is the amount of inventory 
overproduction, and the greater is the increase in reported earnings through a reduction 
in the cost of goods sold. 
To estimate the normal level of discretionary expenses (DISX), Roychowdhury (2006) 
runs the following regression: 
DJSX, _ a fJ (-1-) /J (!)$') /J (~) --- - Po + 1 + 2 + 3 + &, 




D!SX, = discretionary expense at year t, 
D!SX, = sum of selling, general, and administrative expenses (SG&A), and research 
and development (R&D) expenses; 
A,_1 = total assets in year t-1 ; 
S,_1 = net sales in year t-1. 
The abnonnal level of discretionary expenses (REMnisx) is measured as the estimated 
residual from the above equation. Low negative residuals signify that firms cut amounts 
of discretionary expenses to increase reported earnings in the current period. For both 
proxies, higher residuals correspond with high levels of real activities' manipulation. 
Finns that involve in real earnings management (REM) exhibit at least one or both of 
the following characteristics: abnonnally high production costs, and abnormally low 
discretionary expenses. To capture the aggregate effects of REM, we combine the 
residuals of both individual measures REM (REM_PROD and REM_DISX) to compute 
comprehensive metrics of REM. Consistent with Chi, Liao, and Chen (2016); Braam, 
Nandy, Weitzel, and Lodh (2015); Zang (2011); for our measure, we added the 
standardized variable of abnormal discretionary expenses (REM_DISX) to the 
standardized variable of abnormal production costs (REM_PROD) and multiplied by 
negative one. The higher the amount of this measure (REM_ DP), the more likely the 
firm is involved in cutting discretionary expenses and production manipulation. 
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3.3.3 Earnings aggressiveness 
Earnings closer to cash flows are considered to be of higher quality because it contains 
comparatively small amount of accruals, (Visvanathan, 2006). Consistent with prior 
studies such as Sadiq and Othman (2017); Bhattacharya, Daouk, and Welker (2003 ); 
Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003), current study computes total accruals from 
statement of financial position and statement of comprehensive income statement. 
Following Bhattacharya, Daouk, and Welker (2003) current study measures earnings 
aggressiveness as the magnitude of accruals: 
(4) 
If any of the above value is missing, following Bhattacharya, Daouk, and Welker (2003) 







in year t 
= Total accruals of finn kin year t 
= Change in current assets of finn k in year t 
= Change in current liabilities of firm k in year t 
= Change in cash of firm kin year t 
= Change in long-term debt included in total current liabili ties for firm k 
= Amortization and Depreciation expenses of firm kin year t 
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6.TPi,1 = Change in tax payables of firm k in year t 
TA11_1 = Total assets of firm k in year t-1. 
3.3.4 Control Variables 
To test the relation between political influences and eammgs quality (EQ), EQ is 
regressed on the political influences indicator variable (PI) and control variables. Prior 
studies (Al-dhamari and Ismail, 2015; Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley, 20 11 ; Mashayekhi 
and Bazaz, 201 O; Cheng and Warfield, 2005; Reynolds and Francis, 2000) show that 
firm size (SIZE), profitability (ROA) , financial leverage (LEV), growth opportunities 
(GROWTH), net loss (LOSS) and audit quality (BIG4) affect earnings quality. SIZE is 
represented by the natural logarithm of total assets. A negative coefficient estimate of 
SIZE means that finn size is positively related to earnings quality. 
In addition, Jaggi, Leung, and Gul (2009) foW1d that fums with good operating 
performance report high earnings quality; and therefore earnings quality is high as 
profitability or ROA increases. A positive (negative) coefficient estimate of ROA 
means that firm is negatively (positively) related to earnings quality. DeAngelo (1994) 
reveals that earnings quality becomes low as the probability of default in debts 
increases. And thus a positive (negative) coefficient estimate of LEV means that finn is 
negatively (positively) related to earnings quality. LEV is measured as total liabilities 
divided by total assets. Moreover, GROWTH is expected to be positively related to 
lower earnings quality (Lee, Li, and Yue, 2006). A positive coefficient estimate of 
GROWTH m eans that finn is negatively related to earnings quality and vice versa. The 
110 
current study measures GROWTH as the change in sales revenue from the previous 
year divided by sales revenue in the previous year. 
Moreover, Gui and Lai (2002) argues that firms are perceived to disclose high earnings 
quality when their financial statements are audited by 8104 auditors. Thus, a negative 
coefficient estimate of BIG4 implies that a firm is positively related to earnings quality 
and vice versa. BIG4 is represented by an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if a 
finn is audited by one of the Big Four auditing firms and zero if otherwise. Further, a 
positive coefficient estimate of LOSS means that firm is negatively related to earnings 
quality and positive otherwise. LOSS is represented by an indicator variable taking the 


















Residuals of a regression of current accruals on 
previous period, current period, and future cash 
flows from operation, change in revenue, and 
property, plant, and equipment using modified 
Dechow and Dichev model (Francis et al., 2005; 
McNichols, 2002). Finally the residuals are 
transformed through abso lute value of residuals. 
Residuals of a regression of abnormal production 
costs, where production costs are defined as the sum 
of the cost of goods sold (COGS) and the change in 
inventories (Roychowdhury, 2006). Following 
Braam, Nandy, Weitzel, and Lodh (2015), the 
residuals are then multiple by (-1 ). 
Res iduals of a regression of abnormal discretionary 
expenses, where discretionary expenses are the sum 
of R&D expenses and SG&A expenses 
(Roychowdhury, 2006). Following Braam, Nandy, 
Weitzel, and Lodh (2015), the residuals are then 
multiple by (-1 ). 
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Aggregate meas ure of 
pol itical influences using 
three proxies ( I-presence 
ofpolitician(s) or close 
relative(s) of 
politician(s) on board of 
di rectors or senior 
management; 2- fi rm 
significantly owned by 
government; 3- presence 
of former/current 
civi l/military 
bureaucrat(s) on board of 
directors or senior 
management. 
Presence of politician(s) 
or close relative(s) of 
politician(s) on board of 
directors or senior 
management, 
Firm significantly owned 
by government at least 
10%. 
Measurement 
Comprehensive metric of real act ivities' 
manipulation, computed as the sum of the 
standardized variable of RM_PROD and the 
standardized variable of RM_DISX multiplied by 
negative one (Braam, Nandy, Weitzel, and Lodh, 
2015; Zang, 201 I). 
Earnings aggressiveness metric using earnings 
opacity model (Bhattacharya, Daouk, and Welker, 
2003) 
Dummy variable that takes the value of I if a fi rm is 
politically influenced through any of the mentioned 
criteria and O otherwise (Cheema, Munir, and Su, 
2016; Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley, 201 I ; Bushman 
and Piotroski, 2006). 
A dummy variable that takes the value of I if a firm 
is politically connected and O otherwise. There are 
about 37 out of 64 Pl firms which are Pl through 
presence of pol iticians or their close relatives. 
(37*5= I 85). Among these 3 7 firms, approx 55% 
are ruling and 45% is opposition. 
Dummy variable that takes the value of I if a firrn is 
significantly owned by government and 0 
otherwise. 
Presence of Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in 




bureaucrat(s) on board of 
directors or senior 
management 
It is extracted from PC 
i.e. political connected 
finns through ruling and 
opposition party 
Dummy variable that takes the value of I ifa finn is 
politica lly connected through ru ling party and O if 















Presence of politician(s) 
on board of directors or 
senior management 
Size 
Return on assets 
Leverage 
Growth 
Big four auditors 
Net loss 
lndusrry dummies 
3.3.5 Political Influences 
Measurement 
Dummy variable that takes the value of I if a finn is 
politically connected through direct connections i.e. 
in presence of politician(s) and O if firm is 
politically connected through indirect connections 
i.e. through close relative(s) of politician(s). 
Natural log of firms' total assets. 
Percentage of net income divided by total assets. 
LEV represents leverage of finn, which is measured 
by total liabi lities divided by total assets. 
It represents the growth in sales, measured by 
difference between current year and previous year 
sa les divided by previous year sa les. 
BIG4 is a dummy variable for audit quality, which 
takes the va lue of I if a fi rm is audited by BIG4 
auditors and O otherwise. 
LOSS represents net loss of firm, a dummy variable 
which takes the value of I if a firm is report ing net 
loss and O otherwise. 
Finns belonging to the textile sector, manufacturing 
(excluding textile, consumer goods and cement) 
sector, consumer goods, fuel and energy, services 
sector, and cement. 
Political influences are generally not reported publicly, that is why defining fums as a 
politically influenced finn is a difficult proposition. Similarly, identifying politically 
influenced firm in a developing country like Pakistan is complicated. Prior researchers 
have adopted three approaches in seeking to identify finns as being politically 
influenced. 
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In the first approach, prior studies have employed measures to identify the finn 's 
political connections. Fisman (2001) for example, uses Suharto Dependency Index to 
measure the political connections amongst Indonesian firms. The index includes the 
numerical rating ( l to 5) concerning the extent to which each of the industrial groups is 
dependent on political connections for its profitability. Fisman (200 I) takes this 
measure to identify firms' political connections. In the context of Pakistan, there is a 
large economic consulting service (www.export.gov) available for foreign firms to 
identify a potential local trade partner in Pakistan. Although their services include 
useful information on Pakistani firms regarding their financial conditions, business 
activities, trading experience and credit-worthiness, but infonnation on firm political 
connections is unavailable. 
In the second approach, prior studies such as Jayachandran (2006); Roberts (1990) 
identify politically influenced finns through political donations. But public information 
on such political donations is made publicly available in only few countries. In the 
context of Pakistan, there is no such public information available on political donations. 
Therefore, current research is not applicable for identifying political influences through 
political donations because such information is not available publicly in Pakistan. 
In the third approach, prior research matches two different databases to identify firms' 
political connections. Khwaja and Mian (2005) also adopted this method to recognize 
politically influenced finns in Pakistan. In doing so, the names of politicians from the 
first database (such as political parties website, election commission etc.) containing the 
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politician's information are used to cross-check the senior managers or board of 
directors (BOD) of firms from the second database ( containing firm level information). 
If a firms' senior management or BOD name is matched to a politicians' name, the firm 
is considered as politically influenced finn. 
Similarly, Faccio (2006) defines a firm as politically influenced in three ways: firstly, if 
one of the firm's board of directors or large shareholder is a member of parliament; 
secondly, large shareholders or one of the senior managers is closely related to top 
officials; and third, one of the senior managers or large shareholders has links with a 
minister or head of state. The large shareholder is defined as anyone who directly or 
indirectly owns at least l 0% of the voting rights. In the above classifications, finns are 
recognized as being politically influenced if any relative (such as parents, children, 
siblings or spouse) of a politician is a large shareholder. The political connections of a 
second type occur when a senior manager or large shareholder is a friend of the prime 
minister, minister or a Member of Parliament or assembly. This method is adopted by 
several other studies such as (Asquer and Calderoni, 2011 ; Infante and Piaza, 2010; 
Goldman, Rocholl, and So, 2009; Ferguson and Voth 2008; Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 
2006; Khwaja and Mian, 2005). These studies generally identify a firm as being 
connected if any of the firm' s Board members has taken part in any level of national 
elections. 
In addition, Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2004) define firm as politically influenced 
when government owns significant shareholding in a firm. Moreover, prior research 
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such as Cheema, Munir, and Su, 2016; Narayanaswamy (2013); Fan, Wong, and Zhang 
(2007) consider a firm as politically influenced if one of the senior management is 
current/former civil/military bureaucrat(s). 
3.3.5.1 Types of Political Influences 
The current study uses three types of political influences. The first type follows the 
measurement identified by Cheema, Munir, and Su (2016); Faccio (2006). The authors 
classified a firm as politically influenced when there is a presence of politician(s) or 
close relative(s) (friends and family) of politician(s) on the board of directors; one of the 
shareholders (control at least JO percent of votes) or senior managers (such as President, 
Vice-President, Chairman, CEO or Secretary) are a member of provincial assembly or 
parliament, a head of state or a minister. To suit the Pakistani environment, the second 
type of political influence is the percentage of government ownership in a firm; this 
type was identified by Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2004). The third type in the 
current study is consistent with Cheema, Munir, and Su (2016); Narayanaswamy 
(2013 ); Fan, Wong, and Zhang (2007) who consider a firm as politically influenced if 
one of the senior management or board members is a current/former civil/military 
bureaucrat. 
Khwaja and Mian (2005) define politician as a person who holds a position at federal or 
provincial level, or who had previously/currently holding a position in any political 
party at federal or provincial level. In order to identify politically influenced fums , the 
following procedures are carried out: 
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1) A politician 's full name should exactly match with the name of firm 's board 
members name, or the name of a member of senior management or one of the 
large shareholders. 
2) Review of the list of parliament or assembly members at provincial and federal 
levels. 
3) Review of the list of committee members of each political party on its website. 
4) Follow the book of Rehman (2006) who identified the list of politically 
influenced firms in Pakistan. 
5) Review the list of firms having government's significant shareholding. 
6) Review the website of finns that have current/former civil/military bureaucrat(s) 
in board of directors or senior management. 
Table 3.2 
Types of Political Influences used in Previous Studies 
Authors Country Types 
Chi, Liao, and Chen (2016) China • Politically connected CEOs 
Significant government ownership 
Cheema, Munir, and Su (2016) Pakistan 
Zeng, Li, and Hong (2012) China 
Al-dhamari and Ismai l (2015) Malaysia 




• A senior manager(s) or board 
member(s) is politician. 
• Close relatives of politician is board 
member or senior manager in a firm . 
• Board member is former/curren t 
civil/military bureaucrat. 
• A senior manager (s) is politician. 
• Board member is former/current 
bureaucrat. 
• Senior management or Board 
member(s) connected to politician. 
• Government shareholdings. 
Table 3.2 (Continued) 
Authors 
Liu, Saidi, and Bazaz (2014) 




Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley Multiple-countries 
(2011) 
Asquer and Calderoni (201 I) Italy 
Goldman (2009) us 
Fan, Wong, and Zhang (2007) China 
Jayachandra (2006) us 
Khwaja and Mian (2005) Pakistan 
Faccio (2006) Cross-country 
Fisman (2001) Indonesia 
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Types 
• Government shareholdings. 
• Government ownership. 
• If one of firms' board of director is a 
Member of Parliament. 
• Large shareholders are closely related 
to the top official. 
• If one of firms' board of director is a 
Member of Parliament. 
• Large shareholders are closely related 
to the top official. 
• Large shareholders have connections 
with a minister or the head of state. 
• A firm is defined as politically 
connected if any board member holds 
a position at any time in the past such 
as Member of the House of 
Representatives, Member of 
Administration, and Senator. Or has 
been a director of an organization 
such as 0MB, FEMA, or CIA. 
• A firm is considered as politically 
connected if current or former 
bureaucrats (current or former officer 
of the central or local governments or 
the military) are board members or 
senior management of firm. 
• Political donations 
• Consider firm as politically 
connected if a firm has a politician on 
their board of directors. A politician 
is defined as a person who stood in 
the provincial or national elections 
during the sample period. 
• If one of firm's board of directors is a 
Member of Parliament. 
• Large shareholders have links with a 
minister or the head of state. Large 
shareholders are closely related to the 
top official. 
• Suharto Dependency Index (scale 1-
5), developed by the Castle group. 
3.4 Data collection and sample specification 
This section discusses the construction of sample data used in this study. It also 
describes the data sources, and further presents information related to the guidelines for 
the sample selection. 
3.4.1 Sources of data 
In order to conduct this research, three sources of data are used. First, the firm-level of 
financial information used in this study comes from Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSE) and 
State Bank of Pakistan (SBP), which provides financial information of over 600 listed 
financials and non-financials firms. Moreover, the financial statements- income 
statement, balance sheet, cash flow statement and infonnation regarding the Board 
members of each firm are also included. To find political influences through 
politician(s), bureaucrat(s), and significant government shareholding, current study 
checked shareholdings patterns and board of directors' name of all non-financials listed 
finns in PSE. Secondly, in order to identify the indirect (close relatives of politicians) 
politically influenced finns, this study relied upon the book of Rehman (2006), wluch 
reports the list of politically influenced groups or firms and their associated finns within 
the Pakistani market. The similar source for identifying the affiliated groups in Pakistan 
has also been used in several other studies, such as Saeed, Belghitar, and Clark (201 5); 
Ashraf and Ghani (2005). 
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Third, in order to measure the firm' s political connections, databases on politically 
influenced people at national and provincial level are required. The political data is 
taken from Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP), which conducts elections for the 
Local government, Provincial and National Assemblies. It maintains the comprehensive 
information on provincial and national e lections, including parties' positions, candidates 
list and electoral outcomes. Cheema, Munir, and Su (2016); Saeed, Belghitar, and Clark 
(2015); Khwaja and Mian (2005) have used the same method to identify the political 
connections in the Pakistani market. 
3.4.2 Data sample 
The sample of current study includes politically influenced and similar non-politically 
influenced non-financials listed firms of Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSE). The goal of 
the current study is to empirically investigate the relationship between political 
infJuences and earnings quality in Pakistan. The current study has chosen panel data on 
Pakistani firms ranging between 2009- 2013. Additionally, the sample requires 2008 
and 20 14 data, because one year lagged and one year lead data is required to represent 
earnings quality attributes. It was necessary to select a long period (5 years) data , 
because it covers 5 years tenure of elected government. 
Secondly, to draw statistically sound estimations for the relationships to be tested in this 
study, the current study has chosen a long period. Thirdly, earnings management models 
required minimum five years data to be tested. Therefore, to be included in the sample, 
each non-fi nancial finn must have a data ranging 2008-2014 and firms with missing 
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data of these years were removed from the sample. After applying these restrictions on 
approximately 350 non-financial firms, the final sample included a panel of 129 firms, 
which included 64 politically influenced firms and 65 similar non-politically influenced 
firms within same industry was chosen. Thus, cWTent study used panel data that 
contained information for a 7-year period. Researcher argue that panel data, having 
blending characteristics of both time-series and cross-sectional data, improves the 
efficiency of econometric estimates through offering a greater degree of freedom and 
less collinearity amongst variables (Hsiao, 1985). 
The sample thus included all non-financial listed firms from Pakistan for the period 
2008-2014. The reason to limit the sample only to non-financial firms is due to the 
accounting treatment of financial firms (such as insurance companies, ban.ks and 
investment firms) which is significantly different to the non-financial fmns. Moreover, 
the capital structure of financial firms is significantly influenced by regulatory 
requirements; thus, it is not appropriate to compare the financial information of 
financial finns with non-financial firms. 
In order to know that firm is politically influenced, firstly, data on all politicians needed 
to be gathered. For this purpose, this research relied on the Election Commission of 
Pakistan (ECP). ECP provides information on all individuals who have participated in 
previous elections-at both national and state level. Given that the sample period covers 
2008-2014, there are two relevant national and state elections for this study: general 
elections held in 2008 and 2013. This politician database included all the information on 
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the names and party affiliations for all candidates in the elections, including the winner, 
party affiliation, and the number of votes each received. Each politician was identified 
uniquely through a combination of first and last name. There were around 210 national 
and 460 state constituencies in each election, with 6-9 candidates per constituency and 
a total of over 8,800 candidates participated in elections. Following Faccio (2006); 
Khwaja and Mian (2005), irrespective of the electoral outcome, all politicians are 
considered influential individuals who can provide benefits to firms. 
Secondly, finn is considered as politically influenced if significant shareholdings are 
owned by government. Third, firm is considered as politically influenced if 
current/former bureaucrat or army officer is a senior manager. In these situations the 
firms are then considered as politically influenced. Therefore, 64 firms are identified as 
politically influenced firms. 
3.5 Diagnostic Test of Panel Data Analysis 
Although there are many benefits of employing panel data, the technique has its own 
limitations. Thus, a diagnostic test must be performed to avoid results bias. The two 
basic tests are the serial correlation or autocorrelation test and heteroskedasticity test. 
3.5.1 Heteroskedasticity 
One of the important issues in panel data is Heterogeneity. It has serious implications 
for the OLS estimator. Although the OLS estimator remains unbiased, the estimated 
standard error is wrong. Because of this, hypotheses tests cannot be relied on. There are 
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many ways to check the presence of heteroskedasticity in the model such as, the Glejser 
test, Park test, the Goldfeld-Quandt test, Spearman 's rank correlation test, the White 
general heteroskedasticity test and the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test. Since, this study 
used a panel data analysis; therefore it is more appropriate to employ the modified Wald 
test for group wise heteroskedasticity (Greene, 2003). In the presence of a 
heteroskedasticity issue, a corrective action using the Panel-corrected standard error 
(PCSE) or White heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors is more appropriate to 
employed (Gujarati and Porter 2009; Pong and Whittington 1994). 
3.5.2 Autocorrelation 
The presence of serial correlation or autocorrelation results in biased standard error and 
inefficient estimates of the regressions coefficients. Wooldridge test for autocorrelation 
is the method that is available to detect autocorrelation. This test involves ascertaining 
the significance of the null hypothesis showing that no idiosyncratic error of the linear 
panel data model is present. The presence of autocorrelation shows significant F-value. 
An autocorrelation error can be corrected using generalized least square (GLS); 
however, if the panel data has more than fifty observations, panel corrected standard 
error (PCSE) is more appropriate compared to GLS (Gujarati and Porter, 2009). 
3.5.3 Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity is not a serious issue in a panel data model, since panel data itself is 
capable of reducing its effect (Baltagi, Bratberg, and Holmas, 2005). However, we need 
to ensure that the variables are not highly correlated; which is a common practice as 
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well. Highly correlated variables lead to bias and unreliable estimates (Gujarati and 
Porter 2009). To diagnose the presence of multicollinearity, the common diagnostic 
tests are the Correlation Matrix and Variance Inflation factor (VIF). 
3.6 Method of analysis 
This study investigates the relationship between political influences (politically 
connected BOD, significant government ownership, and civil/military bureaucracy in 
BOD) and earnings quality (accruals earnings management, real earnings management, 
and earnings aggressiveness). To achieve the objectives, we employ Panel-Corrected 
Standard Error (PCSE). Several assumptions of multicollinearity, heteroskedasticity, 
and autocorrelation are tested on panel data, which determined that PCSE technique is 
the best estimator. Prior studies like Gujarati and Porter (2009); Pong and Whittington 
( 1994) also suggest that if panel data has heteroskedasticity issue, then PCSE is the best 
estimator. Therefore, PCSE regression method is used to examine the relationship 
between political influences and earnings quality using multiple proxies. 
As discussed previously, this study analyzes earnings quality by accruals quality 
(accruals eanungs management), real eammgs management, and earnings 
aggressiveness. Equation 5 is derived from equation 1 to test hypothesis 1. The 
following equations were used to test the impact of political influences (using combined 
aspect i.e. PI) on accruals quality: 
AEMj,I = Oo +o,Pli., +02SIZEJ,r +03ROAJ., +04LEVJ.1 +osGROWTHj, 
+ o6BIG4 j,I + 67 LOSSJ., + 0s lNDUSTRYJ., + (1)/.t (5) 
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Where: 
AEM 1., = accruals earnings management (accruals quality) of firm j at year t; 
P/1_, = dummy variable for politically influenced firms, 1 for politically influenced 









= finn j's natural log of total assets at year t; 
= firm j 's percentage of net income divided by total assets at year t; 
= finn j's leverage at year t, measured by total liabilities divided by total 
GROWTH 
1
., = firm j's growth rate in sales at year t; 
BIG41_, = dummy variable for audit quality, l if the auditor is Big Four, and 0 
otherwise. 
LOSS = dummy variable for net loss at year t, 1 if the firms report loss and 0 
otherwise. 
The coefficient on PI ( o, ) shows the relationship between political influences and 
accruals quality. Positive (negative) estimates indicate that political influences are 
related to lower (higher) accruals quality. 
The following equation was derived from equation one to test the impact of political 
influences (using multiple aspects i.e. PC, GOVT, and BUR) on accruals quality, AEM 
is regressed on the political influences (i.e. PC, GOVT, and BUR) and control variables. 
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PC, GOVT, and BUR are dummy variables for politically influenced firm, 1 for 
politically influenced firms and O for non-politically influenced firms: 
AEMJ,1 =Oo +o,PC}., +02GOVI'J,I + 03BURJ.I +04SIZE},I + osROA;., +o6LEVJ., 
+ 07GROWTH J.1 +OgBIG4}., + 09LOSSj,I + o,olND USTRYJ,I + m;,, (6) 
Where; 
All variables are same as above in equation 5; 
PC = Political connections through politician(s) or close relative(s) of politician(s), 1 
for poHtically connected firms, and O otheiwise; 
GOVT = Government owned firms, 1 for significantly government own firms and 0 
otherwise; 
BUR = Presence of bureaucrat(s) on BOD, 1 for presence of bureaucrat(s) and 0 
otherwise. 
The coefficient on PC ( 01 ), GOVT ( o2), and BUR ( o3) shows the relationship between 
political influences proxies and accruals quality. Positive (negative) estimates indicate 
that political influences are related to lower (higher) accruals quality. 
Equation 7 is derived from equation two and three to test hypothesis 2. The following 
equations were used to test the relationship between political influences (using 
combined aspect i.e. PI) and real earnings management. REM is regressed on the 
political influences (i.e. Pl) and control variables. Pl is a dummy variable for politically 
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influenced furn, I for politically influenced firms and 0 for non-politically influenced 
firms: 
REM1., =80 +01PI;., +02SJZE1_1 +,53ROA1., +04 LEV,;,, +o5GROWTH1., +o6 BIG41., 
+01 LOSS1., +08 INDUSTRY1 ., +w1.1 (7) 
Where; 
All variables are same as above; 
REM = Aggregate measure of real earnings management. 
The following equation was derived from equation two and three to test the relationship 
between political influences (using multiple aspects i.e. PC, GOVT, and BUR) and real 
earnings management, REM is regressed on the political influences (i.e. PC, GOVT, 
and BUR) and control variables. PC, GOVT, and BUR are dummy variables for 
politically influenced firm, 1 for politically influenced fmns and 0 for non-politically 
influenced firms: 
REM1_, =<J0 +cS1PC1_, +o2 GOVT1., +c53 BUR1_, +c54 SIZE1., +c55 ROA1., +66 LEV1_, 
+ 01 GROWTH ;., + 58BIG4 1., + o9 LOSS1 ., + <510INDUSTRY1., + (1)1_, (8) 
Where; 
All variables are same as above. 
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Equation 9 is derived from equation four to test hypothesis 3. The following equations 
were used to test the relationship between political influences (using combined aspect 
i.e. PI) and earnings aggressiveness (EA). EA is regressed on the political influences 
(i.e. PI) and control variables. PI is a dummy variable for politically influenced firm, 1 
for politically influenced firms and O for non-politically influenced firms: 
EA,,, = 80 + o,PJ 1., + 02SJZE, 1., + o3 ROA 1., + c54LEV.,.r + o5GROWTH.,., 
+56 BIG41., + c57 LOSS1., +c58INDUSTRY1,, +m1., (9) 
Where; 
All variables are same as above; 
EA = EA represents earnings aggressiveness offirmj, in year t. 
The following equation was derived from equation four to test the relationship between 
political influences (using multiple aspects i.e. PC, GOVT, and BUR) and earnings 
aggressiveness (EA), EA is regressed on the political influences (i.e. PC, GOVT, and 
BUR) and control variables. PC, GOVT, and BUR are dummy variables for politically 
influenced finn, 1 for politically influenced firms and O for non-politically influenced 
films: 
EA1., =<50 +01PC1.1 +<52GOVT1., +o3BUR1.t +<54S1ZE1_, + c5, ROA1., +o6LEV1.t 
+ 01 GROWTH 1,, + o8 BIG41., + o9LOSS1., + <510 INDUSTR.Y1., + m,., (I 0) 
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Where; 
All variables are same as above. 
Equation 11 is derived from equation 1, to test the relationship between political 
connections (through ruling or opposition party) and accruals quality, AEM is regressed 
on the rnling/opposition party political connections (PCR) and control variables. PCR is 
a dummy variable for the politically connected firm, 1 for political connection through 
ruling party and O for opposition party. 
AEM }.I = Oo + o!PCR J.I + 02SIZE j ,I + 03ROA j,1 + 04 LEV,,, + OsGROWTHj.l 
+o6 BIG41 ., +o7 LOSS1_, +08 ffi/DUSTRYJ,1 +w1,, (11) 
Where; 
All variables are same as above; 
PCR J.1 = dummy variable of political connections; 1 for ruling party and O for 
opposition party. 
The coefficient on PCR ( 01 ) shows the relationship between ruling/opposition party 
political connections and accruals earnings management (accruals quality). Positive 
(negative) estimates indicate that politically connected firms through ruling party are 
related to lower (higher) accruals quality. 
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Equation 12 is derived from equation two and three (i.e. the combined measure of real 
earnings management), to test the relation between political connections (through ruling 
or opposition party) and real earnings management (REM), REM is regressed on the 
ruling/opposition party political connections (PCR) and control variables. PCR is a 
dummy variable for the politically connected finn, I for political connection through 
ruling party and O for opposition party. 
REMj., = '50 + t51PCRi., + o2 SIZEi-' +'53 ROAi.' + b4 LEVi., + o5GROWTH 11 
+t56BIG4 j,1 +07LOSSj., +oslNDVSTRYj,I +uJj,r (12) 
Where; 
All variables are same as above; 
The coefficient on PCR ( 61 ) shows the relationship between ruling/opposition party 
political connections and real earnings management. Positive (negative) estimates 
indicate that politically connected firms through ruling party are more (less) involved in 
real earnings management. 
Equation 13 is derived from equation four, to test the relationship between political 
connections (through ruling or opposition party) and earnings aggressiveness (EA), EA 
is regressed on the ruling/opposition party political connections (PCR) and control 
variables. PCR is a dummy variable for the politically connected firm, 1 for political 
connection through ruling party and O for opposition party. 
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EA1_, = 00 +01PCRJ., + 02SIZE1., + o3 ROA1 ., +o4 LEV1., +o5GROWFH i-• 
+o6 BIG4J.I +01 LOSSJ.• +o8 INDUSTRY1.1 +w1. , (13) 
Where; 
All variables are same as above; 
Positive (negative) coefficient for PCR ( 01 ) indicates that politically connected finns 
through ruling party(s) have more (less) aggressive earnings, implies less (high) 
transparent earnings. 
Equation 14 is derived from equation two and three (i.e. the combined measure of real 
earnings management), to test the relation between the interaction effect of political 
influences and accruals earnings management (i.e. PIAEM) on real earnings 
management (REM), REM is regressed on the accruals earnings management (AEM), 
political influences (Pl), the interaction effect of political influences and accruals 
earnings management (i.e. PIAEM), and control variables. AEM is the residuals extract 
from equation 1; PI is a dummy variable of the aggregate measure of politically 
influenced firms, I for politically influenced firms and O for non-politically influenced 
firms; PIAEM is the interaction variable of political influences and accruals earnings 
management' 
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REMJ,I = oo +o,AEM,.1 +02PIJ., +03PIAEMj,1 +04SIZEj.1 +05ROA,., +oGLEVj.l 
+o7GROWTH1., +o8 BIG4i-' +o9 LOSS1., +o10INDUSTRY1., +(1)1., (14) 
Where; 
All variables are same as above; 
PIAEM i.1 = interaction effect of political influences and accruals earnings 
management. 
3. 7 Conclusion 
This chapter has covered the theoretical framework of this study. Three proxies of 
political influences are used: presence ofpolitician(s) or close relative(s) of politician(s) 
on fim1s' board of directors or senior management; finn is significantly owned by 
government; and presence of current/fonner civil/military bureaucrat(s) on firms' board 
of directors or senior management. Their relationship with earnings quality is also 
depicted in the theoretical framework. Twenty one hypotheses are to be used to reflect 
the impact of political influences on earnings quality using different proxies of both 
variables. In addition, this chapter has also discussed the research method to be adopted 
in the current study. To achieve the research objectives a quantitative research approach 
is adopted. This chapter also discusses the data collection and data sample procedures to 
be used in the current study. Moreover, it also deals with model specification or 




DAT A ANALYSIS 
This chapter presents the study's empirical results. First, this chapter presents the 
industry classifications, followed by the descriptive statistics and the Pearson 
correlation matrix for the variables used in the study's regression analysis. Next, the 
chapter presents different diagnostic tests of panel data analysis, and results from the 
panel corrected standard error according to the hypotheses outlined in Chapter Three. 
Lastly, this chapter shows sensitivity analyses and the additional tests results. 
4.2 Industry Classification 
Our data sample includes 129 listed firms and 645 observations over the 5-year period 
(2009-2013). In Table 4.1, we can see that the majority number of sample finns are 
from the textile sector (21. 71 %), followed by the manufacturing ( excluding textile, 
consumer goods and cement) sector (20.93%), consumer goods (20.16%), fuel and 
energy (16.28%), services sector (12.40%), and cement (8.53%). 
Table 4.1 
Industry Classification 
Industry Freq. Percent Cum. 
Cement 55 8.53 8.53 
Consumer goods 130 20.16 28.68 
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Table 4.1 (Continued) 
Industry Freq. Percent Cum. 
Fuel and Energy 105 16.28 44.96 
Manufacturing 135 20.93 65.89 
Services 80 12.4 78.29 
Textile 140 21.71 100 
Total 645 100 
4.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.2 shows the descriptive statistics of all the variables used in the earnings quality 
models (i.e. accruals quality model, real earnings management model, earnings 
aggressiveness, and earnings smoothing model). Table 4.2 shows the standard 
deviation, mean, minimum, and maximum of the dependent and explanatory variables 
of the four models. 
4.3.1 Dependent Variables 
In terms of dependent variables, the values reported in descriptive statistics are the 
signed values of the dependent values. However, we used absolute value in our main 
results and signed value in sensitivity analysis. Earnings aggressiveness (EA) score 
ranged from -1.99332 to 1.984933 with a mean value of -0.0077809, which is closed to 
the mean value of Bhattacharya, Daouk, and Welker (2003). 
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Similarly, the accruals earnings management (AEM) score range from -1.92648 to 
1.76998 with a mean value of 0.0084, which is closed to the mean value (0.026) 
reported by Braam, Nandy, Weitzel, and Lodh (2015). Moreover, real earnings 
management (REM) score range from -2.88629 to 13.17507 with a mean value of 
0.0349084, which is close to the mean value of real earnings management model 
reported by Braam, Nandy, Weitzel, and Lodh (2015). 
4.3.2 Independent Variables 
Table 4.2 gives the. descriptive statistics of the independent variables (political 
influences proxies) used in the current study. In total, there are 129 firms and 645 
observations; where politically influenced firms have 48.83% of the observations and 
51.17% of the fim1s are non-politically influenced. In addition, the percentage of 
political influence firms (through politician(s) in BOD) was 28.68%, through significant 
government ownership was 11.62%, while the percentage of politically influenced fums 
(through civil/military bureaucracy) was 18.91 %. 
Moreover, to check the difference in effect between ruling party political connections 
and opposition party political connections, we regressed all three earnings quality 
attributes (i.e. accruals quality, real earnings management, and earnings aggressiveness) 
between political connections through ruling party and opposition party. The percentage 
of ruling party political connection (PCR) was 54.59%, and the percentage of 
opposition party political connections remained 45.41%. 
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4.3.3 Control Variables 
The mean percentage of the return on assets (ROA) of the fitms was 7.80, standard 
deviation 13 .94 with a minimum -49 .38 and maximum 61.43 percent, which is closed to 
the mean value of Harymawan and Nowland (20 I 6). The mean ratio of debt to total 
assets (Leverage) was 0.6283 with a standard deviation of 0.3146 ranging from 
0.0314643 to 3.011882, which is same as the mean value of Harymawan and Nowland 
(2016). The average logged value of firm size was 6.84, standard deviation 0.67 with a 
minimum 4.72 and maximum 8.61. In addition, the average firms' growth was 0. 16 
with a standard deviation of 0.50 ranging from -1.459162 to 7.980104, which is higher 
than the average finns' growth of Harymawan and Nowland (2016) i.e. 0.04. The mean 
percentage of loss was 22.17%, implying that 22.17% of firrn-years observations are 
facing losses, with standard deviation being 0 .41 ranging from 0 to l. Moreover, on 
average, big four audit (BIG4) firms audited 44.34% of the observations, while the 
remaining 55.64% were audited by non-big four auditors, with a standard deviation of 
49. 71 % ranging from 0 to l. 
Table 4.2 
Descriptive Statistics of the earnings quality attributes (i.e. earnings aggressiveness, 
accruals earnings management, and real earnings management), political influences, 
and control variables 




























Table 4.2 (Continued) 
Variables Observations Mean Standard Min Max 
Deviation 
PC 645 0.2868 0.4526 0 1 
GOVT 645 0.1162 0.3208 0 I 
BUR 645 0.1891 0.3919 0 1 
PCR 185 0.5459 0.4992 0 1 
Control Variables 
ROA 645 7.8078 13.9422 -49.38 61.43 
LEV 645 0.6283 0.3146 0.0314 3.0118 
SIZE 645 6.8403 0.6702 4.7298 8.6169 
Growth 645 0.1660 0.5022 -1.4591 7.9801 
Loss 645 0.2217 0.4157 0 1 
BIG4 645 0.4434 0.4971 0 
Note: EA represents the earnings aggressiveness, calculated using Bhattacharya et al. (2003) model, AEM 
is the residuals of accruals earnings managemen1 (accruals quality) model, which is calculated using 
Modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) Model , REM is the aggregate residuals of real earnings 
management model, PI is the aggregate proxy of political influences, which includes all three 
characteristics of poli tical influences in a single proxy; indicator value 1 for politically influenced firms 
and O otherwise, PC represents the presence of politicians or close relatives of politicians in board of 
directors; indicator value 1 for political connections and O otherwise, GOVT is the significant government 
ownership in a firm; indicator value I for government owned firms and O otherwise, BUR represents the 
presence of civil/military bureaucrat in board of directors; indicator value 1 for bureaucrats and 0 
otherwise, PCR is the ruling party political connections; indicator value 1 for ruling party political 
connections and O opposition party political connections , ROA is the percentage of return on assets, LEV 
is ratio of debts on total assets, SIZE is the log of total assets, GROWTH is the percentage change in 
sales, Loss is the net loss of firms; indicator value I for firms producing losses and O otherwise, BIG4 is 
the top four audit firms in the world; indicator value I for BIG4 auditors and O otherwise. 
4.4 Analysis of Pearson Correlation Matrix 
Table 4.3 shows the Pearson correlation matrix for dependent variables i.e. accruals 
earnings management (AEM), real earnings management (REM), and earnings 
aggressiveness (EA), and explanatory variables i.e. aggregate measure of political 
influences (PI), multiple aspects of political influences (i.e. PC, GOVT, and BUR), and 
control variables. The correlation matrix examines the correlation among independent 
variables and control variables. The political influences (PI) and multiple proxies of PI 
(i.e. PC, GOVT, and BUR) have a correlation with a positive relationship with AEM (r 
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= 0.11, p = 0.0025), PC (r = 0.059, p = 0.13), GOVT (r = 0.066, p = 0.09), and BUR (r 
= 0.07, p = 0.05). The correlation between AEM and independent variables (PI, PC, 
GOVT, and BUR) indicate the positive relation between them. In addition, BIG4, 
GROWTH, LEV, and ROA have a correlation with a negative relationship with AEM. 
These control variables were negatively correlated with AEM i.e. BIG4 (r = -0.06, p = 
0.113), GROWTH (r = -0.11, p = 0.004), LEV (r = -0.11, p = 0.004), and ROA (r = -
0.02, p = 0.54). This suggests that firms with BIG4 auditors, high growth rate, high 
leverage and return on assets involve less in AEM. Moreover, Loss and SIZE have a 
correlation with a positive relationship with AEM. These control variables are 
positively correlated with AEM i.e. Loss (r = 0.03, p = 0.37), and SIZE (r = 0.04, p = 
0.27). Therefore, this could be interpreted that firms with negative earnings and big size 
are more involved in AEM. 
In addition, Table 4.3 shows the Pearson correlation matrix for aggregate measure of 
real earnings management (REM), political influences and proxies of political 
influences, and control variables. The political influences (PI) and multiple proxies of 
PI (i.e. PC, GOVT, and BUR) have a correlation with a positive relationship with REM 
(r = 0.15, p = 0.0001), PC (r = 0.10, p = 0.01), GOVT (r = 0.05, p = 0.19), and BUR (r = 
0.08, p = 0.02). The correlation between REM and independent variables (PI, PC, 
GOVT, and BUR) indicate the positive relation between them. In addition, BIG4, 
GROWTH, LEV, and ROA have a correlation with a positive relationship with REM. 
These control va1iables were positively correlated with REM i.e. BIG4 (r = 0.04, p = 
0.23), GROWTH (r = 0.07, p = 0.07), LEV (r = 0.04, p = 0.21), and ROA (r = 0.208, p 
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= 0.00). This suggests that finns with BIG4 auditors, high growth rate, high leverage 
and return on assets involve more in REM. Moreover, Loss and SIZE have a correlation 
with a negative relationship with REM. These control variables were negatively 
correlated with REM i.e. Loss (r = -0.098, p = 0.012), and SIZE (r = -0.097, p = 0.013). 
Therefore, this could be interpreted that firms with negative earnings and big size are 
less involved in REM. 
Moreover, Table 4.3 shows the Pearson correlation matrix for earnings aggressiveness 
(EA), political influences and proxies of political influences, and control variables. The 
political influences (Pl) and multiple proxies of PI (i.e. PC, GOVT, and BUR) have a 
correlation with a positive relationship with EA (r = 0.08, p = 0.024), PC (r = 0.05, p = 
0.19), GOVT (r = 0.02, p = 0.49), and BUR (r = 0.05, p = 0.18). Additionally, BIG4, 
Loss, ROA, and SIZE have a correlation with a positive relationship with EA. These 
control variables were positively correlated with EA i.e. BIG4 (r = 0.017, p = 0.65), 
Loss (r = 0.002, p = 0.94), ROA (r = 0.007, p = 0.85), and SIZE (r = 0.05, p = 0.1 7). On 
the other hand, GROWTH and LEV are negatively correlated with EA i.e. GROWTH (r 
= -0.09, p = 0.01), and LEV (r = -0.11, p = 0.004). Therefore, this could be argued that 




Coefficient correlations between Earnings Quality Attributes and Explanatory Variables 




Pl 0.118*** 0. 15•0 0.088** 
PC 0.059 0.10° 0.051 0.65• 0 
GOVT 0.067• 0.051 0.027 0.361 * -0.12**• 
BUR 0.074• 0.088•• 0.051 0.486••· -0.21 ••· 0.442*** 
BIG4 -0.062 0.046 0.017 -0.041 -0.28• .. 0.211 •0 0.31 ... 
GROWTH -0.11 ... 0.07• -0.1 O•• -0.019 -0.026 0.022 0.005 0.008 
LEV -0. 11 ••• 0.049 -0.11*** 0.177••· 0.267•** -0.018 -0.12• .. -0.31 ... -0.025 
LOSS 0.034 -0.01•• 0.002 0.12* 0.173* -0.053 -0.124* -0.258* -0.0913** 0.3486* 
ROA -0.024 0.208* 0.007 -0.063 -0.214* 0.073*** 0.216* 0.376* 0.12* -0.41 * -0.63* 
SIZE 0.043 -0.01 •• 0.053 0.177* -0.132* 0.449* 0.371 * 0.482* -0.0032 -0.116* -0.07* 0.0441 
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4.5 Diagnostic Test Results 
This study has done the diagnostic tests for the presence of a number of econometrics 
issues related to panel data. As explained earlier in Chapter 4, panel data model assumes 
that the disturbance terms have homoscedastic variances and constant serial correlations 
through random individual effects (Baltagi 2005). The next section presents the 
diagnostic tests results of the residuals of the panel regression model. 
4.5.1 Heteroskedasticity Results 
In current study, the assumption is that the disturbance terms of the variables should be 
constant across the panel. Panel data assumes that the regression disturbances are 
homoscedastic with the same variance across time and individuals (Baltagi, 2005). To 
diagnose heteroskedasticity in our models, we run the Wald test for groupwise 
heteroskedasticity, in order to check the presence of heteroskedasticity in residuals. The 
fixed effects regressions were performed on three earnings quality attribute (i.e. accruals 
quality, earnings aggressiveness, and real earnings management). The accruals quality 
attribute resulted in Chi-Square (129) = 68209.29, earnings aggressiveness resulted in 
Chi-Square (1 29) = 2.1 e+05, and real earnings management resulted in Chi-Square 
(129) = 6.Ie+05, all three attributes were significant at 0.0000 level. Therefore, the 
results signified the presence of heteroskedasticity in all three earnings quality 
attributes, and robust standard errors (panel corrected standard error) technique is 
adopted to solve the heteroskedasticity issue. 
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Normality test was not conducted because under panel data analysis normality and 
linearity were not a major concerns because the standard least squares assumption was 
not applicable in panel data (Gujarati and Porter, 2004) and most of the study's 
continuous variables were transformed (Turpen, 1990). ln addition, outliers test was not 
conducted because this study adopted robust regression techniques, which handle the 
outliers and fit the outliers (Gujarati and Porter, 2004). In addition, outliers could also 
be notice through descriptive statistics of the variables, and thus looking at the 
descriptive statistics in Table 4.2, it does not show any extreme high and low values. 
4.5.2 Autocorrelation Results 
The current study employed the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation or serial correlation 
in STAT A using the xtserial command to check the serial correlation in panel data. The 
null hypothesis assumed no first order serial correlation. For the earnings 
aggressiveness attribute, the test of serial correlation resulted in F (1, 128) == 0.374, for 
the accruals quality attribute F (1, 128) == 0.417, and for real earnings management 
attribute F (I, 128) == 3 .419. Earnings aggressiveness, accruals quality, and real earnings 
management attributes were insignificant at 0.5418, 0.5194, and 0.0667 levels 
respective! y. 
Based on the results, we accept the null hypothesis of no serial correlation between error 
terms in earnings aggressiveness, accruals quality, and real earnings management 
attributes. The results suggest the absence of first order autocorrelation in the earnings 
aggressiveness, accruals quality, and real earnings management attributes. 
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4.5.3 Multicollinearity Results 
Tables 4.3 shows the results of the multicollinearity test between the variables. Even 
though, multicollinearity is not a serious threat for panel data (Baltagi 2005). We further 
examined the nature of the panel data analysis; the correlation coefficient between 
independent variables was also computed. Multicollinearity existed between variables 
when the correlation between variables is more than 0.7 (Hair et al., 2010). In addition, 
Gujarati and Porter (2009) suggested that more than 0.80 is a sign of serious correlation. 
As shown in the correlation coefficient tables, multicollinearity was not a serious threat 
to this study, since all the variables fell within the acceptable range. 
Table 4.4 
VIF results of political influences (using multiple proxies) and control variables 
Variable VIF lNIF 
PC 1.16 0.861823 
GOVT 1.42 0.702099 
BUR 1.39 0.716937 
LOSS 1.71 0.584445 
SIZE 1.66 0.602563 
BIG4 1.66 0.6038 
LEV 1.31 0.763015 
ROA 2.04 0.490727 
GROWTH 1.02 0.980306 
Mean VIF 1.49 
Note: PC represents the presence of politicians or close relatives of politicians in board of directors; 
indicator value I for politic~! connections and 0 otherwise, GOVT is the significant government 
ownership in a firm; indicator value I for government owned firms and 0 otherwise, BUR represents the 
presence of civil/military bureaucrat in board of directors; indicator value I for bureaucrats and 0 
otherwise, ROA is the percentage of return on assets, LEV is ratio of debts on total assets, SIZE is the log 
of total assets, GROWTH is the percentage change in sales, LOSS is the net loss of finns; indicator value 
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I for firms producing losses and O otherwise, BIG4 is the top four audit firms in the world; indicator 
value I for BIG4 auditors and O otherwise. 
In addition, we performed the Variance Inflation Factor (V[F) test, to further test the 
presence of multicollinearity among explanatory variables. The tables below show that 
the VIF did not exceed I 0, since it fell below the threshold of 10 suggested in Kennedy 
( 1992). Therefore, multicollinearity was not a serious threat. 
4.6 Measurements of Relationships 
In order to examine the research questions, seven hypotheses were tested using ten 
regressions in order to use inferential statistic. Hypothesis 1 to 3 was used to answer the 
research question one. Hypotheses 1, investigated the relationship between political 
influences (as a single aspect and multiple aspects) and accruals earnings management 
(accruals quality). Hypotheses 2, tested the relationship between political influences (as 
a single aspect and multiple aspects) and real earnings management. In addition, 
hypothesis 3 tested the relationship between political influences (as a single aspect and 
multiple aspects) and earnings opacity ( earnings aggressiveness). 
Furthermore, hypotheses 4 to 6 were used to answer the research question two. 
Hypothesis 4 tested the relationship between political connections (ruling/opposition 
political party) and accruals earnings management (accruals quality). While hypothesis 
5 tested the relationship between political connections through ruling/opposition 
political party com1ected firm and real earnings management. In addition, hypothesis 6 
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tested the relationship between political connections through ruling/opposition political 
party connected firm and earnings opacity (earnings aggressiveness). 
Additionally, hypothesis 7 was used to answer the research question three. Hypothesis 7 
was used to test whether politically influenced finns substituted real earnings 
management for accruals earnings management. Following Braam, Nandy, Weitzel, and 
Lodh (2015 ), hypothesis 7 tested the interacting effect of political influences and 
accruals earnings management on real earnings management. The research hypotheses 
tested are presented below: 
4.7 Panel Regression Results for Earnings Quality Attributes 
As discussed earlier in chapter three, ten regressions were estimated to test various 
hypotheses of this study. Consistent with the explanations given in previous chapter 
(Section 3.7), panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) estimation techniques were 
employed to test all three earnings quality attributes. Prior studies (Gujarati, 2009 and 
Petersen, 2009), stated that in presence of heteroskedasticity, PCSE and generalized 
least square (GLS) are the best estimators and provide robust results. The Modified 
Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity in fixed effect regression model showed 
(P>Chi-Square = 0.0000) for all three attributes, implies that all models have 
heteroskedasticity issue. Therefore, to overcome heteroskedasticity issue, GLS or PCSE 
techniques are more appropriate. However, PCSE technique gives more robust results 
compared to GLS. Therefore, PCSE technique is employed to test our hypothesis. 
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4.7.1 Relationship between Political Influences (combined proxy and multiple 
proxies) and Accruals Earnings Management (Accruals Quality) 
The R-Square for model 1 and 2 was 0.1577 and 0.1605 respectively. The low R-Square 
is consistent with previous studies. For example, Asthana and Boone (2012); Choi, 
Kim, and Zang (2010) report 0.20 and 0.148 respectively. Table 4.5 shows the results of 
relationship between political influences (using combined aspect) and accruals quality. 
In addition, model 2 in Table 4.5 presents the results of relationship between political 
influences (using multiple aspects) and accruals quality. 
Results of Hl 
The result shows that politically influenced firms are positively and significantly related 
to accruals earnings management and have lower accruals quality, which implies that 
the quality of earnings are lower amongst politically influenced firms. The coefficient 
for the political influences (using combined aspect) was positive and significant 
0.03196 (z = 3.99) using panel corrected standard error (PCSE) technique. This result is 
consistent with the findings of studies by Al-dhamari and Ismail (2015); Guo and Ma 
(2015); and Narayanaswamy (2013), who relates political influences with lower 
earnings quality (accruals quality). Therefore, the results suggest that the presence of 
politically influenced people in board of directors (BOD) or management and 
significant government ownership increase accruals earnings management activities. 
Thus, this finding supports hypothesis 1. 
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Model 2 of Table 4.5, shows that political influences (through politically connected 
(PC) BOD) are significantly and positively related to accruals earnings management and 
have lower accruals quality, which means that politically connected firms have lower 
earnings quality. The coefficient for the political connections is significant and positive 
0.0231 (z = 3.11) using (PCSE) technique. This fmding is in line with the results of 
studies by Al-dhamari and Ismail (2015); Li et al. (2013); and Chaney, Faccio, and 
Parsley (2011 ), who relate political connections with accruals earnings management 
(accruals qulity). Hence, the results suggest that the presence of politician(s) in (BOD) 
or management increase accruals earnings management activities and lower accruals 
quality. 
In addition, the positive and significant relationship between political influences 
(through significant government ownership) and accruals earnmgs management 
supports the view that political influences in terms of the significant government 
ownership is related to lower accruals quality. The coefficient for the government 
ownership is significant and positive 0.0465 (z = 2.28) using (PCSE) technique. This 
finding is consistent with the findings of studies by Ben-Nasr et al. (2015); Capalbo et 
al. (2014); Zeng, Li, and Hong (2012); and Li et al. (2011), who relate government or 
state ownership with lower accruals quality and high accruals earnings management 
activities. Thus, the findings suggest that firms with significant government ownership 
are more involved in accruals earnings management, implies lower accruals quality. 
Therefore, this finding supports hypothesis 1. 
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Moreover, the results show that accruals quality is poor amongst firms with political 
influences (through civil/military bureaucracy). The coefficient for the presence of 
bureaucrat in firms' BOD was significant and positive 0.0211 (z = 1.8). 
Narayanaswamy (2013) and Zeng, Li, and Hong (2012) also found a positive 
relationship between political influences (through civil/military bureaucracy) and 
accruals earnings management; it means firms with bureaucrats in the BOD have lower 
accruals quality. Hence, the findings suggest that firms with the presence of 
civil/milatary bureaucrat(s) on the BOD are more involved in accruals earnings 
management and have lower earnings quality (accruals quality). Thus, this finding 
supports hypothesis 1. 
Results for Control Variables 
We included seven control variables in our models, which represented the financial 
attributes of the finns. Jn addition, we included industry dummies to control for sector-
specific effects. Consistent with previous studies, we included as finn control variables 
leverage (LEV), return on assets (ROA), total assets (SIZE), BIG4 auditors, GROWTH, 
and LOSS (Al-dhamari and Ismail, 2015; Braam, Nandy, Weitzel, and Lodh, 2015; 
Zang, 2012; Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley, 201 l; Cohen, Dey, and Lys, 2008). 
Table 4.5 , shows the relationship between accruals earnings management and control 
variables. Seven control variables were included in accruals earnings management 
(accruals quality) model, which represented the financial attributes of the firms. 
Consistent with previous studies such as Dimitropoulos and Asteriou (201 O); Epps and 
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Ismail (2009); and Sivaramakrishnan and Yu (2008), in model 1, the coefficient for firm 
size was positive and significant 0.0285535 (z = 1.32). However, in model 2, the 
coefficient for firm size was positive but not significant 0.0235668 (z = 1.01). 
Moreover, loss was positively related to accruals earnings management in both models. 
The coefficient for loss in model 1 and 2 was positive but not significant 0.0198 (z = 
1.1) and 0.0215 (z = 1.2) respectively. 
In addition, consistent with prior studies (i.e. Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley, 20 11 ; and 
Cheng and Warfield, 2005), BIG4 auditors were negatively and significantly related to 
accruals earnings management. It is argued that firms audited by top big four audit firms 
are less involved in accruals earnings management activities compared to firms audited 
by non-big four audit firms. In model 1, the coefficient for BIG4 was negative and 
significant -0 .03 14674 (z = -1.98). Moreover, in model 2, the coefficient for BIG4 was 
negative and significant -0.0308565 (z = -1.84). 
Furthermore, consistent with the study of Gu], Fung, and Jaggi (2009), return on assets 
(ROA) was negatively and significantly related to accruals earnings management, it 
implies that politically influenced firms employ accruals earnings management strategy 
in order to report poor organizational performance. In model 1, the coefficient for ROA 
was negative and significant -0.0007 (z = -1.3 1). In model 2, the coefficient for ROA 
was negative and significant -0.000751 (z = -1.37). 
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Table 4.5 
AEM = a 0 + a 1PI , + f( Contra/Variables)+€., I, I' (Eq. 5) 
AEM = a0 + a 1PC1_, + a 2GOVT1_, + a 3 BUR ;,, + f(ControlVan·ables) + €1_, (Eq. 6) 
Regression 1 (Model 1) Regression 2 (Model 2) 
AEM Coefficient z P>z Coefficient z P>z 
PI 0.03196 3.99 0.000 
PC 0.02312 3.11 0.001 
GOVT 0.04654 2.28 0.0115 
BUR 0.02111 1.8 0.036 
ROA -0.00070 -1.31 0.0955 -0.00075 -l.37 0.0855 
LEV -0.12523 -4.86 0.000 -0.12196 -4.64 0.000 
SIZE 0.02855 1.32 0.0925 0.02356 1.01 0.1555 
Growth -0.04475 -2.38 0.0085 -0.04538 -2.43 0.0075 
Loss 0.01984 1.1 0.135 0.02156 1.20 0.116 
BIG4 -0.03146 -1.98 0.0235 -0.03086 -1.84 0.0325 
cons -0.26625 -1.85 0.032 -0.24412 -1.61 0.054 
Industry Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.1577 0.1605 
Number 645 645 
Note: AEM is the residuals of accruals earnings management (accruals quality) model, which is 
calculated using Modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) Model, Pl is the aggregate proxy of political 
intluences, which includes all three characteristics of political influences in a single proxy; indicator 
value I for politically influenced firms and 0 otherwise, PC represents the presence of politicians or close 
relatives of politicians in board of directors; indicator value 1 for political connections and 0 otherwise, 
GOVT is the significant government ownership in a finn; indicator value I for government owned firms 
and 0 otherwise, BUR represents the presence of civil/military bureaucrat in board of directors; indicator 
value I for bureaucrats and 0 otherwise, ROA is the p ercentage of return on assets, LEY is ratio of debts 
on total assets, SIZE is the log of total assets, GROWTH is the percentage change in sales, Loss is the net 
loss of finn s; indicator value I for firms producing losses and 0 otherwise, BIG4 is the top four audit 
firms in the world; indicator value I for BIG4 auditors and 0 otherwise; Number represents number of 
observations. 
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Moreover, leverage was significantly and negatively related to accruals earrings 
management in both models, because politically influenced firms are engaged in 
income-decreasing accruals earnings management activities. This view is also supported 
from a negative relationship between AEM and ROA, which implies that accruals 
earnings management is employed to report poor organizational performance in order to 
hide political gains and report less taxable income. Unlike ptior studies which show that 
high leverage finns get involved in income-increasing earnings management activities 
in order to report better organizational performance, and thus continue debt covenant. In 
model 1, the coefficients for leverage (LEV) was negative and significant -0.1252 (z = -
4.86). Whereas in model 2, the coefficients for leverage (LEV) was negative and 
significant -0.1219 (z = -4.64). 
In addition, high growth firms were negatively and significantly related to accruals 
earnings management in both models, it means firms with high sales growth have better 
earnings quality (accruals quality) and Jess likely involved in accruals earnings 
management. The coefficient for growth in model l and 2 was negative and significant -
0.0447 (z = -2.38) and -0.0453 (z = -2.43) respectively. 
4.7.2 Relationship between Political Influences (combined proxy and multiple 
proxies) and Real Earnings Management 
The R-Square for model 1 and 2 was 0.116 and 0.1167 respectively. The low R-Square 
is higher than the study of Braam, Nandy, Weitzel, and Lodh (2015), who reported 
0.054. Model I in Table 4.6 shows the results of relationship between political 
influences (using combined aspects) and real earnings management. While model 2 of 
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Table 4.6, presents the results of relationship between political influences (using 
multiple aspects) and real earnings management. 
Results of H2 
The result shows that politically influenced firms are positively and significantly related 
to real eamings management, which implies that earnings quality is lower amongst 
politically influenced firms in terms of real earnings management. In model 1, the 
coefficient for the political influences (using combined aspect) was positive and 
significant 0.297753 (z = 4.22) using panel corrected standard error (PCSE) technique. 
This result is consistent with the findings of study by Braam, Nandy, Weitzel, and Lodh 
(2015), who stated that firms with political connections are more involved in real 
earnings management. Therefore, the results suggest that the presence of politically 
influenced people in board of directors (BOD) or management and significant 
government ownership increases real eamings management activities. Thus, this finding 
supports hypothesis 2. 
Model 2 in Table 4.6, shows that political influences (through politically connected 
(PC) BOD) are significantly and positively related to real earnings management. The 
coefficient for the political connections was significant and positive 0.28304 (z = 3 .17) 
using (PCSE) technique. This finding is in line with the results of study by Braam, 
Nandy, Weitzel, and Lodh (2015), who relates political connections with real earnings 
management. Hence, the results suggested that the presence of politician(s) in (BOD) or 
management increase real earnings management activities. 
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The positive and significant relationship between political influences (through 
significant government ownership) and real eammgs management supports the view 
that firm with significant government ownership is related to real earnings management. 
The coefficient for the government ownership was significant and positive 0.212186 (z 
= 4.06) using (PCSE) technique. Thus, the findings suggest that fums with significant 
government ownership are more involved in real learnings management, implying 
lower earnings quality. 
Moreover, the results show that finns are more involved in real earnings management 
when it has civil/military bureaucrat(s) in their board of directors (BOD) or 
management, which implies lower earnings quality in terms of real activities 
manipulation. The coefficient for the presence of bureaucrat in firms' BOD was 
significant and positive 0.155019 (z = 4.51). Zeng, Li, and Hong (2012) and 
Narayanaswamy (2013) also relate political influences (through civil/military 
bureaucracy) with poor earnings quality. Hence, the findings suggest that firms with the 
presence of civil/milatary bureaucrat(s) on the BOD are more involved in real earnings 
management and have lower earnings quality. 
Results for Control Variables 
Table 4.6, shows the relationship between control variables and real eanungs 
management. There are seven control variables included in real earnings management 
model which represent the financial attributes of the finns, and industry being one of 
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these variables,. In model 1 and 2, the coefficient for firm size was significant and 
negative -0.25145 (z = -2.98) and -0.2568 (z = -3 .03). Moreover, loss was not 
significantly related to real earnings management in both models. However, the 
coefficient for loss in model 1 was negative -0.0098 (z = -0.08) and positive in model 2 
0.01040 (z = 0.08). 
In addition, BIG4 auditors were positively and significantly related to real earnings 
management. In model I and 2, the coefficient for BIG4 was positive and significant 
0.097485 (z = 1.34) and 0.096344 (z = 1.33) respectively. Furthermore, return on assets 
(ROA) was positively and significantly related to real earnings management in both 
models. This implies that firms audited by BIG4 auditors manipulate earnings through 
real earnings management in order to report better organizational performance, because 
real earnings management activities do not come under the jurisdictions of auditors. In 
model 1 and 2, the coefficient for ROA was positive and significant 0.0154 (z = 2.63) 
and 0.0157 (z = 2.55). 
Moreover, the findings also reveal that high leverage firms are more involved in real 
earnings management and have lower earnings quality in terms of real activities 
manipulation. These findings are consistent with the view that high leverage firms get 
more involved in income-increasing earnings management activities in order to 
continue debt contracts. Leverage was positively and significantly related to real 
earrings management in both models. In model I and 2, the coefficients for leverage 
(LEV) was positive and significant 0.3658 (z = 2.63) and 0.3734 (z = 2.71) respectively. 
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Table 4.6 
REM= a 0 + a 1PI1,, + f(Contro!Variables) + &i,1 (Eq. 7) 
REM= a0 + a 1PC1_, + a 2GOVI'1,, + a 3BUR1,, + f(ControlVariables) + &1,, (Eq. 8) 
Regression 3 (Model 1) Regression 4 (Model 2) 
REM Coefficient z P>z Coefficient z P>z 
PI 0.29775 4.22 0.000 
PC 0.28305 3.17 0.001 
GOVT 0.21219 4.06 0.000 
BUR 0.15502 4.51 0.000 
ROA 0.0154 2.63 0.0045 0.0157 2.55 0.0055 
LEV 0.36585 2.63 0.0045 0.37349 2.71 0.0035 
SIZE -0.2515 -2.98 0.0015 -0.2568 -3.03 0.001 
GROWTH 0.08583 1.42 0.0785 0.08341 1.4 0.0805 
LOSS -0.0098 -0.08 0.468 0.0104 0.08 0.4665 
BIG4 0.09748 1.34 0.09 0.09634 1.33 0.0925 
cons 1.30728 2.36 0.009 1.3171 2.36 0.009 -
Industry effect Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.116 0.1167 
Nwnber 645 645 
Note: REM is the aggregate residuals of real earnings management model, Pl is the aggregate proxy of 
political influences, which includes all three characteristics of political influences in a single proxy; 
indicator va lue I for politically influenced firms and O otherwise, PC represents the presence of 
pol iticians or close relatives of politicians in board of directors; indicator value 1 for political connections 
and O otherwise, GOVT is the significant government ownership in a firm; indicator value 1 for 
government owned firms and O otherwise, BUR represents the presence of civil/military bureaucrat in 
board of directors; indicator value 1 for bureaucrats and O otherwise, ROA is the percentage of return on 
assets, LEV is ratio of debts on total assets, SIZE is the log of total assets, GROWTH is the percentage 
change in sales, Loss is the net loss of firms; indicator value 1 for firms producing losses and O otherwise, 
B!G4 is the top four audit firms in the world; indicator value l for BIG4 auditors and O otherwise, 
Number represents number of observations. 
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In addition, high growth firms are seen positively and significantly related to real 
eamings management in both models. This implies that fmns with high sales growth are 
more involved in real earnings management. The coefficient for growth in model I and 
2 was positive and significant 0.085827 (z = I .42) and 0.083409 (z = 1.4) respectively. 
4.7.3 Relationship between Political Influences (combined aspect and multiple 
aspects) and earnings opacity (earnings aggressiveness) 
The R-Square for model 1 and 2 was 0.0723 and 0.0722 respectively. The low R-Square 
was consistent with previous studies. For example, Liu et al. (2016) reported 0.0786. 
Model 1 in Table 4. 7 shows the results of relationship between political influences 
(using combined aspect) and earnings aggressiveness. While model 2 of Table 4. 7, 
presents the results ofrelationship between political influences (using multiple aspects) 
and earnings aggressiveness. 
Results of H3 
The results show that politically influenced firms are positively and significantly related 
to earnings opacity (earnings aggressiveness), which implies that earnings lack 
transparency amongst politically influenced firms. In model 1, the coefficient for the 
political influences (using combined aspect) was positive and significant 0.027598 (z = 
2.5) using panel corrected standard error (PCSE) technique. This result is consistent 
with the findings of study by Riahi-Belkaoui (2004), who stated that politically 
connected firms lack transparency and are related to earnings opacity. Therefore, the 
results show that the presence of politically influenced people in board of directors 
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(BOD) and significant government ownership increases earnings aggresivess, which 
results in reporting less transparent earnings numbers. Thus, this finding supported 
hypothesis 3. 
Model 2 of Table 4.7, shows that political influences (through politically connected 
(PC) BOD) are significantly and positively related to earnings aggressiveness. The 
coefficient for the political connections was significant and positive 0.02641 (z = 2.25) 
using (PCSE) technique. This finding is in line with the findings of study by Riahi-
Bel.kaoui (2004), who relates political connections with earnings aggressiveness 
(earnings opacity). Hence, the results suggest that the presence of politician(s) in (BOD) 
or management reduces transparency. 
Further, the relationship between political influences (through significant government 
ownership) and earnings aggressiveness were positive, but not significant. It implies 
that significant government owned firms do not lack transparency. The coefficient for 
the government owned firms was positive and insignificant 0.01835 (z = 1.22) using 
(PCSE) technique. 
The results show that a firm lacks transparency when it has civil/military bureaucrat(s) 
in their board of directors (BOD), which implies lower earnings quality in terms of 
transparency. The coefficient for the presence of bureaucrat in firms ' BOD was 
significant and positive 0.01321 (z = 2.25). Narayanaswamy (2013); Zeng, Li, and 
Hong (2012) also relate political influences (through civil/military bureaucracy) with 
157 
poor earnings quality. Hence, the findings suggest that firms with the presence of 
civil/milatary bureaucrat(s) on the BOD are positively related to earnings 
aggressiveness. 
Results for Control Variables 
Table 4.7 shows the relationship between control variables and earnings aggressiveness 
including industry dummies, seven control variables were included in earnings 
aggressiveness attribute. In both models 1 and 2, return on assets (ROA), firms' debt to 
assets ratio (LEV) and sales growth (Growth) are negatively related to earnings 
aggressiveness. However, the LEV and Growth are significantly related to earnings 
aggressiveness, but ROA is not significant related to earnings aggressiveness. In model 
1 and 2, the coefficient for firm's ROA is negative and insignificant -0.00044 (z == -0.8) 
and -0.00040 (z = -0.72). 
In addition, the coefficient of LEV in both models is significant and negative -0.08169 
(z = -3.1 2) and -0.08106 (z = -3.04). Moreover, the coefficient for Growth in model 1 
and 2 is negative and significant -0.03677 (z = -2.03) and -0.03698 (z = -2.04) 
respectively. 
Furthermore, BIG4 auditors, firm size and loss are positively, but not significantly 
related to earnings aggressiveness in both models. In model 1, the coefficient for BIG4, 
size and loss is positive and insignificant 0.00641 (z = 0.26), 0.019351 (z = 0.96) and 
0.00772 (z = 0.57) respectively. Additionally, in model 2, the coefficient for BIG4, size 
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and loss is positive and insignificant 0.006268 (z = 0.25), 0.01922 (z = 0.96), and 
0.009651 (z = 0.68) respectively. 
Table 4.7 
EA= a 0 + a 1PI1., + f(Contro!Van·ables) + e1,, (Eq. 9) 
EA= a 0 + a 1PC1_, + a 2GOVT1., + a 3BUR.1., + f(Contro/Vmiables) + &;,, (Eq. 10) 
Regression 5 (Model 1) Regression 6 (Model 2) 
EA Coefficient z P>z Coefficient z P>z 
Pl 0.0276 2.5 0.006 
PC 0.02642 2 .25 0.012 
GOVT 0.01836 1.22 0.1115 
BUR 0.01321 2.25 0.0125 
ROA -0.0004 -0.8 0.21 J -0.0004 -0.72 0.237 
LEY -0.0817 -3.12 0.00 1 -0.0811 -3.04 0.001 
SIZE 0.01935 0.96 0.169 0.01923 0.96 0.17 
GROWTH -0.0368 -2.03 0.021 -0.037 -2.04 0.021 
LOSS 0.00773 0.57 0.2845 0.00965 0.68 0.2475 
BIG4 0.00642 0.26 0.3955 0.00627 0.25 0.4 
cons -0.233 l -1.87 0.0305 -0.234 -1.9 0.0285 -
R-Squared 0.0723 0.0722 
Industry effect Yes Yes 
Number 645 645 
Note: EA represents the earnings aggressiveness, calculated using Bhattacharya et al. (2003) model,, PI 
is the aggregate proxy of political influences, which includes all three characteristics of political 
influences in a single proxy; indicator value 1 for politically influenced firms and O otherwise, PC 
represents the presence of politicians or close relatives of politicians in board of directors; indicator value 
I for political connections and O otherwise, GOVT is the significant government ownership in a firm; 
indicator value I for government owned firms and O otherwise, BUR represents the presence of 
civil/mi litary bureaucrat in board of directors; indicator value I for bureaucrats and O otherwise, ROA is 
the percentage of relurn on assets, LEV is ratio of debts on total assets, SIZE is the log of total assets, 
GROWTH is the percentage change in sales, Loss is the net loss of firms; indicator value I for firms 
producing losses and O otherwise, BIG4 is the top four audit firms in 1he world; indicator value I for 
BIG4 auditors and O otherwise. 
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4.7.4 Relationship between Political Connections (through ruling/opposition 
political party) and accruals earnings management 
Table 4.8 shows the results of relationship between political connections (through 
rul ing/opposition political party) and accruals earnings management (accruals quality). 
Results of H4 
The result shows that political connections through ruling political party are positively 
related to accruals earnings management, but not significant. It implies that the there is 
no difference in effect on accruals quality between political connections through ruling 
party or opposition party. The coefficient for the political connections is found positive 
and insignificant 0.009 135 (z = 0.34) using panel corrected standard error (PCSE) 
technique. This result is also not consistent with the findings of study by Chaney, 
Faccio, and Parsley (2011), who state that political connections through ruling party are 
related to lower earnings quality (accruals quality). Therefore, the results suggest that 
compared to opposition party, the presence of political connections (through ruling 
party) in board of directors (BOD) does not make a significant impact on accruals 
earnings management (accruals quality). Thus, this finding does not support hypothesis 
4. 
Results for Control Variables 
Return on assets (ROA) leverage (LEV), and loss are negatively related to accruals 
earnings management. However, ROA and LEV are also significantly related to 
accruals earnings management, but loss is not significantly related to accruals earnings 
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management. The coefficients for ROA, LEV, and Loss are -0.00281 (z = -2.13), -
0.07644 (z = -3.21), and -0.01233 (z = -0.43) respectively. 
Table 4.8 




































Note: AEM is the residuals of accruals earnings management (accruals quality) model, which is 
calculated using Modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) Model, PCR is the ruling party political 
connections; indicator value I for ruling party political connections and 0 opposition party political 
connections, ROA is the percentage of return on assets, LEV is ratio of debts on total assets, SIZE is the 
log of total assets, GROWTH is the percentage change in sales, Loss is the net loss of firms; indicator 
value I for firms producing losses and 0 otherwise, B104 is the top four audit firms in the world; 
indicator value I for 8104 auditors and 0 otherwise. 
In addition, natural log of total assets (Size), change in sales (growth), and BIG4 
auditors are positively, but not significantly related to accruals earnings management 
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(accruals quality). The coefficients for size, growth, and BIG4 are 0 .013723 (z = 0.81), 
0.016269 (z = 0.58), 0.024386 (z = 1.05) respectively. 
4.7.5 Relationship between Political Connections (through ruling/opposition 
political party) and real earnings management 
Table 4.9 shows the relationship between political connection (through 
ruling/opposition political party) and real earnings management: 
Results of HS 
The result shows that political connections through ruling political party are negatively 
and significantly related to real earnings management. The coefficient for the political 
connections is negative and significant -0.599 (z = -2.46) using panel corrected standard 
en-or (PCSE) technique. This result is contrary to the findings of study by Chaney, 
Faccio, and Parsley (2011), who state that political connections through ruling party(s) 
are related to lower earnings quality. This is because; Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley 
(20 I 1 ), does not employ real earnings management as a attribute of earnings quality. In 
addition to attribute, it is also argued that opposition party(s) politically connected firms 
are more engaged in real earnings management compared to ruling party(s) fmns 
because regulators do not come under the direct influence of opposition party political 
connected people. Thus, they get more involved in less detectable real earnings 
management activities in comparison with ruling party(s) politically connected firms in 
order to avoid the detection by the regulators. Therefore, our results suggest that 
compared to ruling party(s) political connected firms, the presence of political 
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connections through opposition party(s) finns are more involved in real earnings 
management. Thus, our finding is contrary to our hypothesis 5 and does not support it. 
Table 4.9 
REM= a 0 + a 1PCR_;., + /(Control Variables)+ £,1., (Eq. 12) 
Regression 8 
REM Coefficient z P>z 
PCR -0.599004 -2.46 0.007 
ROA 0.0227056 I. I 3 0.13 
LEV 0.3977777 1.36 0.087 
SlZE -0.689826 -2.65 0.004 
GROWTH 0.3988534 2.27 0.0115 
LOSS 0.0762922 0.21 0.415 
BIG4 -0.069338 -0.42 0.336 
cons 5.233054 2.51 0.006 
R-Squared 0.3391 
Industry effect Yes 
Number )85 
Note: REM is the aggregate residuals of real earnings management model, PCR is the ruling party 
political connections; indicator va lue I for ruling party political connections and O opposition party 
political connections, ROA is the percentage of return on assets, LEV is ratio of debts on total assets, 
SIZE is the log of total assets, GROWTH is the percentage change in sa les, Loss is the net loss of finns; 
indicator value 1 for firms producing losses and O otherwise, BIG4 is the top four audit firms in the 
world; indicator value I for BIG4 auditors and O otherwise, Number represents number of observations. 
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Results for Control Variables 
Table 4.9 shows the relationship between control variables and real earnings 
management. It is evident that Return on assets (ROA), finns' debt to assets ratio 
(LEV), sales growth (Growth) and loss are positively related to real earnings 
management. However, LEV and Growth are significantly related to real earnings 
management, but ROA and loss are significantly related to real earnings management. 
The coefficients for ROA and loss are positive and insignificant 0.022706 (z = 1. 13) 
and 0.076292 (z = 0.21) respectively. 
Similarly, the coefficients of LEV and Growth are positive and significant 0.397778 (z 
= 1.36) and 0.398853 (z = 2.27). Moreover, size and BJG4 are negatively related to real 
earnings management. However, size is significantly related, but BIG4 is not 
significantly related to real earnings management. The coefficients of size and BIG4 are 
-0.68983 (z = -2.65) and -0.06934 (z = -0.42). 
4.7.6 Relationship between Political Connections (through ruling/opposition 
political party) and earnings aggressiveness 
Table 4.10 shows the results of relationship between political connection (through 
ruling/opposition political party) and earnings aggressiveness. 
Results of H6 
The results show that political connections through ruling political party are positively 
related to earnings aggressiveness, but not significant. It implies that the there is no 
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difference in effect on transparency between political connections through ruling party 
and opposition party. The coefficient for the political connections was positive and 
insignificant 0.0133279 (z = 0.66) using panel corrected standard error (PCSE) 
technique. Contrary to the findings of study by Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley (2011), 
who stated that political connections through ruling party are related to lower earnings 
quality in terms of accruals. However, our findings show that compared to opposition 
party, the presence of political connections (through ruling party) in board of directors 
(BOD) does not make a significant impact on transparency ( earnings aggressiveness). 
Thus, this finding does not support hypothesis 6. 
Results for Control Variables 
Return on assets (ROA), leverage (LEV), and loss are negatively related to earnings 
aggressiveness. However, ROA and LEV are significantly related to earnings 
aggressiveness, but loss is not significantly related to earnings aggressiveness. The 
coefficients for ROA, LEV, and Loss are -0.0019903 (z = -1.45), -0.0603083 (z = -
2.56), and -0.0005534 (z = -0.02) respectively. In addition, natural log of total assets 
(SIZE), change in sales (GROWTH), and BIG4 auditors are positively, but not 
significantly related to earnings aggressiveness. The coefficients for SIZE, GROWTH, 




EA= a 0 + a 1PCR;., + f(Contro/Variables) + &1 , (Eq. 13) 
Regression 9 
EA Coefficient z P>z 
PCR 0.0133279 0.66 0.254 
ROA -0.00199 -1.45 0.073 
LEV -0.060308 -2.56 0.005 
SIZE 0.0127556 0.92 0.18 
GROWTH 0.0222957 1.27 0.1025 
LOSS -0.000553 -0.02 0.4915 
BIG4 0.0003342 0.02 0.494 
cons -0.139052 -1.31 0.0945 -
R-Squared 0.169 
Industry effect Yes 
Number 185 
Note: EA represents the earnings aggressiveness, calculated using Bhattacharya et al. (2003) model, PCR 
is the ruling party political connections; indicator value I for ruling party political connections and 0 
opposition party political connections, ROA is the percentage of return on assets, LEV is ratio of debts on 
total assets, SIZE is the log of total assets, GROWTH is the percemage change in sales, Loss is the net 
loss of firms; indicator value I for finns producing losses and 0 otherwise, 8104 is the top four audit 
firms in the world; indicator value I for 8104 auditors and 0 otherwise, Number represents number of 
observations. 
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4.7.7 Relationship between the interaction effect of political influences and 
accruals earnings management on real earnings management 
Table 4.11 shows the results of the relationship between the interaction effects of 
political influences and accruals earnings management on real earnings management. 
Results for H 7 
Table 4.11 shows the results of the relationships between real earnings management and 
accruals earnings management, political influences and the interaction of accruals 
earnings management and political influences. The result shows the negative 
relationship between accrual earnings management and real earnings management, but 
not significant. The coefficient of accruals earnings management is negative and 
insignificant -0.14217 (z = -0.7). The result also shows the positive and significant 
relationship between political influences and real earnings management, which implies 
that politically influenced finns are more involved in real earnings management. 
However, the interaction of accruals earnings management with political influences is 
negatively and significantly related to real earnings management. It implies that 
politically influenced firms substitute accmals earnings management for real earnings 
management. This result is congruent with previous studies (Braam, Nandy, Weitzel, 
and Lodh, 2015; Zang, 20 11 ; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Cohen, Dey, and Lys, 2008), 
that state that firms substitute real earnings management for accrual-based earnings 
management. 
The coefficient for political influences is positive and significant 0. 144277 (z = 1.88). 
While, the coefficient for the interaction of accruals earnings management and political 
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influences is negative and significant -1.14588 (z = -2.3). Therefore, these findings 
suggest that politically influenced finns are likely to substitute accrual earnings 
management strategy for real earnings management strategy compared to non-
politically influenced firms. Thus, our findings support Hypothesis 7. 
Table 4.11 
REM= a 0 + a 1AEM i,r + a 2Pli., + a 3PIAEM 1,, + /(Control Variables)+ ci,, (Eq. 14) 
Regression 10 
REM Coefficient z P>z 
AEM -0.1422 -0.7 0.2425 
PI 0.14428 1.88 0.0295 
PIAEM -1.1459 -2.3 0.011 
ROA 0.01346 2.52 0.006 
LEV 0.26967 1.9 0.029 
SIZE -0.2350 -2.78 0.0025 
GROWTH 0.0808 1.43 0.076 
LOSS -0.0167 -0.14 0.4425 
BIG4 0.08926 1.26 0.1035 
cons l .26459 2.18 0.0145 
R-Squared 0.1372 
Industry effect Yes 
Number 645 
Note: REM is the aggregate residuals of real earnings management model, AEM is the residuals of 
accruals earnings management (accruals quality) model, which is calculated using Modified Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) Model, PI is the aggregate proxy of political influences, which includes all three 
characteristics of political influences in a single proxy; indicator value I for politically influenced firms 
and O otherwise, PIAEM represents the interaction effect of Pl and AEM, PC represents the presence of 
politicians or close relatives of politicians in board of directors; indicator value 1 for political connections 
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and O otherwise, GOVT is the significant government ownership in a finn; indicator value l for 
government owned firms and O otherwise, BUR represents the presence of civil/military bureaucrat in 
board of directors; indicator value l for bureaucrats and O otherwise, PCAEM represents the interaction 
effect of PC and AEM, BURAEM represents the interaction effec t of BUR and AEM, GOVAEM 
represents the interaction effect of GOVT and AEM, ROA is the percentage of return on assets, LEV is 
ratio of debts on total assets, SIZE is the log of total assets, GROWTH is the percentage change in sales, 
Loss is the net loss of firms; indicator value l for firms producing losses and O otherwise, BIG4 is the top 
four audit firms in the world; indicator value l for BIG4 auditors and O otherwise. 
Result for Control Variable 
Table 4.11 shows the relationship between control variables and real earnings 
management. Return on assets (ROA), firms' debt to assets ratio (LEV), sales growth 
(Growth) and BIG4 auditors are positively related to real earnings management. 
However, ROA, LEV, and Growth are significantly related to real earnings 
management, but BIG4 is not significantly related to real earnings management. The 
coefficients for ROA, LEV, Growth, and BIG4 are 0.013463 (z = 2.52), 0.269674 (z = 
1.9), 0.080001 (z = 1.43), and 0.089255 (z = 1.26) respectively. 
Moreover, SIZE and LOSS are negatively related to real earnings management. 
However, SIZE is significantly related, but LOSS is not significantly related to real 
earnings management. The coefficient of SIZE is negative and significant -0.23502 (z = 
-2.78). The coefficient of LOSS is negative and insignificant -0.01671 (z = -0.14). 
4.8 Alternative measures of Earnings Quality Attributes 
We performed a number of sensitivity analyses to examine the robustness of our 
findings. As a robustness test, three measures of accruals earnings management were 
tested, and two measures ofreal earnings management were tested. In addition, to check 
the robustness of regression ten, we employed multiple proxies of political influences. 
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4.8.1 Sensitivity Analysis for Accruals Earnings Management Model (Accruals 
Quality) and Political Influences (using single aspect) 
In addition to the residuals obtained through the modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
model, we perfonned additional three measures of accruals earnings management. The 
first additional measure of accruals earnings management uses the signed abnonnal 
residuals from the regression of the modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) model. The 
second alternative measure is the residuals from the unmodified (original) Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) model. The third alternative measure of accruals earnings management 
uses the absolute value residuals from the regression of the modified Jones model 
( 1995). Table 4.12 compares the results of regression 1 using the absolute reriduals 
measure (main results) and the results of three alternative measures. As shown in Table 
4.12, the findings of all three alternative measures are consistent with the main results, 
which shows the positive and significant relationship between political influences 
(using single aspect) and accruals eami:ings management. However, the coefficients are 
higher and p-values are more significant for modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
model i.e. the main model. This signifies that the main model employed for accruals 
earnings management can be considered more robust against three alternative measures 
of accruals earnings management. 
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Table 4.12 
Alternative measures of accruals earnings management with single pro),,y of political 
in uences 
Signed AEM (Unmodified DD) Modified Jones Model 
Coefficient z P>z Coefficient z P>z Coefficient z P>z 
Pl 0.0168 1.46 0.0725 0.02399 2.04 0.0205 0.02971 2.32 0.01 
ROA -0.0009 -0.66 0.255 -0.0006 -0.94 0. 174 -0.0008 -0.53 0.299 
LEV 0.05404 1.3 0.0975 -0.0771 -2.83 0.0025 -0. I 768 -2.8 0.0025 
SIZE 0.03368 5.61 0.000 0.04195 1.94 0.0265 0.]1945 3.02 0.0015 
Growth 0.06128 2.95 0.0015 -0.0362 - 1.92 0.0275 0.00281 0,07 0.4705 
LOSS -0.0198 -0.66 0.255 0.01446 0.79 0.2155 0.05735 136 0.087 
BlG4 0.01789 0.62 0.268 -0.0188 -1.11 0.1 34 -0.0693 -1.69 0.0455 
cons -0.2994 -5.96 0 -0.4159 -2.95 0.00 15 -0.9 11 5 -3.23 0.0005 -
R-Squared 0.0261 0.1055 0.0646 
Industry Yes Yes Yes 
effect 
Number 645 645 645 
Note: Signed AEM is the signed residuals of accruals earnings management (accruals quality} model, 
which is calculated using Modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) Model; Unmodified DD is the absolute 
residuals of accruals earnings management (accruals quality) model, which is calculated using 
unmodified Dechow and Dichev (2002) Model; Modified Jones Models is the absolute residuals of 
accruals earnings management (accruals qua lity) model, which is calculated using Dech ow ( 1995) Model; 
Pl is the aggregate proxy of political influences, which includes all three characteristics of political 
influences in a single proxy; indicator val ue I for politically influenced finns and O otherwise; ROA is the 
percentage of return on assets, LEV is ratio of debts on total assets, SIZE is the log of total assets, 
GROWTH is the percentage change in sales, LOSS is the net loss of tinns; indicator va lue 1 for finn s 
producing losses and O otherwise, BIG4 is the top four audit finns in the world; indicator value I for 
BIG4 auditors and O otherwise; Number represents number of observations. 
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4.8.2 Sensitivity Analysis for Accruals Earnings Management Model (Accruals 
Quality) and Political Influences (using multiple proxies) 
As a robustness test for regression 2, three different measures of accruals earnings 
management were tested, in addition to the residuals obtained from the modified 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) model. The first additional measure of accruals earnings 
management uses the signed abnormal residuals from the regression of the modified 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) model. The second alternative measure is the residuals from 
the unmodified (original) Dechow and Dichev (2002) model. The third alternative 
measure of accruals earnings management uses the absolute value residuals from the 
regression of the modified Jones model (1995). 
Table 4.13 compares the results of regression 2 using the absolute residuals measure 
(main results) and the results of three alternative measures. As shown in Table 4. I 3, the 
findings of all three alternative measures are consistent with the main results for the PC, 
which shows the positive and significant relationship between PC and accruals earnings 
management. However, GOVT remain significant with the same sign using original 
(unmodified) Dechow and Dichev model. While the results are not consistent when 
using the signed measure of Dechow and Dichev (2002) and modified Jones model 
(1995). Moreover, as shown in the Table 4.13, the results for BUR are similar for 
modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) and modified Jones model (1995). However, the 
BUR becomes insignificant when original (unmodified) Dechow and Dichev model and 
signed residuals from the modified Dechow and Dichev model is used. This suggests 
that the results of PC, GOVT, and BUR in BOD can be considered more robust when 
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using the modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) model compared to alternative measures 
of AEM. 
Table 4.13 
Alternative measures of accruals 
political influences 
















Signed AEM (Unmodified DD) Modified Jones Model (1995) 
Coefficient Z P>z Coefficient z P>z Coefficient z P>z 
0.01643 1.28 0. 1 0.0205 1.33 0.091 0.02627 2.14 0.016 
0.03101 1.09 0.137 0.D25 2.08 0.019 -0.01132 -0.62 0.268 
-0.01815 -1.08 0.140 0.0102 0.94 0.174 0.03719 J.92 0.027 
-0.00078 -0.58 0.282 -0.0006 -0.84 0.200 -0.00079 -0.57 0.284 
0.05453 1.28 0.099 -0.0758 -2.63 0.004 -0.17578 -2. 74 0.003 
0.03362 5.94 0.000 0.0406 1.93 0.027 0.12175 3.13 0.001 
0.06067 2.91 0.002 -0.0365 -1.94 0.026 0.00317 0.08 0.467 
-0.01858 -0.62 0.267 0.016 0.84 0.201 0.05982 1 .4 0.080 
0.01958 0.65 0.256 -0.0186 -1.06 0.145 -0.07203 -1.74 0.04] 
-0.29263 -6 89 0 -0.4104 -2. 96 0.00 I -0.92622 -3.36 0.0005 
0.027 0. 105 0.064 
Yes Yes Yes 
645 645 645 
Note: Signed AEM is the signed residuals of accruals earnings management (accruals quality) model, 
which is calculated using Modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) Model; Unmodified DD is the absolute 
residuals of accruals earnings management (accruals quality) model , which is calculated using 
unmodified Dechow and Dichev (2002) Model; Modified Jones Models is the absolute residuals of 
accruals earnings management (accruals quality) model, which is calculated using Dechow (1995) Model; 
PC represents the presence of politicians or close relatives of politicians in board of directors; indicator 
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value I for political connections and 0 otherwise, GOVT is the significant government ownership in a 
firm; indicator value I for government owned finns and 0 otherwise, BUR represents the presence of 
civil/military bureaucrat in board of directors; indicator value I for bureaucrats and 0 otherwise; ROA is 
the percentage of return on assets, LEV is ratio of debts on total assets, SIZE is the log of total assets, 
GROWTH is the percentage change in sales, LOSS is the net loss of firms; indicator value I for firms 
producing losses and 0 otherwise, 8104 is the top four audit firms in the world; indicator value 1 for 
BIG4 auditors and 0 otherwise; Number represents number of observations. 
4.8.3 Sensitivity Analysis for Real Earnings Management Model (using 
individual measure) and Political Influences (using single aspect) 
To test whether our results are sensitive to alternative measures of real earnings 
management, we considered individual measures (i.e. over-productions of goods to 
reduce cost, and reducing discretionary expenditures) as alternative measures of real 
earnings management. 
For this reason, we repeated our analysis for regression 3 by using the individual 
measures of real eamfogs management as dependent variables. These alternative 
measures have also been adopted by Braam, Nandy, Weitzel, and Lodh (2015). Our 
results for alternative measures are consistent with the main results, which means that 
political influences (using single aspect) are positive and significant related to real 
earnings management (using individual measures). Therefore, this could be suggested 
from the results that politically influenced firms are involved in both individual 
measures of real earnings management (i.e. over-production, and reducing discretionary 
expense). However, the coefficients of real earnings management (through discretionary 
expenditure) is higher compared to managing earnings through over-production, implies 
that political influences firms are comparatively engaged more in managing earnings 
through discretionary expenditures. 
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Table 4.14 
Alternative measures of real earnings management with single proxy of political 
in uences 
REM_PROD REM_DISX 
Coefficient z P>z Coefficient z P>z 
PI 0.0989116 3.15 0.001 0.19884 3.62 0.000 
ROA 0.0049625 3.06 0.001 0.010441 1.73 0.042 
LEV 0.0453165 0.62 0.2675 0.32053 2.61 0.0045 
SIZE -0.021361 -0.63 0.265 -0.23009 -3.63 0.000 
Growth 0.0256497 0.6 0.275 0.060178 1.01 0.1575 
Loss -0.035465 -0.94 0.1745 0.025651 0.23 0.4075 
BIG4 0.1420263 4.71 0.000 -0.04454 -0.54 0.295 
cons -0.032762 -0.13 0.448 1.340037 3.45 0.0005 
R-Squared 0.076 0.086 
Industry effect Yes Yes 
Nwnber 645 645 
Note: REM_PROD is the residuals of real earnings management activities through over-production of 
goods; REM_ DISX is the residuals of real earnings management activities through reducing discretionary 
expenditures; Pl is the aggregate proxy of political influences, which includes all three characteristics of 
political influences in a single proxy; indicator value I for politically influenced firms and 0 otherwise; 
ROA is the percentage of return on assets; LEV is ratio of debts on total assets; SIZE is the log of total 
assets; GROWTH is the percentage change in sales; LOSS is the net loss of firms; indicator value I for 
firms producing losses and 0 otherwise; 8104 is the top four audit firms in the world; indicator value l 
for 8104 auditors and 0 otherwise; Number represents number of observations. 
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4.8.4 Sensitivity Analysis for Real Earnings Management Model (using 
individual measures) and Political Influences (using multiple aspects) 
To test the robustness of regression 4, following Braam, Nandy, Weitzel, and Lodh 
(2015), we repeated our analysis by using the individual measures of real earnings 
management as dependent variables and multiple proxies of political influences as 
explanotry variables. As shown in Table 4.15, the results of individual measures are not 
consistent with the main results (i.e. aggregate measure of real earnings management). 
Political influences (through government ownership (GOVT) and bureaucrats (BUR) in 
BOD) are positively and significantly related to real earnings management (through 
over-productions). However, political influences (through politicians in BOD) are 
positive, but not significant. It shows that GOVT and BUR are more involved in 
manipulating earnings through over-production compared to non-politically influenced 
firms. However, PC firms are not significantly involved in earnings management 
through over-productions of goods. 
In addition, as shown in the Table 4.15, PC fums are positively and significantly related 
to real earnings management (through reducing discretionary expenditures). However, 
political influences (through GOVT and BUR) are not significantly related to real 
earnings management (through discretionary expenditures). It shows that GOVT and 
BUR are not involved in manipulating earnings through reducing discretionary 
expenses. However, PC firms are significantly involved in manipulating real activities 
through reducing discretionary expenditures. 
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Table 4.15 
Alternative measures of real earnings management with multiple proxies of political 
influences 
REM PROD REM DISX 
Coefficient z P>z Coefficient z P>z 
PC 0.0362919 1.13 0.129 0.246755 3.52 0.000 
GOVT 0.2390403 7.6 0.000 -0.02685 -0.63 0.2635 
BUR 0.1102556 3.59 0.000 0.044764 1.27 0.1025 
ROA 0.0043268 2.51 0.006 0.011374 1.8 0.0355 
LEV 0.0671887 0.96 0.168 0.3063 2.5 0.006 
SIZE -0.057766 -1.86 0.0315 -0.19903 -3.03 0.001 
GROWTH 0.0223922 0.58 0.28 0.061017 1.03 0.1515 
LOSS -0.032344 -0.88 0.1905 0.042748 0.38 0.3505 
BIG4 0.1457664 4.86 0000 -0.04942 -0.6 0.2755 
cons 0.1344311 0.56 0.2885 1.18267 1 2.96 0.0015 
R-Squared 0.105 0.089 
Industry effect Yes Yes 
Number 645 645 
Note: REM_PROD is the residuals of real earnings management activities through over-production of 
goods; REM_DISX is the residuals of real earnings management activities through reducing discretionary 
expenditures; PC represents the presence of politicians or c lose relatives of politicians in board of 
directors; indicator value I for political connections and O otherwise; GOVT is the significant government 
ownership in a firm; indicator value I for government owned firms and O otherwise; BUR represents the 
presence of civil/military bureaucrat in board of directors; indicator value l for bureaucrats and 0 
otherwise; ROA is the percentage of return on assets; LEV is ratio of debts on total assets; SIZE is the log 
of total assets; GROWTH is the percentage change in sales; LOSS is the net loss of firms; indicator value 
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I for finns producing losses and O otherwise; BIG4 is the top four audit firms in the world; indicator 
value 1 for BIG4 auditors and O otherwise; Number represents number of observations. 
4.8.5 Sensitivity Analysis for the interaction of political influences and accruals 
earnings management on real earnings management 
To check the sensitivity of our results for regression l 0, we repeated our analysis by 
using the il1teraction effects of political influences (using multiple aspects) and accruals 
earnings management on aggregate measure of real eantings management. In order to 
see the interaction effects of political influences and accruals earnings management on 
real earnings management, we introduced the interaction term (j.e. PC* AEM, 
GOVT* AEM, and BUR* AEM). As shown in the Table 4.16, the relationship between 
accrual earnings management (AEM) and real earnings management (REM) is 
consistent with the main results, which shows negative but not significant relationship 
between REM and AEM. Consistent with the main results, the interaction of accruals 
earnings management with political influences (PC firms) is negatively and 
significantly related to real eantings management; it implies that PC firms substitute 
accruals earnings management for real earnings management. 
However, the interaction of accruals eantings management with political influences 
(through GOVT and BUR) are not significantly related to real earnings management, 
which means that GOVT and BUR firms do not substitute accruals earnings 
management for real earnings management. These findings suggested that the types of 
political influences need to be clearly specified. 
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Table 4.16 
Alternative results for the interaction effect of political influences and accruals 
earnings management on real earnings management 
REM Coefficient z P>z 
AEM -0.179495 -0.86 0.392 
PC 0.0668649 0.67 0.503 
GOVT 0.1886892 3.8 0.000 
BUR 0.1624756 4.05 0.000 
PCAEM -1.586512 -2. l 7 0 .03 
GOVAEM -0.321939 -0.76 0.445 
BURAEM 0.0709585 0.28 0.782 
ROA 0.0135785 2.45 0.014 
LEV 0.2604188 1.84 0.066 
SIZE -0.234749 -2.77 0.006 
Growth 0.0798444 1.39 0.165 
Loss -0.000103 0 0.999 
BIG4 0.0978313 1.58 0.115 
cons 1.222169 2.14 0.032 
R-Squared 0.143 
Industry effect Yes 
Nwnber 645 
Note: REM is the aggregate residuals of real earnings management model which is calculated using 
Roychowdhury (2006) model; AEM is the residuals of accruals earnings management (accruals quality) 
model, which is calculated using Modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) Model; PC represents the 
presence of politicians or close relatives of politicians in board of directors; indicator value I for political 
connections and O otherwise; GOVT is the significant government ownership in a firm; indicator value 1 
for government owned firms and O otherwise; BUR represents the presence of civil/military bureaucrat in 
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board of directors; indicator value I for bureaucrats and 0 otherwise; PCAEM is the interaction effect of 
PC and AEM; GOVAEM represents the interaction effect of GOVT and AEM; BURAEM is the 
interaction effect of BUR and AEM; ROA is the percentage of retum on assets, LEV is ratio of debts on 
total assets, SIZE is the log of total assets, GROWTH is the percentage change in sales, LOSS is the net 
loss of finns; indicator value l for firms producing losses and 0 otherwise, BIG4 is the top four audit 
finns in the world; indicator value 1 for 8104 auditors and 0 otherwise; Number is the number of 
observations. 
4.8.6 Sensitivity Analysis using different aspects of political influences 
individually 
We employed and included multiple aspects of political influences (i.e. political 
connections (PC), government ownership (GOVT), and Bureaucracy (BUR)) in 
regression, 2, 4, and 6. It is possible that including all aspects of political influences as 
explanatory variables in a single regression may weaken the significance of each 
individual coefficient to the extent that significance disappears. Although this could be 
identified using correlation coefficients matrix and Variance inflation factor; however, 
as an additional test, each political influences aspects was used individually as a proxy 
of political influences. 
Table 4.17 shows that the individual use of the political influences aspects do not 
significantly change the results from main results. However, as shown in Table 4.17 and 
4.21, using multiple aspects of political influences individually in regression 2 and 4 
changed the significant level of all three aspects of political influences to 1 %. In 
addition, the insignificant relationship (in regression 6) between earrungs 
aggressiveness with government owned (GOVT) finns changed to significant 
relationship at 5% significant level. 
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Table 4.17 
Regression results of multiple aspects of political influences (using individually) and 
accruals earning_s manag_ement 
AEM Coef. z P>z Coef. 7. P>z Coef. z P>z 
PC 0.01991 2.8 0.0025 
GOVT 0.05360 3.09 0.001 
BUR 0.02993 3.3 0.0005 
ROA -0.00055 -1.03 0.152 -0.00069 -1.33 0.091 -0.0007 - 1.34 0.0895 
LEV -0.12162 -4.61 0 -0.11506 -4.58 0 -0.1157 -4.61 0 
SIZE 0.03459 1.62 0.053 0.02613 I.II 0.133 0 03146 1.52 0.0645 
GROWTH -0 04491 -2.37 0.009 -0.04585 -2.45 0.007 -0.0449 -2.39 0.0085 
LOSS 0.02336 1.25 0.106 0.02268 1.23 0. 1095 0.02344 1.27 0. [03 
8104 -0.03365 -2.13 0.0165 -0.03213 -1.96 0.0245 -0.036 -2.27 0.0115 
cons -0.29826 -2.07 0.019 -0.2579 -1.69 0.0455 -0.2864 -2.02 0.0215 -
R-Squared 0.153 0.157 0.154 
Industry Yes Yes Yes 
effect 
Note: AEM is the residuals of accruals earnings management (accruals quality) model, which is 
calculated using Modified Dcchow and Dichev (2002) Model; PC represents the presence of politicians or 
close relatives of politicians in board of directors; indicator value I for political connect ions and 0 
otherwise, GOVT is the significant government ownership in a firm; indicator value I for government 
owned finns and O otherwise, BUR represents the presence of civil/military bureaucrat in board of 
directors; indicator value I for bureaucrats and O otherwise; ROA is the percentage of return on assets, 
LEV is ratio of debts on total assets, SIZE is the log of total assets, GROWTH is the percentage change in 
sales, LOSS is the net loss of firms; indicator value 1 for firms producing losses and O otherwise, BIG4 is 
the top four audit fi rms in the world; indicator value 1 for B1O4 auditors and O otherwise. 
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Table 4.18 
Regression results of multiple aspects of political influences (using individually) and 
real earnings management 
REM Coef. z P>z Coef. z P>z Coef. z P>z 













0.25666 4.98 0.000 
0.17145 4.6 0.000 
0.01690 2.75 0.003 0.01596 2.65 0.004 0.01555 2.51 0.006 
0.37645 2.7 0.003 0.45764 3 21 0.0005 0.4548 3.15 0.00 I 
-0. 1984 -2.58 0.005 -0.23184 -2.85 0.002 -0.2101 -2.76 0.003 
0.08505 1.39 0.082 0.07908 1.36 0.0875 0.08401 1.42 0.078 
0.02008 0. 16 0.435 0.02297 0.19 0.4265 0.02602 0.2 0.42 
0.08421 1.15 0.125 0.07614 0.97 0.166 0.05691 0.74 0.2295 
1.03312 1.99 0.023 1.17452 2.21 0.0135 1.05526 2.06 0.02 
Yes Yes Yes 
0.105 0.095 0.093 
Note: REM is the aggregate residuals of real earnings management model, PC represents the presence of 
politicians or close relatives of politicians in board of directors; indicator value I for political connections 
and O otherwise, GOVT is the significant government ownership in a finn; indicator value I for 
government owned firms and O otherwise, BUR represents the presence of civil/military bureaucrat in 
board of directors; indicator value I for bureaucrats and O otherwise, ROA is the percentage of return on 
assets, LEV is ratio of debts on total assets, SIZE is the log of total assets, GROWTH is the percentage 
change in sales, LOSS is the net loss of firms; indicator value I for firms producing losses and 0 




Regression results of multiple aspects of political influences (using individually) and 
earnings aggressiveness 














0.02471 2.13 0.0165 
0.022 1.66 0.0485 
0.01437 3.16 0.001 
-0.0003 -0.53 0.2995 -0.0004 -0.7 0.242 -0.0004 -0.75 0.225 
-0.0808 -3.03 0.001 -0.0732 -2.98 0.0015 -0.0735 -3.00 0.0015 
0.02425 1.3 0.0965 0.02148 1.11 0. I 34 0.02339 1.27 0.1015 
-0.0368 -2.02 0.02 I 5 -0.0374 -2.05 0.0205 -0.0369 -2.03 0.0215 
0.01048 0.72 0.235 0.01081 0.74 0.2305 0.01108 0.75 0.226 
0.00522 0 .22 0.4135 0.00433 0.18 0.4275 0.00268 0.12 0.4535 
-0.2585 -2.2 0.014 -0.247 -2.08 0.0185 -0.2574 -2 .22 0.013 
Yes Yes Yes 
0.070 0.068 0.067 
Note: EA represents the earnings aggressiveness, calculated using Bhattacharya et al. (2003) model, PC 
represents the presence of politicians or close relatives of politicians in board of directors; indicator value 
I for political connections and O otherwise, GOVT is the significant government ownership in a firm; 
indicator value I for government owned firms and O otherwise, BUR represents the presence of 
civil/military bureaucrat in board of directors; indicator value I for bureaucrats and O otherwise, ROA is 
the percentage of return on assets, LEV is ratio of debts on total assets, SlZE is the log of total assets, 
GROWTH is the percentage change in sales, LOSS is the net loss of firms; indicator value I for firms 
producing losses and O otherwise, B1G4 is the top four audit firms in the world; indicator value I for 
BIG4 auditors and O otherwise. 
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4.8.7 Sensitivity analysis for the relationship between direct and indirect political 
connections and earnings quality attributes 
The result shows that direct political connected (DPC) finns (presence of politicians in a 
firm) are positively and significantly related to accruals earnings management compared 
to indirect political connected (IDPC) firms (presence of close relatives of politicians in 
a firm). However, our results suggest that compared to DPC, indirect politically 
connected (IDPC) finns are more engaged in real earnings management. Moreover, 
DPC firms are significantly and positively related to earnings aggressiveness. It implies 
that DPC firms lack transparency compared to IDPC firms. 
Therefore, it is argued that DPC firms are reporting poor earnings quality compared to 
IDPC firms when earnings quality is measured through accruals attributes. In addition, 
lDPC firms are reporting poor earnings quality compared to DPC firms when earnings 
quality is measured through real earnings management attribute. 
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Table 4.20 
Regression results of direct/indirect political connections, and real and accnials 
earning_s manag_ement 
AEM REM 
Coefficient z P>z Coefficient z P>z 
DPC 0.0712331 2.77 0.006 -0.4245 -2.71 0.007 
ROA -0.002657 -2.07 0.038 0.022484 1.05 0.292 
LEV -0.076341 -3.18 0.001 0.34065 1.1 0.271 
SIZE 0.026408 1.57 0.116 -0.72971 -2.65 0.008 
GROWTH 0.0203668 0.76 0.448 0.417133 2.13 0.033 
LOSS -0.01533 -0.57 0.569 0.17578 0.45 0.655 
BIG4 0.027845 1.23 0.217 -0.1 4156 -0.81 0.419 
cons -0.383404 -2.87 0.004 5.069001 2.47 0.013 -
Industry effect Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.1996 0.3155 
Number 185 185 
Note: AEM is the residuals of accruals earnings management (accruals quality) model, which is 
calculated using Modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) Model, REM is the aggregate residuals of real 
earnings management model, which is calculated using Roychowdhury (2006) model, DPC represents 
direct political connections; indicator value I in presence of politician(s) in board of directors or senior 
management i. e. direct political connections and O in presence of close relative(s) of politician(s) in board 
of directors or senior management i.e. indirect political connections, ROA is the percentage of return on 
assets, LEV is ratio of debts on total assets, SIZE is the log of total assets, GROWTH is the percentage 
change in sales, LOSS is the net loss of firms; indicator value I for firms producing losses and 0 
otherwise, BIG4 is the top four audi t firms in the world; indicator value 1 for BIG4 auditors and 0 
otherwise, Number represents number of observations. 
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Table 4.21 
Regression results of direct/indirect political connections ands earnings aggressiveness 
EA Coefficient z P>z 
DPC 0.0268498 3.79 0.000 
ROA -0.001945 -1.41 0.16 
LEV -0.059245 -2.48 0.013 
SIZE 0.0168887 1.18 0.237 
Growth 0.0230653 1.35 0.178 
Loss -0.003164 -0.13 0.901 
BIG4 0.0025748 0.12 0.905 
cons -0. 163984 -1.61 0.107 -
Industry effect Yes 
R-Squared 0.1737 
Number 185 
Note: EA represents the earnings aggressiveness, calculated using Bhattacharya et al. (2003) model, DPC 
represents direct political connections; indicator value 1 in presence of poli tician(s) in board of directors 
or senior management i.e. direct political connections and O in presence of close relative(s) of 
politician(s) in board of directors or senior management i.e. indirect political connections, ROA is the 
percentage of return on assets, LEV is ratio of debts on total assets, SIZE is the log of total assets, 
GROWTH is the percentage change in sales, Loss is the net loss of firms; indicator value I for firms 
producing losses and O otherwise, B1G4 is the top four audit firms in the world; indicator value I for 




FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
This chapter provides an overview of the findings and a detailed discussion of the 
results, contributions of the present study, and its limitations. The chapter also gives 
suggestions for future research that would extend the body of knowledge in financial 
reporting quality and audit pricing literature. The last sections highlight the limitations 
and conclusion of the study. 
5.1 Overview of the Study 
This study was motivated to empirically achieve three main objectives mentioned m 
chapter one: 1) to examine the relationship between political influences and earnings 
quality; 2) To examine whether ruling party politically connected firms are reporting 
poor earnings quality compared to opposition party politically connected firms; 3) to 
investigate whether politically influenced firms substitute real earnings management 
strategy for accruals earnings management. 
Previous studies have documented that politically influenced firms are related to lower 
earnings quality. For example, some studies have documented that politically connected 
firms are significantly associated with earnings management (for e.g., Harymawan and 
Nowland, 2016; Liu, Li, Zeng, and An, 2016; Al-dhamari and Ismail, 2015, Chaney, 
Faccio, and Parsley, 2011 ). Other studies provide evidence that the reported earnings 
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lack transparency in politically connected finns (e.g., Riahi-Belkaoui, 2004). Congruent 
to these studies, the findings of (hypotheses l to 3) show the negative relationship 
between political influences and earnings quality. 
In addition, Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley (201 I) opine that politically connected firms 
through ruling political party have poorer earnings quality compared to opposition party 
politically connected firms. Contrary to this study, the findings of (Hypothesis 5) shows 
that opposition party politically connected firms are more involved in real earnings 
management and reporting poor earnings quality compared to ruling party politically 
connected firms. Further, the findings of Hypotheses 4 and 6 shows that there is no 
difference in effect of ruling and opposition party political connections on earnings 
quality when earnings quality is measured by accruals attributes of earnings quality. 
Recently, Braam, Nandy, Weitzel, and Lodh (20 I 5) show that politically influenced 
firms substitute real earnings management for accruals earnings management. However, 
this study enriched existing literature by using three aspects of politically influenced 
firms. Congruent with previous studies, it is also found (Hypothesis 7) that politically 
influenced firms' substitute real earnings management strategy for accruals earnings 
management. 
The independent variables (i.e. three aspects of political influences) were selected based 
on prior literature. Three attributes of earnings quality were employed and modified. 
These attributes were the accruals quality (accruals earnings management) model of 
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Dechow and Dichev (2002) as modified by McNichols (2002), the real earnings 
management model of Roychowdhury (2006), the earnings aggressiveness model of 
Bhattacharya, Daouk, and Welker (2003). Seven control variables were used for all 
three earnings quality attributes. Data (i.e. Financial Position, Income Statement, Cash 
Flow, and Financial Ratios) of non-financial listed finns in Pakistan Stock Exchange 
(PSE) were collected from State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) and PSE websites. The sample 
comprised 645 observations for the five-year (panel data) period from 2009 to 2013. 
Stata statistical software was used to analyze the panel data. Panel Corrected Standard 
Error (PCSE) technique was employed to analyze the data. In presence of 
Heteroskedasticity, and when panel includes large number of observations, then PCSE 
technique is more appropriate compared to generalized least square (GLS) (Gujarati, 
2009). Therefore, PCSE technique was used for our analysis; seven hypotheses from all 
three attributes of earnings quality were tested and analyzed. 
5.2 Overview of Results 
Table 5.1 to 5.5 below presents and summarizes the results of this study. As shown in 
the tables, four hypotheses are supported, two are not supported and one is contradicted 
and not supported. 
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Table 5.1 
Summary of Hypotheses Testing for Political Influences and Accruals Earnings 
Management 
Hypothesis Results 
HI: Politically influenced firms have lower accruals quality compared Supported 
to non-politically influenced firm. 
Hla: Political influences (in presence of politician(s) in BOD) have Supported 
lower accruals quality compared to non-politically influenced firms. 
Hlb: Political influences (through significant government ownership) Supported 
have lower accruals quality compared to non-politically influenced 
firms. 
Hlc: Political influences (in presence of civil/military bureaucrat(s) on Supported 
BOD) have lower accruals quality compared to non-politically 
influenced finns. 
Table 5.2 
Summa,y of Hypotheses Testing for Political Influences and Real Earnings 
Management 
Hypothesis Results 
H2: Politically influenced firms are more involved in real earnings Supported 
management compared to non-politically influenced firms. 
H2a: Political influences (in presence of politician(s) on BOD) are more Suppo1ied 
involved in real earnings management compared to non-politically 
influenced finns. 
H2b: Political influences (through significant government ownership) Supported 
are more involved in real earnings management compared to non-
politically influenced firms. 
H2c: Political influences (in presence of civil/military bureaucrats) are Supported 
more involved in real earnings management compared to non-
politically influenced firms. 
Table 5.3 
Summary a/Hypotheses Testing for Political Influences and Earnings Aggressiveness 
Hypothesis Results 
H3: Politically influenced firms are positively related to earnings Supported 
opacity (earnings aggressiveness) compared to non-politically 
influenced firms. 
H3a: Political influences (in presence of politician(s) in BOD) are Supported 
positively related to earnings opacity (earnings aggressiveness) 





Table 5.3 (Continued) 
Hypothesis 
Political influences (through significant government ownership) 
are positively related to earnings opacity ( earnings 
aggressiveness) compared to non-politically influenced firms. 
Political influences (in presence of civil/military bureaucrats) are 
positively related to earnings opacity (earnings aggressiveness) 




Summary of Hypotheses Testing for Ruling/Opposition Party Political Connections and 






Political connections (ruling political party firms) have 
lower accruals quality compared to political connections 
from opposition political party firms. 
Political connections (ruling political party firms) are more 
involved in real earnings management compared to political 
connections from opposition political party firms. 
Political connections (ruling political party firms) are 
positively related to earnings opacity (earnings 
aggressiveness) compared to political connections from 










Summary of Hypothesis Testing for Politically Influenced firms and Substitution for 
Earnings Management Strategies 
H7: 
Hypothesis 
Politically influenced finns substitute real earnings 
management for accruals earnings management compared to 





This thesis is built upon the agency theory to investigate the relationship between 
political influences and earnings quality. Political influences are significantly and 
negatively related to earnings quality. It is observed that the presence of politically 
influenced managers or board members creates agency cost, which in tum provides 
incentives to managers to report manipulated earnings in order to achieve their political 
gains. Agency theory elucidates the basis of conflicts and ways to curtail the conflicts 
that can arise between shareholders and managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Agency 
theory also explains that the conflict between managers and shareholders occur when 
they have contrary interest. Managers are perceived to take decisions that capitalize on 
their self-interest and do not satisfy the interests of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976 ). This conflict causes cost to the shareholders which are known as agency cost 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). 
In respect of the research questions and objectives pertaining to the relationship 
between political influences and earnings quality, the current study finds out that 
political influences are significantly and positively related . to accruals eammgs 
management, real earnings management, and earnings aggressiveness, which implies 
lower earnings quality. Particularly, politically influenced firms (in presence of 
politician(s) on BOD, firm significantly owned by government, and in presence of 
civil/military bureaucrat(s) on BOD of firm) are positively and significantly related to 
both accruals and real earnings management. Moreover, politically influenced firms (in 
presence of politician(s) and bureaucrat(s) on BOD of firm) are positively and 
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significantly related to earnings aggressiveness. But politically influenced firms 
(through government ownerships) are not significantly related to earnings 
aggressiveness. However, Table 4.19 shows that politically influenced firms 
(significantly owned by government) are significantly and positively related to earnings 
aggressiveness, when we repeated our analysis using multiple aspects of political 
influences individually. Therefore, politically influenced firms have lower earnings 
quality. 
With regard to the research question and research objective related to the political 
connections (through ruling/opposition party) and earnings quality, Table 4.8 and 4. I 3 
show that the politically connected firms (through ruling party) are not significantly 
related to accruals earnings management and earnings aggressiveness compared to 
opposition party politically connected finns. Therefore, there is no difference in effect 
between ruling and opposition party political connections on earnings quality (when 
earnings quality is measured by accruals earnings management and earnings 
aggressiveness attributes of eammgs quality). However, ruling party's political 
connections are significantly and negatively related to real earnings management, which 
is contradicted to our predicted hypothesis. It implies that opposition party politically 
connected firms are more engaged in real earnings management activities compared to 
ruling party politically connected firms. Thus, it is argued that ruling party politically 
connected firms have better earnings quality as compared to opposition party politically 
connected firms (when earnings quality is measured by real earnings management 
attribute of earnings quality). 
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In respect of the research question and research objective pertaining to examine whether 
politically influenced firms ' substitute one earnings management strategy for the other, 
Table 4.11 shows that politically influenced firms substitute real earnings management 
for accruals earnings management. 
The results of current study are grounded by the agency theory which was discussed in 
chapter 2. In current study, the agency theory is extended by using three aspects of 
political influences i.e. I) the presence of politician(s) or their closed relative(s) in a 
finn; 2) the presence of civil/military bureaucrat(s) in a firm; 3) a firm is significantly 
owned by the government. According to the agency theory, the politically influenced 
manager(s) have interests contrary to those of shareholders'; in other words, managers' 
interests do not match with the interests of the shareholders. The managers (politically 
influenced) are found making decisions that protect and maximize their own interests 
and do not protect the interests of the shareholders. Therefore, politically influenced 
managers manipulate earnings to satisfy their own interests. 
Hillman (2005) opines that firms build relationship with the government to get benefits, 
and the best way to build the relationship is to appoint a politician on the board of 
directors. This relationship is assumed to be able to decrease the effects of government 
policies, enforcements and regulations. Such relationships could improve firms' 
performance through protecting them from external threats and fluctuations (Hillman, 
2005). Further, political influences also occur in a firm when a firm is significantly 
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owned by politician(s) or their close relative(s) (Cheema, Munir, and Su, 2016; Faccio, 
2006). Politically influenced firms through any aspects enjoy benefits in fonn of low 
taxes, high debts and low interest rates (Saeed, Belghitar, and Clark, 2015; Faccio, 
Masulis, and McConnel, 2006; Fisman, 2001). 
However, the association of politicians with a firm can create agency problem involving 
self-centered behavior by both politicians and managers (Wong, 2004). Some 
researchers opine that people engaged in the political process are self-centered actors 
who want to maximize their own interests which may curtail the interests of the 
majority shareholders ( e.g., Buchanan and Tullock, 1968). For instance, politicians may 
create a connection between government agencies and managers, which may give firms 
a preferential access to loans and in return fim1s may give political donations (Hillman 
and Pitt, 1999). 
Further, negotiation between managers and politicians could take place in order to 
maximize their own interest (Sheleifer and Vishny, 1994). The authors argue that when 
a firm is controlled by managers, politicians engaged in the firms use subsidies as bribes 
to influence managerial decisions in order to pursue their pohtical objectives. Thus, the 
involvement of politicians in a fum can affect managerial decisions, and consequently 
may affect the outcomes of the firms' economic objectives. The current study looks at 
the earnings quality as the outcomes. 
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In firms where the government owned significant shareholdings, conflicts may also 
occur more between principal and agent (Shliefer and Vishny, 1994). In such firms, the 
principal-agent relationship is broken down into two other agency relationships as the 
government act simultaneously as principal and agent. In relation to the managers of 
government-owned firms, the government is a principal and thus it must assign goals 
(Rodriguez, Espejo, and Cabrera, 2007). The government is also the agent in its 
relationship with the public, the ultimate owner of the resources invested in by the 
government-owned firms (Ernst, 2004). The government not only considers the public 
interest as voters in decision making process, but also the agendas of the opposition 
parties that compete for votes. Therefore, the government wants to control managerial 
decisions so that the decisions are congruent with its political interests. The govenunent 
may use its political influences to interfere with firms' operational decisions (Chen, 
2004). For instance, the government may put pressure on managers to provide benefits 
to its supporters or stabilize employment and induce them to drift beyond profit-
maximizing goals (Roe, 2003). 
In addition, prior studies exemplify that the politically influenced firms can create 
double agency problems involving self-interested behavior by both politically 
influenced people and managers (Wong, 2004). Overall, the interference from the 
politically influenced people and government in firms may compromise the managerial 
autonomy, which reduce managers monitoring ability (Chen, 2004), and as a result the 
managers may pursue self-interest at the cost of firms' interests (Andrews and Dowling, 
1998). Therefore, the managers or board members of politically influenced firms are 
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likely to get involved in manipulating activities, which in turn leads to poor earnings 
quality. 
5.3.1 Political Influences and Earnings Quality 
This study predicted a negative relationship between political influences and earnings 
quality. The results show significant and positive relationship between political 
influences and accruals earnings management. The study also documents that firms with 
politically influenced board members are more involved in real earnings management, 
and report aggressive earnings. Therefore, hypotheses H I to H3 are supported. The 
significant findings suggest that politically influenced firms are involved in 
manipulating earnings through accruals and real manipulating activities. The findings of 
current study are consistent with the findings of prior studies that conclude that 
politically influenced firms are more involved in accruals earnings management (Sadiq 
and Othman, 2017; Chi, Liao, and Chen, 2016; Harymawan and Nowland, 2016; Al-
dhamari and Ismail, 2015; Liu, Saidi, and Bazaz, 2014; Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley, 
201 I), real earnings management (Chi, Liao, and Chen, 2016; Braam, Nandy, Weitzel, 
and Lodh, 2015), and earnings aggressiveness (Sadiq and Othman, 2017; Liu, Saidi, and 
Bazaz, 2014; Riahi-Belkaoui, 2004). The positive relationship between political 
influences and earnings quality attributes indicate that the earnings quality decreases 
with the presence of politically influenced people in firms, which is consistent with 
agency theory's contention of the role of political influences in reducing the quality of 
eammgs. 
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The findings for hypothesis 1 are consistent with the findings of previous studies that 
show the positive relationship between political influences and accruals earnings 
management (e.g., Harymawan and Nowland, 2016; Al-dhamari and Ismail, 2015; 
Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley, 2011 ). In addition, Chi, Liao, and Chen (2016) document 
that politically connected CEOs are positively related to lower level of accruals earnings 
manipulation. Furthermore, Chen, Ding, and Kim (2011) argue that political influences 
insert a new dimension to the earning generating process of firms, which makes it more 
complex. This complexity might increase accruals estimation errors. Other researchers 
opine that the accruals estimation errors is also influenced by managerial intention; and 
managerial intention is influenced by political factors (Bushman and Piotroski, 2006). 
Consequently, it results in lower accruals quality. Thus, the results of this current study 
taken together with evidence from prior studies confirm that politically influenced firms 
are more involved in accruals earnings management, and this implies lower accmals and 
earnings quality. 
Our findings for hypothesis 2 is consistent with the fmdings of previous studies that 
show the positive relationship between political influences and real earnings 
management (Chi, Liao, and Chen, 2016; Braam, Nandy, Weitzel, and Lodh, 2015), 
because politically influenced firms want to obscure the gains that they typically derive 
from their connections (Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley, 2011). Recently, some researchers 
document that finns with politically connected CEOs are more inclined to manipulate 
earnings through real earnings management ( e.g., Chi, Liao, and Chen, 2016). Other 
scholars opine that after the implementation of SOX, firms get more involved in real 
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earnings management (e.g., Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Cohen, Dey, and Lys, 2008), 
because real earnings management is less detectable and does not come under any 
auditors ' and regulators ' j urisdictions (Braam, Nandy, Weitzel, and Lodh, 2015). In a 
recent study, some researchers empirically find out that politically Influenced firms 
substitute real earnings management for accruals earnings management (Braam, Nandy, 
Weitzel, and Lodh, 2015). Therefore, the results of this current study taken together 
with evidence from previous studies confinn that politically influenced firms are more 
involved in real earnings management, implies lower earnings quality. 
The findings of the hypothesis 3 are consistent with the findings of previous studies that 
show the positive relationship between politically influenced fums and earnings 
aggressiveness (e.g., Ben-Nasr, Boubakri and Cosset, 2015; Liu, Saidi, and Bazaz, 
2014; Riahi-Balkaoui, 2004). Ben-Nasr, Boubakri and Cosset, 2015 find out that firms 
with significant government ownership are positively related to high accruals. The 
authors suggest that the state owned firms have lower incentives to report high earnings 
quality. Moreover, the finns lack transparency when they have politically connected 
board of directors (Riahi-Balkaoui, 2004) and significantly owned by the government 
(Ben-Nasr, Boubakri and Cosset, 2015; Liu, Saidi, and Bazaz, 20 14). Such finns that 
report earnings also lack transparency when they delay reporting losses and exhibit high 
accruals (Bhattacharya, Daouk, and Welker, 2003). Therefore, the results of this current 
study taken together with evidence from previous studies confirm that politically 
influenced firms are positively and significantly related to earnings aggressiveness 
relative to non-politically influenced firms. 
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The current study findings for Hypotheses 4 and 6 show insignificant relationship 
between political connections (through ruling and opposition party political connected 
finns) and earnings quality (when earnings quality is measured by only accruals 
attributes of earnings quality). These findings are not consistent with the findings of 
Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley (2011), which shows that ruling party's politically 
connected firms have poor earnings quality, because politicians remain influential even 
when they are not directly in power (Boubakri, Cosset, and Saffar, 2008). Our findings 
are also not in line with the findings of Saeed, Belghitar, and Clark (2015); Khwaja and 
Mian (2005), which show that amongst the politically influenced finns, those that have 
stronger (ruling party) political connections get more preferential treatment compared to 
connections with opposition party. The reason of inconsistent result is that current study 
includes both direct/indirect political connected fi.nns in sample of ruling/opposition 
party political connected firms. Therefore, current study repeated the analysis using 
different sample to check the difference in effect between direct and indirect political 
connected firms on accruals earnings management and earnings aggressiveness. Table 
4.20 and 4.22 show that politically connected firms (through direct connections) are 
more involved in accruals earnings management and earnings aggressiveness compared 
to politically connected finns through close relatives (indirect connections). Thus, there 
is no difference in effect between ruling party political connections and opposition party 
political connections on earnings quality when earnings quality is only measured by 
accruals attributes of earnings quality. However, political connection through direct 
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connections report poor earnings quality when earnings quality is measured by accruals 
attributes. 
In addition, the findings for hypothesis 5 is contradictory to the findings of previous 
studies, which show that ruling party's politically connected firms' exhibit lower 
earnings quality compared to opposition party political connections (Chaney, Faccio, 
and Parsley, 2011). 'This study finds out that politically connected (through opposition 
party) finns are more involved in real earnings management, which implies that 
earnings quality is better among firms with stronger (ruling party) political connections 
compared to opposition party. The reason of contradictory findings is that Chaney, 
Faccio, and Parsley (2011) suggested the adoption of accruals earnings management 
(accruals quality) measure, whereas the current study adopted real earnings 
management measure for this hypothesis. Another reason of contradictory result is that 
current study includes both direct/indirect political connected fmus in sample of ruling 
and opposition party political connected firms, which gives the inconsistent and 
contradictory results in our main results. Thus, current study repeated the analysis using 
different sample to check the difference in effect between direct and indirect political 
connected firms on real earnings management. Table 4.20 shows that politically 
connected firms (through direct connections) are more involved in real earnings 
management compared to politically connected firms through close relatives (indirect 
connections), which support the view that the contradictory results is due to including 
both direct/indirect political connected fums in sample of ruling and opposition party 
political connected firms . 
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Therefore, the results from our repeated analyses for hypotheses 4 and 6 are consistent 
with the findings of Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley (2011 ), who suggest that stronger 
political connections or political connections through direct connections (presence of 
politicians) are more involved in accruals earnings management and reporting 
aggressive earnings. In addition, the results from our repeated analysis for hypothesis 5 
suggest that weaker political connections or political connections through indirect 
connections (presence of closed relatives of politicians) are more involved in real 
earnings management. 
Hypothesis seven predicts that politically influenced firms substitute real earnings 
management for accruals earnings management compared to non-politically influenced 
finns . The finding is in tandem with those of Braam, Nandy, Weitzel, and Lodh (2015); 
Zang (2011); Cohen and Zarowin (2010); Cohen, Dey, and Lys (2008), who state that 
firms substitute real earnings management for accruals earnings management to reduce 
risk of detection. In addition, using multiple-countries data the study of Braam, Nandy, 
Weitzel, and Lodh (2015) find out that politically influenced firms are likely to 
substitute real earnings management for accrual-based earnings management when the 
risk of detection increases. Other scholars opine that politically connected CEOs are 
more involved in higher level of real earnings management compared to lower level of 
accruals earnings management (e.g., Chi, Liao, and Chen, 2016). 
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The current study findings for Hypotheses seven are congruent with the findings of 
previous studies that show the negative relationship between the interaction effect of 
political influences and accruals earnings management (i.e. PIAEM) on real earnings 
management (Braam, Nandy, Weitzel, and Lodh, 2015). Therefore, the results of this 
current study taken together with evidence from previous studies confirm that politically 





6.1 Contributions of the Study 
6.1.1 Theoretical Contributions 
The findings of the previous studies together with the current study indicate that agency 
theory explains the relationship between political influences and earnings quality. The 
findings of the current study are consistent with the findings of prior studies, which 
document that politically influenced firms are involved in accruals earnings 
management (Chi, Liao, and Chen, 2016; Al-dhamari and Ismail, 2015; Liu, Saidi, and 
Bazaz, 2014; Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley, 201 I), real earnings management (Chi, Liao, 
and Chen, 2016; Braam, Nandy, Weitzel, and Lodh, 2015), and earnings aggressiveness 
(Liu, Li, Zeng, and An, 2016; Riahi-Balkaoui, 2004), implies lower earnings quality. 
Further, the findings of the current study document that there is no difference in effect 
between ruling/opposition party political connections and earnings quality (when 
earnings quality is measured only by accruals attributes of earnings quality). 
However, politically connected firms through opposition party are more involved in real 
earnings management, which implies that they are reporting poorer quality of earnings 
compared to political connections through ruling party. Notably, these findings are one 
of the main contributions of the current study to the body of literature of political 
influences and earnings quality. While previously, some authors have suggested that 
politically connected firms through ruling party are more involved in earnings 
management (Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley, 2011 ). The current study findings are 
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contrary to the findings of Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley (2011 ), because they only 
employed accruals attributes of earnings quality, whereas the current study has 
employed both accruals and real earnings management attributes of earnings quality. 
Hence, current study suggests that the types of political influences and earnings quality 
need to be specified clearly and precisely. 
The current study was motivated to investigate the relationship between political 
influences and earnings quality, because Pakistan is famous for its close and doubtful 
relationship between firms and politicians (Khwaja and Mian, 2005). Over the last 25 
years, three elected governments were dissolved on corruption allegations and political 
abuse of power. Because of the weak government institutions, the Pakistani business 
environment looks particularly weak to political connections (Cheema, Munir, and Su, 
20 I 6). Pakistan has many politically influenced listed firms; however, there are no 
restrictions to such political connections (Saeed, Belghitar, and Clark, 2015). Such 
features of the Pakistani economy gave an attractive platform to examine the effect of 
political influences on firms' earnings quality. Recently, some scholars also opine that 
political influences and earnings quality need to be investigated in a more detail ( e.g., 
Chi, Liao, and Chen, 2016; Al-dhamari and Ismail, 2015; Zeng, Li, and Hong, 2012). 
To the best of the researcher's knowledge, limited studies have used multiple aspects 
and attributes of political influences and earnings quality respectively, no extant 
literature bas examined the relationship between political influence and earnings quality 
using three aspects of political influences (as measured by significant government 
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shareholdings; presence of politician(s) or close relative(s) of a politician(s) in a firm; 
and presence of current/retired military/civil bureaucrat(s) in a firm) and three attributes 
of earnings quality (as measured by accruals earnings management, real earnings 
management, and earnings aggressiveness). The current study has found significant and 
negative relationship between political influences and earnings quality. In addition, 
most of the previous studies have used multiple countries' data, while current study has 
used Pakistani data, which overcomes some criticisms of multiple-countries studies. 
Moreover, to provide more detailed investigations between political influences and 
earnings quality, the researcher has given more insight into the ·effects of 
ruling/opposition party's political connections on earnings quality attributes. The 
present study also contributes by testing the difference in effect between direct and 
indirect political connections on earnings quality. Therefore, an important contribution 
of this study to the existing literature of political influences and earnings quality is that 
it offers more detailed empirical insights using data from a less-studied and less-
regulated environment i.e. South Asia (specifically Pakistan). 
Furthermore, while previous studies ( e.g., Chi, Liao, and Chen, 20 I 6; Braam, Nandy, 
Weitzel, and Lodh, 2015) on political influences and earnings quality have investigated 
the relationship between political influences and earnings management strategies (i.e. 
accruals and real earnings management) using single aspect of political influences. 
However, the present study investigated the relationship between political influences 
(using three aspects) and both strategies of earnings management. The study further 
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contributes by investigating whether politica11y influenced firms substitute between 
earnings management strategies to avoid detections, which to the best of this 
researcher's knowledge previous studies had only investigated using single aspect of 
political influences. 
Similarly the study contributes theoretically to political influences and earnings quality 
by investigating how politically connected people influence finns to report poor quality 
of earnings. The findings of the current study also suggest that it does not matter if 
firms are directly or indirectly connected to the ruling party or the opposition party, all 
connected finns on any mentioned criteria have reported lower quality of earnings. 
Thus, the findings of the current study give insights that the political influences through 
any means would provide incentives to the managers and weaken the earnings quality. 
6.1.2 Practical Contributions 
The findings of the current study offer recommendations especially to the financial and 
economics regulatory bodies i.e. Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan 
(SECP) and State Bank of Pakistan (SBP), policymakers and other regulatory 
authorities such as Federal Board of Revenue (FBR), National AccoW1tability Bureau 
(NAB), and Federal Investigation Agency (FIA). From a policy perspective, the study 
empirically reveals that politically influenced firms are manipulating earnings through 
accruals and real earnings management activities and reporting lower earnings quality. 
The presence of politically influenced people in a firm provides incentives and 
207 
influence managers decision, which compromise the objectives of the board and 
management and leads to an undesirable reporting of lower quality of earnings. 
Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) plays an important role to 
stop or minimize the reporting of lower earnings quality. First, as a regulatory authority, 
SECP should direct firms to disclose their politically connected directors and enforce 
other non-politically influenced directors to not compromise on their responsibilities. 
Second, current study's' findings can awaken BIG4 auditors, though they are negatively 
related to accruals earnings manipulations, but positively related to real earnings 
manipulations. It means BIG4 auditors often fail to stop or minimize real manipulating 
activities. Therefore, SECP can direct auditors to detect real earnings manipulation 
activities of finns, which could prevent politically influenced firms from real earnings 
management and substitution of earnings management strategies. 
Furthermore, future regulatory efforts should consider examining earnings manipulating 
activities of politically influenced firms to make politically influenced finns more 
accountable. For example, SECP should take serious disciplinary measures to improve 
governance activities such as increasing the number of independent directors on board 
and audit committee, enhancing the independence of other non-politically influenced 
board members. SECP could also ask firms to disclose the presence of current/former 
politician(s) and bureaucrat(s) on board of directors and it should not be increased to 
majority board members. 
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Moreover, the findings of the current study suggest that the other non-politically 
influenced board members have failed to perform their duties in politically influenced 
finns. Therefore, it is essential for SECP to provide training programs, and ensure that 
the training programs are attended by independent or non-politically influenced board 
members to successfully perform their duties. The results of this study suggest that only 
enforcing good governance activities is not enough to enhance the earnings quality. 
Therefore, regulators should also offer enlightenment programs on shareholder 
activism. 
Politically influenced firms manipulate earnings to hide their political gains. As 
discussed earlier in Chapter 2, presence of politically influenced people on board creates 
agency problem or costs, which will result in lower quality of earnings. Hence, to 
reduce these costs, strong regulatory bodies and enlightened shareholders are needed. 
The results of current study enable shareholders and other potential investors to evaluate 
the negative effects of politically influenced directors on reporting earnings quality. 
This will help shareholders or investors to protect their interests and put pressure on 
directors to report un-manipulated earnings. Furthermore, other stakeholders can use the 
findings of the current study to identify which factors should be taken into consideration 
when evaluating a firms' earnings quality. The results of the current study suggest that 
political influences create the agency problem and, accordingly, diminish the earnings 
quality (by engaging in accruals and real earnings management, and reporting less 
transparent earnings (earnings aggressiveness), and substituting real earnings 
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management for accruals earnings management). Therefore, corporate political 
influences and connections should be taken into consideration in the valuation process. 
The findings of the current study further add in setting up the foundation that agency 
theory explains the relationship between political influences and earnings quality in 
Pakistan and worldwide. The findings in this study also document that there is no 
difference in effect of ruling/opposition party political connection on earnings quality 
(when earnings quality is measured by accruals measures only), however, politically 
connected finns through opposition parties are more involved in real earnings 
management. Therefore, this study provides evidence to the academic research that 
firms connected with opposition parties have poorer earnings quality compared to the 
finns connected with the ruling party. Instead of focusing solely on the impact of 
politically influenced firms on earnings quality (using three attributes), this study gives 
evidence that ruling/opposition party also significantly strengthens this relationship. 
Moreover, the current study also focuses on the impact of direct/indirect political 
connections on earnings quality (using three attributes). Thus, the agency cost in 
political influences and earnings quality literature should extend to other developing and 
under-developing economies in future. 
6.2 Limitations of the Study 
Like any other research, the results of the current study have shown potential 
limitations, which readers must be aware of while interpreting the findings. The 
limitations of the current study are discussed below: 
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l. First, the current study provides a detailed investigation on the relationship 
between political influences and earnings quality, though, this study employs 
three earnings quality attributes, but does not consider other earnings quality 
attributes such as earnings conservatism, value relevance, earnings persistence 
etc. 
2. Secondly, there are a few such internal and external factors that may influence 
the quality of reporting earnings but are not included in the current study such as 
internal control system, corporate governance, audit committee characteristics, 
internal audit, firm specific characteristics, corporate social responsibility, tax 
and non-tax regulations, and capital requirements etc. However, the purpose of 
this study is to investigate the relationship between political influences and 
earnings quality in more detail, and therefore, the impact of this limitation on the 
results cannot be a major concern. 
3. The choice of earnings quality attributes and their proxies limits the strength of 
the evidence provided in the current study. So far, there is no consensus on the 
definition of earnings quality and measurement of various earnings quality 
attributes, and thus the chosen earnings quality attributes and their proxies have 
the potential to exhibit measurement errors. However, to reduce the effects of 
this limitation, current study adopts various alternative measures of earnings 
quality (earnings management), and the results largely remain unchanged. 
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4. The results of the current study may not be applicable to other developed 
economies with strong regulatory bodies and institutes, with higher investor 
protection and lower corruption. The conflict of interest law in developed 
economies is strongly implemented compared to developing economies. 
Therefore, politically influenced firms in developed economies might not be 
able to get political gains and manipulate earnings to hide these gains. 
5. Because of the lack of prior studies concerning the effect of political influences 
(using three aspects simultaneously) on earnings quality attributes (particularly 
real earnings management), the current study has tried to compare the results of 
this study with those of accruals attributes of earnings quality. This may not be 
appropriate as both accruals and real earnings manipulating are two different 
attributes of earnings quality. 
6. Finally, current study has generated its own list of politically influenced firms, 
where the selection of politically influenced firms was based on predetermined 
criteria mentioned in chapter three. Thus, current study might miss some 
politically influenced firms, because not all politicians in Pakistan disclose their 
wealth, and they probably plan their investments through their front man. 
However, current study does not have the evidence to declare such finns as 
politically influenced firms, and hence they have been excluded from the sample 
of this study. 
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6.3 Future Research 
The limitations discussed m prev10us section could be an opportunity for future 
research. 
1. Another avenue of future research could be to examine the interaction effect of 
political influences and corporate governance on earnings quality attributes. It 
would be of interest for future researchers to investigate whether good 
governance practices can reduce the negative effects of political influences on 
earnings quality. 
2. In order to make a more detailed investigation, future research can examine the 
effects of political influences on earnings quality using other attributes (i.e. 
earnings persistence, earnings informativeness, and value relevance etc.). In 
addition, future study can also add another dimension to politically influenced 
firms, by investigating whether there is difference in effect between 
winning/losing party political connections on earnings quality, despite 
connections to ruling or opposition party. 
3. Another opportunity for future research could be to investigate whether 
politically influenced firms manipulate earnings to report under/over-
performance. It 1s interesting to examine the interaction effects of political 
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influences and earnings management strategies (i.e. accruals eammgs 
management and real earnings management) on organizational performance. 
4. Future research can also replicate the current research while using the data from 
other developing economies ( e.g. Bangladesh, India, Srilanka, Jndonesia, and 
China etc.). It is worthy to investigate for future research whether politically 
influenced finns in these countries report lower earnings quality. 
5. Finally, current study has used quantitative research approach (using secondary 
data) in this study. Future research can also use primary data and qualitative 
research approaches to explore and investigate the relationship between political 
influences and earnings quality in more detail. These approaches could identify 
how politically influenced board members influence other board members and 
what exactly motivates them to manipulate earnings and report lower earnings 
quality. 
6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter provides a detailed summary of all the chapters in this research, starting 
with the introductory chapter one, and the chapters on research methodology, literature 
review and findings of the study. Consistent with prior studies, current study provides 
evidence that politically influenced firms in Pakistan are significantly and positively 
related to accruals earnings management, real earnings management, and earnings 
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aggressiveness. This implies that politically influenced firms in Pakistan are reporting 
lower quality of earnings compared to non-politically influenced fums. 
In addition, this study indicates that politically connected firms (through opposition 
party) in Pakistan are more involved in real earnings management compared to ruling 
party politically connected fmns, implying lower earnings quality. Furthermore, 
politically influenced firms in Pakistan substitute real earnings management for accruals 
earnings management strategy. 
Overall, four out of the seven hypotheses were found to be supported. These findings 
serve as alarm to the regulatory bodies and enforcing firms to adopt good governance 
practices and report higher earnings quality. The findings also highlight the need of 
implementing conflict of interest law, strong institutions which can prevent politically 
influenced firms from manipulating earnings, provide awareness to shareholders, and 
other stakeholders. The findings also provide awareness to the potential investors in 
Pakistan that political influences is one of the main factor, which need to consider 
before making any investment. 
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APPENDIX A: List of firms used in the current study 
S.No Firms Status 
1 Asim Textile Mills Ltd. PI 
2 Chenab Ltd. PI 
3 Dewan Farooque Spinning Mills Ltd. PI 
4 Dewan Khalid Textile Mills Ltd. PI 
5 Dewan Mushtaq Textile Mills Ltd. PI 
6 Dewan Textile Mills Ltd. PI 
7 Kohat Textile Mills Ltd . PI 
8 Mahmood Textile Mills Ltd. PI 
9 Masood Textile Mills Ltd. PI 
10 Nishat (Chunian) Ltd. PI 
11 Nishat Mills Ltd. PI 
12 Saif Textile Mills Ltd. PI 
13 Service Industries Textiles Ltd. Pl 
14 Bannu Woollen Mills Ltd. PI 
15 Al-Noor Sugar Mills Ltd. PI 
16 Dewan Sugar Mills Ltd. PI 
17 Haseeb Waqas Sugar Mills Ltd. PI 
18 JDW Sugar Mills Ltd. PI 
19 Khairpur Sugar Mills Ltd. PI 
20 Mirza Sugar Mills Ltd. PI 
21 Noon Sugar Mills Ltd. PI 
22 Sanghar Sugar Mills Ltd. PI 
23 Shakarganj Mills Ltd. PI 
24 Tandlianwala Sugar Mills Ltd. PI 
25 Noon Pakistan Ltd. PI 
26 Berger Paints Pakistan Ltd. PI 
27 Biafo Industries Ltd . PI 
28 Fauji Fertilizer Bin Qasim Ltd. PI 
29 Fauji Fertilizer Co. Ltd. PI 
30 Sanofi-aventis Pakistan Ltd. PI 
31 Khyber Tobacco Co. Ltd. PI 
32 Pakistan Engineering Co. Ltd. PI 
33 Pakistan Tobacco Co. Ltd. PI 
34 Service Industries Ltd. PI 
35 Treet Corporation Ltd. PI 
36 Tri-Pack Films Ltd. PI 
37 Attock Cement Pakistan Ltd. PI 
38 D.G. Khan Cement Co. Ltd. PI 
39 Dewan Cement Ltd. PI 
243 
S.No. Firms Status 
40 Fauji Cement Co. Ltd. Pl 
41 Maple Leaf Cement Factory Ltd. PI 
42 Thatta Cement Ltd. PI 
43 Dewan Farooque Motors Ltd. PI 
44 Ghandhara Industries Ltd. PI 
45 Ghandhara Nissan Ltd . PI 
46 The General Tyre and Rubber Co. of Pak Ltd. PI 
47 K-Electric (formerly KESC) PI 
48 Sitara Energy Ltd. PI 
49 Southern Electric Power Co. Ltd PI 
50 Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Ltd. PI 
51 Kot Addu Power Co. Ltd. PI 
52 Mari Petroleum Co. Ltd. PI 
53 Oil and Gas Development Co. Ltd. PI 
54 Sui Southern Gas Co. Ltd. PI 
55 Pakistan National Shipping Corporation. PI 
56 Pakistan Telecommunication Co. Ltd. PI 
57 Worldcall Telecom Ltd. PI 
58 Attack Petroleum Ltd. PI 
59 Attack Refinery Ltd. PI 
60 National Refinery Ltd. NPI 
61 Pakistan Oilfields Ltd. PI 
62 Pakistan Petroleum Ltd. Pl 
63 Pakistan Refinery Ltd. NPI 
64 Pakistan State Oil Co. Ltd. Pl 
65 Packages Ltd . PI 
66 Siemens (Pakistan) Engineering Co. Ltd. NPI 
67 Pace (Pakistan) Ltd. PI 
68 Ahmed Hassan Textile Mills Ltd. NPI 
69 Al-Qadir Textile Mills Ltd. NPI 
70 Ali Asghar Textile Mills Ltd. NPI 
71 Allawasaya Textile and Finishing Mills Ltd. NPI 
72 Apollo Textile Mills Ltd. NPI 
73 Artistic Denim Mills Ltd. NPI 
74 Bhanero Textile Mills Ltd. NPI 
75 Kohinoor Mills Ltd. NPI 
76 Kohinoor Spinning Mills Ltd. NPI 
77 Kohinoor Textile Mills Ltd. NPI 
78 N.P. Spinning Mills Ltd. NPI 
79 Premium Textile Mills Ltd. NPI 
80 Quetta Textile Mills Ltd. NPI 
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S.No. Firms Status 
81 Sapphire Textile Mills Ltd. NPI 
82 Abdullah Shah Ghazi Sugar Mills Ltd.(Al-Asif Sugar Mills NPI 
Ltd 
83 Adam Sugar Mills Ltd. NPI 
84 Al-Abbas Sugar Mills Ltd. NPI 
85 Habib - ADM Ltd.( Habib Arkady LTD.) NPI 
86 Habib Sugar Mills Ltd. NPI 
87 Mehran Sugar Mills Ltd. NPI 
88 Mirpurkhas Sugar Mills Ltd. NPI 
89 Shahrnurad Sugar Mills Ltd. NPI 
90 The Thal Industries Corporation Ltd. NPI 
91 Ismail Industries Ltd. NPI 
92 Murree Brewery Co. Ltd. NPI 
93 National Foods Ltd. NPI 
94 Nestle Pakistan Ltd . NPI 
95 Rafhan Maize Products Co. Ltd. NPI 
96 Shezan International Ltd. NPI 
97 Abbott Laboratories (Pakistan) Ltd. NPI 
98 Colgate-Palmolive (Pakistan) Ltd. NPI 
99 Glaxosmithkline (Pakistan) Ltd. NPI 
100 Highnoon Laboratories Ltd. NPI 
101 ICI Pakistan Ltd. NPI 
102 Searle Pakistan Ltd. NPI 
103 Eco Pack Ltd. NPI 
104 International Industries Ltd. NPI 
105 Philip Morris (Pakistan) Ltd. NPI 
106 Thal Ltd. NPI 
107 Karam Ceramics Ltd. NPI 
108 Flying Cement Co. Ltd. NPI 
109 Lafarge Pak. Cement Ltd. NPI 
110 Lucky Cement Ltd. NPI 
111 Kohat Cement Co. Ltd. NPI 
112 Agriauto Industries Ltd. NPI 
113 Atlas Battery Ltd. NPI 
114 Baluchistan Wheels Ltd. NPI 
115 Sazgar Engineering Works Ltd. NPI 
116 Kohinoor Energy Ltd. NPI 
117 Altern Energy Ltd. NPI 
118 Japan Power Generation Ltd. NPI 
119 The Hub Power Co. Ltd. NPI 
120 Hum Network Ltd . NPI 
121 TRG Pakistan Ltd. NPI 
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S.No. Firms Status 
122 Pakistan Int. Container Tenninal Ltd. NPI 
123 Telecard Ltd. NPI 
124 Byco Petruleum (Bosicor Pakistan Ltd.) NPI 
125 Shell Pakistan Ltd. NPI 
126 Security Papers Ltd. NPI 
127 Pakistan Cables Ltd. NPI 
128 Shifa International Hospitals Ltd. NPI 
129 Zeal Pak Cement Factory Ltd. NPI 
Key: PI - Politically Influenced Firms; NPI - Non-Politically Influenced Firms. 
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